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Abstract 
This thesis studies the behaviour of interest rates in government bonds mar- 
kets, foreign exchange rates and national savings. There are three main chapters in 
the thesis. The first chapter consists of a-comparative study of government securities 
and risk. It generates monthly interest rate risk premium data and examines their 
determinants. The results show that the risk premia are time varying and also vary 
considerably across sample countries. In particular, countries with better financial 
development and higher income generally have lower risk premia of government 
assets. Additionally, the risk premia are significantly affected by macroeconomic 
circumstances, especially economic growth and the real effective exchange rate. 
The second chapter revisits the empirical literature testing the efficiency of 
forward markets for foreign exchange. According to the forward rate unbiasedness 
hypothesis, the forward premium should be an unbiased estimate of the subsequent 
exchange rate change. However, not only is this hypothesis rejected by standard 
regressions of the spot return on the forward premium but there are also puzzling 
negative coefficients from these regressions, which is referred to as the forward 
premium anomaly. This chapter addresses the forward premium anomaly first by 
examining statistical artifacts of the data; and secondly by considering the presence 
of a foreign exchange risk premium. This chapter finds the forward premium series 
to be fractionally integrated, which contributes to the forward premium anomaly. 
Structural breaks in the forward premium series are also found to increase the per- 
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sistency of the series. Lastly, this chapter suggests 6 new methodology in estimating 
the exchange rate risk premium and finds that the foreign exchange risk premium is 
non-trivial. 
The last main chapter models and simulates individuals' savings behaviour. 
The study extends the Diamond (1965) Overlapping Generation Model (OLG) to 
model-more explicitly the differencebetween the accumulation and decumulation 
phases of private pensions. A similar question to that of Diamond is analysed, 
namely the effect of government debt, but changes the logic considerably by noting 
that government debt has different characteristics from private debt (i. e. equity) 
and that the two may be less close substitutes than is usually assumed. Rather than 
crowding out private investment, government bonds provide an important part of 
the funded system. The results show that it is socially optimal to rely entirely upon 
a funded pension system. 
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Tluee major areas of interest for financial economics and macro-economics are interest 
rates, exchange rates and national savings. 
The first main chapter of the thesis is called "Determinants of the time varying risk 
prernia! '. It studies the behaviour of the risk premia of short term government assets (trea- 
sury bills). First, I generate monthly risk premia data using zero coupon government trea- 
sury bills. The risk premia series in this study are proxied by the time series volatility of 
the excess holding yields for short- and long-tenn treasury bills. The risk premia measure 
is based on the ARCH-in-Mean (ARCH-M) model introduced by Engle, Lilien and Robins 
(1987). The estimated risk premia are found to be time varying and also vary considerably 
across countries. Second, this chapter examines the macroeconomic and political determi- 
nants of government asset risk premia by using cross section and dynamic panel regression 
analyses. The results show that the risk premia. are significantly affected by macroeconomic 
circumstances, especially economic growth and the real effective exchange rate. 7111e re- 
sults are robust across the majority of countries in our study. 
The next chapter, entitled "Fractional integration and the forward premium puzzle", 
revisits the empirical literature testing the efficiency of forward markets for foreign ex- 
change. In previous work, forward rate unbiasedness has been rejected. Generally, the lit- 
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erature has found that the future exchange rate change is negatively related to the forward 
premium. This chapter assumes rational expectations and'aftempts to explain the forward 
premium anomaly by firstly the presence of foreign exchange risk premia and secondly by 
examining statistical artifacts of the data. 
The results show that the forward premium series are fractionally integrated while 
the return on the spot exchange rate is stationary. This yields an unbalanced test regression 
of Uncovered Interest Parity, which causes the violation of the hypothesis. However, there 
is also evidence that structural breaks cause spurious long memory in the forward premium 
series for some of the sample currencies analysed in this study. Nonetheless, the finding of 
a fractionally integrated forward premium series is still robust. 
This chapter also pays attention to the relationship of the exchange rate risk premia 
and the test of forward market efficiency. Previous. studies suggested that the time varying 
foreign exchange risk premium is extremely small at the monthly level. However, this 
chapter argues that the time varying foreign exchange risk premium is significant at the 
daily level. This chapter also suggests a new methodology to estimate the foreign exchange 
risk premium by modelling the time series volatility in the conditional varian ce of the 
forward rate forecast error series. The results show that such series appear to have long 
memory in the conditional variance for all of the *sample currencies in this study. 
The last main chapter of this thesis is entitled "Funded and PAYG Pensions when 
Annuities are backed by Bonds". This chapter studies optimal proportion of the private 
funded pensions and the state pay-as-you-go pension. Previous literature (such as Samuel- 
son, 1958 and Aaron, 1966) suggested that funded pensions provides better incentives to 
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save and results in higher capital. On the other hand, the state pension (funded by govern- 
ment debt and income tax) reduces the utility of individuals in the long run since it creates 
a further reduction in the productive capital stock arising from the substitution of govern- 
ment debt for physical capital in individual portfolios. However, the contribution of this 
chapter is motivated by the observation that government debt is both a complement and a 
substitute to physical capital. 
The analysis in this chapter extends the Diamond (1965) Overlapping Generation 
Model (OLG) model to model more explicitly the difference between the accumulation 
and decumulation phases of private pensions. We observe that ownership of physical cap- 
ital is mediated largely through equity, which provides a high risk high return financial 
asset, whereas government debt is mediated through bonds, which can insure against long 
term risk. So although government debt and physical capital. compete for funds (suggest- 
ing they are substitutes), the financial assets which result are quite different (suggesting 
complementary). 
'Me results show that the optimal government policy is to have people funded (via 
annuity market) for retirement consumption rather than public pension transfer. People are 
worse off in the long run after a sudden fall in national debts, while a baby-boom generates 
a small improvement to the welfare in the long run. Lastly, these two shocks do not only 
affect the current generations but also hurts the future generations. 
1.2 Literature Review 
1.2 Literature Review 
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Each separate main chapter contains review material of the principal literature. The purpose 
of this section is to provide an overview of the related literature 
1.2.1 The interest rate risk premia and their determinants: 
There is an abundance of work on the term structure of interest rates but this focuses mainly 
on the validity of the expectations hypothesis. Empirical evidence of time varying risk pre- 
mia in government asset returns is frequently interpreted as evidence against the expec- 
tations hypothesis. However, we need a better understanding of the determinants of the 
term premia. This will in turn give a clearer explanation for the rejection of expectations 
hypothesis. ibis is the purpose of the research in chapter. 
The literature has not yet fully identified the detenninants of riskp'remia in govern- - 
ment assets. There are a few works that attempt to relate the term structure to movements 
in macroeconomic variables such as Wu (2002), Hordahl, Tristani, and Vestin (2006), and 
Rudebusch and Wu (2003). These papers explain how macroeconomic factors (inflation, 
ouýput gaps and the short term policy interest rates) drive movements in the term struc- 
ture, of interest rates and how they affect the behaviour of the risk premia embedded in 
observed yields. However, these works ignore the role of time-varying risk premia which 
is an important component in explaining movements in yields over time. 
Previous literature addressing cross country comparison of risk premia includes Alesina, 
DeBroek, Prati, Tabellini, Obstfeld, and Rebelo, 1992; Lenimen and Goodhart, 1999; Gi- 
avannini and Piga, 1994; Favcro, Giavazzi and Spavcnta, 1997; IMF, 1997; Mc Caulcy, 
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1996; Eijfinger, Huizinga and Lemmen, 1998. However, these works examine risk premia 
based on the credit risk of government debt and ignore the time variation in risk premium 
within countries obviously. 
Alesina, DeBroek, Prati, Tabellini, Obstfeld and Rebelo (1992) study the default 
risk on government debt in OECD countries. The risk is derived by comparing the return 
from holding government debt with the return from holding corporate debt denominated 
in the same currency. However, the drawback is that the measure of default risk tends to 
be sensitive to significant changes in private risk. Additionally, they consider a variety of 
different maturities for both public and private yields. 
However, differences in the maturity between the public and private yields may lead 
to inaccurate measurement of the magnitude of government default risk. 
Lemmen and Goodhart (1999) find the determinants of credit risk in the European 
government bond markets using fixed effects estimation. The risk specified in their work 
is the default risk (credit risk) proxy by the spread of I 0-year benchmark government bond 
yields over the corresponding swap yield of the same I 0-year maturity denominated in the 
same currency. Although the risk specified represents an improvement to the one used by 
Alesina, DeBroek, Prati, Tabellini, Obstfeld and Rebelo (1992), the risk measure still has 
several problems. Firstly, the risk premia may not be a good proxy for country risk if the 
government and private bonds interact with each other. According to Lernmen and Good- 
hart (1999), uncertainty about government debt servicing will affect private sector risks 
particularly when bank or other financial institutions hold a large proportion of their assets 
in government debt, leading private and public risks to move in a lockstep fashion. Sec- 
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ondly, Lemmen and Goodhart (1999) consider government bond redemption yield data. 
The use of redemption yields introduces coupon reinvestment risk in the default risk mea- 
sure. The redemption yield depends on the coupon size. To solve this problem, we use zero 
coupon yields data to calculate the risk premia. 
Other works employ the credit risk of sovereign debt, which can be assessed by 
comparing yields on domestic government bonds with high quality private risk as repre- 
sented by interest rate swap yields ( see Giavannini and Piga, 1994; Favero, Giavazzi and 
Spaventa, 1997; IMF, 1997; Me Cauley, 1996; Eijfinger, Huizinga and Lemmen, 1998 ). 
The risk premia measures in these papers cannot distinguish between credit risk and liq- 
uidity risk. The measure of the risk premia in these studies requires the assumption that 
variations in liquidity are negligible. However, liquidity effects may play a central role 
in government assets return. In the first main chapter of this thesis, the liquidity effect is 
automatically taken into account in the risk premia estimation. 
From previous literature, there is a room for improvement in the estimation of the 
interest rate risk premia. The generated risk premia. from the first main chapter of this 
thesis is suitable not only for cross country comparison but also capable to explain the time 
variation factor of risk premia within countries. 
1.2.2 The forward premium anomaly and related literatures: 
According to the forward rate unbiasedncss hypothesis, the forward premium should be an 
unbiased estimate of the subsequent exchange rate change. However, previous literature 
(such as Frankel, 1980; Fama, 1984; Bekaert and Hodrick, 1993; and others) finds that not 
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only is this hypothesis rejected by standard regressions of the spot return on the forward 
premium but there are also puzzling negative coefficients from these regressions. This 
is referred to as the forward premium anomaly. Froot and Thaler (1990) find that the 
average coefficient in the regression across some 75 publishedestimates is -0.88. Of these 
estimates, a few are positive, but none of them have the coefficient statistically greater than 
or equal to unity. There are two main explanations for the forward premium anomaly, 
which are the statistical artifacts of the data and the existence of the foreign exchange risk 
premium. 
The statistical artifacts of the data view explains the forward premium anomaly based 
on 1) the long memory behaviour of the forward premium; and 2) the existence of structural 
breaks in the forward premium. Baillie and Bollerslev (2000) proposed that the anomaly is 
caused by a very persistent autocorrelation in the forward premium. Maynard and Phillips 
(2001) also found evidence of fractionally integrated behaviour in the forward premium. 
However, the returns on the spot exchange rate are widely accepted to be stationary (Cor- 
nell, 1977; Meese and Singleton, 1982; Corbae and Ouliaris, 1986, Baillie and Bollersley, 
1989; Baillie and Bollersley, 1993; Maynard and Phillips, 2001; Choi and Zivot, 2005). 
This suggests that the traditional asymptotic regression for unbiasedness may not be suit- 
able due to the difference in persistence between the two series mentioned above. Recently, 
Choi and Zivot (2005) pointed out the importance of structural breaks and confirmed that 
both explanations are important. 
The foreign exchange risk premium explanation states that the forward rates are bi- 
ased predictors of actual exchange rate movements because there exists a risk premium on 
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one country's currency relative to another. Fama (1984) originally attempted to explain the 
anomaly by arguing that the time varying risk premium term can lead to bias and incon- 
sistency in the OLS estimates of coefficient in the unbiasedness regression. There are two 
approaches used within the literature in interpreting the risk prernia. The first approach es- 
timate the risk premium by the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM), the second approach 
specifies the statistical model of the risk premium. 
Literature using the CAPM approach to estimate the risk premium include Hansen 
and Hodrick, 1980; Hodrick and Srivastava, 1984,1986; Giovannini and Jorion, 1987; 
Bekaert and Hodrick, 1992 and Bekaert, 1994. In this approach, the risk premium is gen- 
erally defined by the sum of the conditional variance of the spot exchange rates, the co- 
variance of the spot exchange rates and inflation, and the covariance of the intertemporal 
marginal rate of substitution in consumption and exchange rate. However, this research 
in general finds that the model has limited success in explaining the risk premium. A key 
problem is that the risk premium model is not robust across different datasets and time 
periods (Lewis, 1995). There is also a limitation of the data, in particular, a small covaria- 
tion between consumption and exchange rates since the data of the former is fairly smooth 
(Kaminsky and Peruga, 1990; Sarno and Taylor, 2002; Baillie and Bollerslev 1989,1990; 
and Bekaert and Hodrick., 1993)), and a small covariation, between exchange rate and in- 
flation (Lewis, 1995; Engel, 1984; and Cumby, 1988) and the foreign exchange rate data 
show little evidence of conditional heteroskedasticity (Baillie and Bollersley 1989,1990; 
and Bekaert and Hodrick, 1993). 
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Literature that specifies "statistical" models of the risk premium include Domowitz 
and Hakkio (1985) and Baillie and Bollerslev (1990). This approich tests for certain pat- 
terns in or across excess exchange rate returns. Dornowitz and Hakkio (1985) give an 
explanation of the risk premia through the conditional variance of the forward exchange 
rate forecast error using monthly exchange rate data. The forward rate forecast error is 
defined as the difference between the future spot rate and the forward rate. The estima- 
tion of the variance of the forward rate forecast error is by the ARCH-in-mean Model by 
Engle, Lilien and Robins (1987). However, the estimated risk premium is found to be in- 
significant in the unbiasedness regression. Baillie and Bollerslev (1990) use an alternative 
approach to estimate the risk premium, by specifying it as a function of the conditional co- 
variance matrix for all currencies. They examine the conditional variance and covariance 
of the forward rate forecast error using a multivariate GARCH model in the weekly data. 
Unfortunately, the test for the presence of the time varying risk premium gains little support 
which confirms the finding in Dornowitz and Hakkio (1985). 
The "statistical" models of the risk premium have not been completely successful and 
there is room for new research. The test for the presence of a time varying risk premium 
gains little support when using monthly data in Domowitz and Hakkio (1985) and weekly 
data in Bailie and Bollerslev (1990). In contrast, my thesis chapter argues that there is 
a possibility that using higher frequency data and a longer-time span would give more 
information to the model. Moreover, in estimating the conditional variance of the forecast 
error, one can find a model that fits the data better than the ARCH-in-mean model and 
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the multivariate GARCH model. Thus, my thesis chapter employs the second approach in 
estimating the risk premium. 
1.2.3 Pensions and related literature 
The first and foremost research in pension modelling the difference between funded and 
unfunded schemes is the overlapping generations framework is by Samuelson (195 8) and 
Aaron (1966). Ile research shows that With a Pay-As-You-Go (PAYG) scheme, it is pos- 
sible in principle for every generation to receive more in pensions than it paid in contri- 
butions, provided that the rate of growth of total real eamings exceeds the interest rate 
indefinitely. However, this argument does not appear to be currently relevant. The old age 
dependency ratio in nearly all developed economies is substantially higher than it used to 
be. This has generated a large literature on the reform of the pension systems (such as 
Feldstein, 1996; Feldstein and Samwick, 1998; Mitchell and Zeldes, 1996; Disney, 1996; 
Kotlikoff, 1996; Huang, Imrohoroglu and Sargent, 1997; Miles and Timmerman, 1999; 
Sinn, 1999; and Campbell and Feldstein, 2001). These works mainly concentrate on the 
appropriate proportion of unfunded state pensions and private pension provision. 
Among these, many researchers have expressed different opinions on the problem 
whether the pay-as-you-go state pension syýtem should be replaced with a funded sys- 
tem. The first group suggested efficiency gains from a transition to a funded system (Di- 
amond, 1965; Feldstein, 1977,1995; Kotlikoff, Smetters, and Walliser, 1998; Feldstein 
and Samwickm 1998; Borsch-Supan, 1998; Homburg, 1990,1997; and Mile, 1999). The 
second group argued that a Pareto improving transition to a funded system is not possi- 
I 
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ble (Breyer, 1989, Fenge, 1995; Brunner, 1996; Sinn, 1997,1998; and Geanakopolos, 
Mitchell, and Zeldes, 1998). 
The first group argued that the pay-as-you-go schemes induce important labour mar- 
ket distortions due to the income tax. Moreover, such schemes diminish the capital stock 
because they are a special fonn. of goverment debt (Feldstein, 1977). On the other hand, 
funded pensions are dynamically more efficient, since they encourage saving, which in turn 
raises the capital-labour ratio and income per head. As a result, phasing out state pensions 
completely generates higher saving, a higher capital stock and lower real rates of return. 
The second group argued that this comparison of rates of return does not imply 
that the abolition of the state pay-as-you-go pension system would lead to an intergencra- 
tional Pareto improvement since it is impossible to compensate the losers of the transition 
(namely, the first generation which does not receive the state pension) without making at 
least one of the later generations strictly worse off. In addition to this, the argument is on 
income redistribution grounds, whilst the public pension systems often redistribute income 
from the rich to the poor (see Barr and Diamond, 2006). 
Within the work of Diamond, 1965; Feldstein, 1977; and others, the pay-as-you-go 
schemes diminishes the capital stock because they rely on a special form of government 
debt. The logic of the models is that government debt will reduce welfare because it will 
divert savings away from productive capital, which is a typical example of crowding out. 
The contribution of this chapter is motivated by the observation that government debt 
is both a complement and a substitute to physical capital. We observe that ownership of 
physical capital is mediated largely through equity, which provides a high risk high return 
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financial assets, whereas government debt is mediated through bonds, which can insure 
against long term risk. So although government debt and physical capital compete for 
funds (suggesting they are substitutes), the financial assets which results are quite different 
(suggesting complementary). 
Chapter 2 
Determinants of the time varying risk premia 
2.1 Introduction 
This paper studies the behaviour of the risk premia of short term government assets (trea- 
sury bills). The paper makes 2 contributions to the literature. Firstly, we generate monthly 
risk premia, data using zero coupon government treasury bills for 43 countries over the pe- 
riod of 1994-2006. The risk premia measure is based on the ARCH-in-Mean (ARCH-M) 
model introduced by Engle, Lilien and Robins (1987). The estimation of the risk premia in 
this paper can perform the same function as the agencies' credit ratings as it allows us to 
extract the market perceptions of the risk in holding government assets. Moreover, the risk 
premia data generated in this study are somewhat more continuous and more time varying 
measure of risk in holding government asset than the risk indices based on credit ratings. 
We find that the risk premia are time varying and also vary considerably across countries. 
The second contribution of this paper is that we examine the macroeconomic and political 
determinants of the risk premia by using cross section and dynamic panel regression analy- 
ses. Tle results show that the risk premia are significantly affected by macroeconomic 
circumstances, especially economic growth and the real effective exchange Tate. Tle re- 
sults are robust across the majority of countries in our study. 
'Me risk premia series in this study are proxied by the time series volatility of the ex- 
cess holding yields for short- and long-term treasury bills. Thus the risk premia in this study 
13 
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correspond to the term premia in the theory of the term structure of interest rates, I will use 
these two terms interchangeably. The process used to construct risk premia data follows 
the argument of Engle, Lilien and Robins (1987), and associates the mean of the excess re- 
turns on holding long-term comparing to short-term government bills to the volatility of the 
excess returns. It focuses on the fundamental trade-off between expected returns and their 
volatility. The theoretical appeal of this model is that it provides microeconomics founda- 
tions by measuring the response of risk averse economic agents to uncertainty using the 
time series data. Estimating the risk premia from the treasury bills data is relevant to previ- 
ous studies which have documented that the treasury bills rates contain time varying term 
premiaý. 
There is an abundance of work on the term structure of interest rate but this focuses 
mainly on the validity of the expectations hypothesis. Empirical evidence of time varying 
risk premia, in government asset returns is frequently interpreted as evidence against the 
expectations hypothesis. However, we need a better understanding of the determinants of 
the term premia. This will in turn give clearer explanation for the rejection of expectations 
hypothesis. 
The literature has not yet fully identified the determinants of risk premia in govem- 
ment assets. There are a few works that attempt to relate the term structure to movements 
ip macroeconomic variables such as Wu (2002), Hordahl, Tristani, and Vestin (2006), and 
Rudebusch and Wu (2003). However, these works ignore the role of time-varying risk pre- 
2 Many papers provide evidence that the risk (term) premium in term structure of interest rate varies over 
time instead of being constant. Parts of this evidence consist of repeated rejection of the expectation hypoth. 
esis [Shiller, 1979; Startz, 1982; Shiller, Campbell and Schoenboltz, 1983; Fama, 1984a; Mankiw, 1986; 
Mankiw and Mirdn, 1986; Campbell, 1987; Engel, Lilien and Robins, 1987; Fama and Bliss, 1987; Shiller 
and McCulloch, 1987; flardouvelis, 1988; Froot, 1989; Simon, 1989; Campbell and Shiller, 1991 and others] 
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mia which is an important component in explaining movements in yields over time. Ang 
and Piazzesi (2003) suggest that macroeconomic factors (inflation and economic growth 
factors) bave an important explanatory role for the dynamics of the yield curve, and that in- 
cluding these variables in a term structure model can improve its one-step ahead forecasting 
performance'. They find that macro factors explain up to 85 percent of the observed varia- 
tion in bond yields. Hordahl, Tristani and Vestin (2006) employ macroeconomic variables 
to indirectly explain the risk premia. Their paper explains how macroeconomic factors (in- 
flation, output gaps and the short term policy interest rates) drive movements in the term 
structure of interest rates and how they affect the behaviour of the risk premia embedded 
in observed yields. Their paper utilises a dynamic term structure model based on macro- 
economic factors, which allows for an explicit feedback from the short term policy rates to 
macroeconomic outcomes. At the same time, the explicit modelling of risk premia captures 
dynamics of the entire term structures. They conclude that the dynamics of risk premia can 
ultimately be attributed to underlying macroeconomic dynamics'. 
This paper can be divided into two main parts. In the first part, we generate measures 
of the risk premia of government securities for 43 countries over the period 1994-2006. In 
the latter part, we find the determinant of the risk premia using the data generated from 
the fist part. In examining the determinants of risk premia, we carefully deal with the 
characteristics of small sample sizes in our study. In the cross section regression analysis, p 
we use the small sample version of the heteroskedasticity consistent covariance matrix 
3 Ileir two stage estimation methods is based on the asssumption that short term interest rates do not affect 
macroeconomic variables. 
4 Anyhow, the paper did not include the foreign variables or exchange rate, which will provide fully satis- 
factory account of macroeconomic dynamics in the country of study e. g. Germany. 
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estimates (HC3) suggested by MacKinnon and White (1985) to improve the performance 
of the analysis in small samples. In the dynamic panel regression, the determinants of 
risk premia are estimated using a Least Squares Dummy Variable Corrected (LSDVC) 
procedure proposed by Bruno (2005a, b). This estimator is a recently proposed panel data 
technique that is suitable for small samples in unbalanced panels. 
Ile result from the cross section analysis can be briefly surnmarised as follows. On 
average, over the period 1994-2006, the risk premia for holding goverment assets required 
by risk averse investors is positively associated with the level of inflation and the budget 
deficit as a percentage of GDP (both variables are significant at the I percent level), and is 
negatively affected by the country's economic growth (significant at the 5 percent level). 
Additionally, low income countries are estimated to have risk premia about 19 percent 
higher than in the high income countries outside the Eurozone, holding other variables 
constant. In the high income countries outside the Eurozone, the risk premia on holding 
government assets is predicted to be 10 percent more than those in Eurozone. 
Using panel data analysis, we found that economic growth and the volatility of real 
effective exchange rates are the main determinants of the risk premia in the full sample. 
Risk averse investors require lower risk premia for holding government assets in countries 
with good economic performance i. e. high economic growth and a stable external price 
competitive position i. e. low volatility of real effective exchange rate. If we split the sam- 
ple by income group, economic growth remains the main determinant of the risk premia. 
However, we also find that the real effective exchange rate plays an interesting and impor- 
tant role: in high income countries, devaluations bring favorable results to the economy as 
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consistent with the Mundell-Fleming model. There is a better price competitiveness which 
in turn reduces the country risk premia. The opposite relationship is found in the sample 
of low income countries. One possible mechanism explaining this may be that in finan- 
cial vulnerable countries, weaker local currency can exacerbate the external debt service 
difficulties. Devaluations therefore raise the country risk premia. This corresponds to the 
results from Cespedes, Chang and Velasco (2004). 
The paper is organised as follows. The following section first outlines the definition 
of the risk premia and the departure from the existing literature. We then present a theo- 
retical. model for the ARCH-M methodology of time varying risk premia following Engle, 
Lilien and Robins (1987). Next, we construct measures of the time varying risk premia for 
43 countries over the period of 1994 to 2006. The results show that, in general, term pre- 
mia exist, are time varying and different between countries. After deriving measures of the 
term premia, we then ask what factors determine the movements in risk premia and what 
makes it vary across countries and through time5. Using cross sectional and panel data re- 
gression analysis, our main aim is to establish how macroeconomic, financial and political 
conditions determine the differences in risk premia. The final section concludes. 
2.2 Risk premia and related literatures 
In this section, we first discuss the concept of the risk premia. We explain the rationale for 
estimating the nsk premia from the term structure of interest rates. We also explain why 
5 Assuming that investors form their expectations concerning movements in the interest rate using all avail- 
able information, perfect capital mobility no longer implies that interest rates on the same asset class are 
equal across countries. The widely used measure of risk in finance is the volatility, however, in an arbitrage 
free economy; the risk perceived corresponds to the relevant information available to an investor as well. 
2.2 Risk premia and related literatures 18 
the risk premia estimated here provides an alternative to those used in previous literatures. 
Lastly, we briefly discuss the rationale for using the ARCH-M model to estimate the risk 
premia. 
The risk premium is the differential in the expected rate of return on a risky asset 
as compared with a safe asset. The risk associated with holding government assets can be 
classified into 2 aspects; the pure time factor of the risk, and the risk of default. 
The pure time factor of risk refers to the term or maturity risk, and this is directly 
related to the term structure of interest rates in monetary economics through the expectation 
hypothesis. This hypothesis states that the interest rate on the long term asset must equal 
the average of the expected future interest rate on short term assets plus the term premium 
(Campbell and Schiller, 199 1). Hence, this term premium is simply an increment of return 
required to induce investors to hold longer term securities. The longer maturities entail 
greater risks for the investor. With longer maturities, more catastrophic events might occur 
that may impact the investment, hence the need for a risk (term) premiurný. This pure time 
factor of risk premia series can be directly estimated by the ARCII-M model by Engle, 
Lilien and Robins (1987). 
The risk of default refers to the likelihood of the loan not being repaid. Although it 
is generally recognised that securities issued by governments are relatively safer than other 
types of assets, the risk associated with hQlding them as perceived by international in- 
6 17his explanation depends on the distant future being more uncertain than the near future, and risk of future 
adverse events (such as default and higher short-term interest rates) being higher than the chance of future 
positive events (such as lower short-term interest rates). 
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vestors, varies according to the economic and political conditions of the country of issueF. 
717his risk is thus country specific and is regarded as a country's credit-risk. 
Previous literature addressing cross country comparison of risk premia includes Alesina, 
DeBroek, Prati, Tabellini, Obstfeld, and Rebelo, 1992; Lernmen and Goodhart, 1999; Gi- 
avannini and Piga, 1994; Favero, Giavazzi and Spaventa, 1997; IMF, 1997; Mc Cauley, 
1996; Eijfinger, Huizinga and Lemmen, 1998, However, these works examine risk premia 
based on the credit risk of government debt. I believe that the measure of the risk premia 
in my study is a somewhat better measure of risk in holding government assets than the 
government defaulted risk constructed by previous literatures in several ways as follows. 
Alesina, DeBroek, Prati, Tabellini, Obstfeld and Rebelo (1992) study the default 
risk on government debt in OECD countries. The risk is derived by comparing the return 
from holding government debt with the return from holding corporate debt denominated 
in the same currency. However, the drawback is that the measure of default risk tends to 
be sensitive to significant changes in private risk. Additionally, they consider a variety of 
different maturities for both public and private yields. However, differences in the maturity 
between the public and private yields may lead to inaccurate measurement of the magnitude 
of government default risk. 
Lernmen and Goodhart (1999) find the determinants of credit risk in the European 
government bond markets using fixed effects estimatign. The risk specified in their work 
is the default risk (credit risk) proxy by the spread of I 0-year benchmark govermncnt bond 
7 This concept is quite similar to the asset market and portfolio balance approach in international economics 
which states that domestic and foreign bonds are not perfect substitutes and foreign bonds carry some ad- 
ditional risk with respect to domestic bonds. However, in some countries with less financial stability, the 
domestic bonds may be rclatively more risky than the government bonds in developed countries. 
2.2 Risk premia and related literatures 20 
yields over the corresponding swap yield of the same 10-year maturity denominated in 
the same currency. Although the risk specified in Lernmen and Goodhart (1999) offer an 
improvement to the one used by Alesina, DeBroek, Prati, Tabellini, Obstfeld and Rebelo 
(1992), the risk measure still has several problems. Firstly, the risk premia may not be 
a good proxy for country risk if the government private bonds interact with each othen 
According to Lernmen and Goodhart (1999), uncertainty. about government debt servicing 
will affect private sector risks particularly when bank or other financial institutions hold 
large proportion of their assets in goverranent debt, leading private and public risks to 
move in a lockstep fashion. Secondly, Lemmen and Goodhart (1999) consider government 
bond redemption yield data. The use of redemption yields introduces coupon reinvestment 
risks in the default risk measure. The redemption yield depends on the coupon size. To 
solve this problem, I use zero coupon yields data to calculate the risk premia. 
Other works employ the credit risk of sovereign debt, which can be assessed by com- 
paring yields on domestic government bonds with high quality private risk represented by 
interest rate swap yields ( see Giavannini and Piga, 1994; Favero, Giavazzi and Spaventa, 
1997; IMF, 1997; Mc Cauley, 1996; Eijfinger, Huizinga and Lemmen, 1998 ). The risk pre- 
mia measures in these literatures cannot distinguish between credit risk and liquidity risk. 
The measure of the risk premia in these studies requires the assumption that variations in 
liquidity are negligible. However, liquidity effects may play a c5ntral role in government 
assets return. In my study, the liquidity effect is automatically taken into account in the risk 
premia, estimation. 
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2.3 Methodology: Measuring risk premia 
This section describes the construction of our risk premia data. Section 2.3.1 describes the 
source of data for calculating the excess holding yield for 6 month treasury bills over 3 
month treasury bills in 43 countries over the sample period of 1994: 12 to 2006: 2. Due to 
the limited availability of the zero coupon yield data, there are 43 countries in our studies. 
These include both developed and developing countries. See table 2.1 for a list of coun- 
tries, data definition and the period of observation. Section 2.3.2 presents the theoretical 
derivation of the time varying risk premia. Section 2.4.1 uses the calculated excess hold- 
ing return to generate the risk premia data by applying the ARCII-M methodology. The 
formulation closely follows Engle, Lilien and Robins (1987). The risk premia is the depen- 
dent variables in the cross section regression and the panel data analysis in sections 2.5 and 
2.6, respectively. 
2.3.1 The data 
The tenn structure data available in each country start in different years and was collected 
from Bloomberg L. P. We use monthly observations' of the yield on short term assets, i. e. 
3 month- and 6-month treasury bills, to calculate the excess holding yield. We use the 
volatility of excess holding yield to generate the risk premia. 
8 Ibis chapter closely follows Engle, Lilien and Robins (1987) in using the risk premia estimation technique 
and the choice of data frequency. 
An additional reason is that the objective of this work is to "plain the risk premia bý the macro economic 
and institutional variables. The frequency of these data is naturally low (i. e. monthly, quarterly and annually). 
Thus, the monthly estimated of the risk premia is considered to be sufficient to fulfil the objective of the paper. 
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Instead of using the outstanding coupon treasury securities to calculate the excess 
holding yields, we use the calculated zero coupon instruments (fixed income) instead. This 
methodology is the same as Dotsey and Otrok (1995) and Harris (2004)'. The zero coupon 
instruments make a single payment at the maturity date. The size of the payment is the 
face value of the instruments. The advantage of the zero coupon bills is that it is free of 
liquidity and coupon effects that are common in outstanding treasury securities. The data 
is, therefore, of the same type as that is analysed in Campbell and Schiller (199 1). This type 
of data is suitable for the analysis of term structure of interest rate since they have no effects 
from different coupons and compounding methods. To interpret a zero coupon yield index, 
the zero coupon yields are derived by stripping the par coupon curve. For example, the 
USD Govenunent Agency (FMC84) Zero Coupon `Yield is the zero coupon rate derived by 
stripping FMC" curve84. Most of the yield indices are denominated in national currencies 
except Turkey, Brazil and Uruguay. These 3 countries are denominated in US Dollars. The 
dataset we obtained here is daily reported, and the last trading day of the month is therefore 
chosen to serve as the end of month observation. Naturally, the 30th or 31st data of each 
month is used except for national Holidays or other non-trading days. 
In estimating the term premia, we first define the excess holding yield. The formula 
for constructing the excess holding yield of 6-month over 3-month zero coupon treasury 
bills is analogous to Englc, Lilicn and Robins (1987), Dotsey and Otrok (1995) and Hqrris 
11 Engle, Lilien and Robins (1987) uses the treasury bills rate to calculate the riks premia. However, the US 
treasury bills are zero coupon bills in that they do not pay interest prior to maturity; instead they are sold at a 
discount of the par value to create a positive yield to maturity. 
10 FMC stands for Fair market value curve. The fair market value indices are derived from data points on 
Bloomberg's option free market curves. The yield at each maturity point represents the composite yield of 
securities around that maturity. 
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6,3 
(2004). To set the notation, yt is defined as the excess holding return from holding a 
6-month treasury bill compared to the return from holding consecutive 3-month treasury 
bills. The unit of time period in t stands for every 3 months. Thus, the time t is actually 3 
months ahead of time t+1. Rt is the 6-month zero coupon treasury bill rate and rt is the 
zero coupon yield of the treasury bill with maturity of 3 months. The excess holding period 
yield can therefore be calculated as: 
6,3 
= )2 + rt+, )] + rt) , Yt [(l + Rt (2.1) 
and following Engle, Lilien and Robins (1987), the linear approximation of equation (2.1) 
is used to calculate the excess holding yield as follow, 
63 
yt, = 2Rt - rt+l - rt. 
Prior to generating the risk pren-ýia, it is useful to briefly explain the descriptive sta- 
tistics of the excess holding yield in the different countries. T'his will help in visualising 
the expected characteristics of risk premia. 
Table 2.3 illustrates descriptive statistics of the excess holding yield generated from 
equations (2.1). The number of observations is represented by number of montbs observed. 
The main findings are summarised as follows. 
First the mean of the excess holding yield for 6 months vs 3 months of our sample 
countries is positive in sign with value between 0 to I per cent per annum. Argentina 
and Uruguay are exceptions; the mean of the excess teturn is -3.95 and -0.99 percent per 
annum, respectively. This means that an investor would be better off if he keeps investing 
in a shorter term asset (3-month bill) for a year than buying a single 6-month treasury bill 
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which gives less return in time t+1. Additionally, the excess holding yield of government 
securities in these 2 countries is extremely volatile with standard deviations" of 18.09 and 
9.73 in Argentina and Uruguay", respectively. The data available for Argentina is from 
1998: 07 to 2002: 03. Hence, it includes the time of economic crisis" in Argentina in 2001 - 
2002. Over the period of study, the excess holding yield in Argentina hit its low at -71.716 
per cent per annum in late 2001. This probably reflects the lack of confidence in economic 
prospects as investors do not want to take a risk in longer term assets. From Figure 2.1, 
thanks to the currency board, we can see a period of stability in the excess holding yield 
from late 1998 to late 2000. The volatility coincides with the time of criSiS14. 
During year 2001-2002, Uruguay (see Figure 2.41) went through a similar economic 
and financial crisis" which developed mostly from external factors, not least the crisis in 
Argentina. As a result, there was considerable volatility in the excess holding period return 
during late-2001 to mid-2002. Although Uruguay's economy recovered in 2003 through 
improving its export performance and a more positive investment climate, the excess hold- 
11 The standard deyiation of the return measures the average deviations of the return series from its mean, 
and is often used as a measure of risk. A large standard deviation implies that there have been large swings 
in the return series of assets. 
11 The volatility of excess return is also increasing with maturity of longer term bonds. s. d. (Y12,3) > S. d(Y6,3). 
Appendix table A, the standard deviation of excess return in Argentina and Uruguay are 48.96 and 35.15, re- 
spectively. The excess holding yield in these 2 countries is also the most volatile among 43 countries in this 
study. 
13 This entailed output falling by 20 percent over 3 years, high inflationary pressure, a severe devaluation of 
Argentine peso, government debt default, and lastly, a stagnant banking system. 
14 Unfortunately, we cannot obtain the zero coupon yield data for Argentina after 2002: 03. 
15 The crisis started by the devaluation in Brazilian Reais in 1999 made Uruguayan exports relatively less 
competitive. In late 2000, the situation was exacerbated by the economic crisis in Argentina, which is 
Uruguay's major trading partner. Subsequently in mid 2002 there was a bank run due to massive withdrawals 
from Uruguayan banks. The bank run was unfortunately overcome by massive borrowing from international 
financial institutions which in turn, led to a serious debt sustainability problem. 
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ing yield swung wildly over the studied period. This reflects a persisting unstable financial 
system. 
At the other extreme is the excess holding return of government securities in the 
Philippines (in table 2.3) which has a mean value of 1.91 percent per annum. It is also 
highly volatile with a standard deviation of 2.10. Figure 2.32 shows that the excess holding 
yield fluctuates wildly throughout the period of study. The excess holding yield is espe- 
cially volatile with the sharp spikes in 1997-1998 and in late 2000 owing probably to the 
6 Asian financial crisis and oil price shocks' , respectively. 
Apart from the countries already mentioned, there have also been large swings in the 
excess return series in Brazil, with a standard deviation of 4.27 (see table 2.3). This is 
probably because Brazil was also affected by the South American economic crisis of 2002. 
Like other emerging market economies in general, Brazil was susceptible to contagion 
effects. In Brazil's case, it was contagion from Argentina's economic melt down causing 
a crisis of confidence among investors and lenders who were demanding higher interest 
rates. That put increasing pressure on the Brazilian economy to come up with those higher 
interest rates. Figure 2.5 shows that the excess holding yield series is again extremely 
volatile. 
-Our second finding is that the less volatile excess 
holding yield series rclate to economies 
with more stable financial systems and better economic development. For example, the 
16 Nevertheless, the Philippines was less severely affected by the Asian financial crisis of 1998 than its 
neighbours, aided in part by its high level of annual remittances from overseas workers, and no sustained run 
up in asset prices or foreign borrowing prior to the crisis. The impact from surging petroleum prices shock 
during late 2000 was more serious since the Philippines is an oil importer country. Overall, we find that the 
excess rates of return from holding Philippines' securities are highly erratic. 
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mean of the excess return is relatively lower but exhibits much less variation over time in 
the majority17 of countries in the EU, compared to the rest of the world. 
To test the robustness of the econometric results, the excess holding yield" of 12- 
123 - month over 3-month zero coupon rate, yi I is constructed. Following the same fashion as 
(2.1), the excess holding yield of 12-month versus 3-month Treasury bill can be generated 
as 
12,3 
(1 +Rt )4 
Vt --,: - - 
(1 + rt), (2.2) 
1 
(1 + 'rt+3) + 7t+2) + rt+l) 
I 
and the linear approximation is 
12,3 
Yt -- 4Rt - rt+3 - rt+2 - rt+l - rt- 
The descriptive statistics of the excess holding yield generated from equation (2.2) 
is presented in the Appendix Table A. The results show that mean and volatility of excess 
return are increasing with maturity of longer term bonds. There is higher uncertainty as- 
sociating with the longer horizon, thus investors require more excess return. The excess 
return series are also more fluctuate with longer maturity spread. The standard deviation 
of excess return in Argentina and Uruguay are 48.96 and 35.15, respectively. The excess 
holding yield in these 2 countries is also the most volatile among 43 countries in this study. 
The next section describes how the excess holding yield data can be used to construct 
risk premia. 
"' lbrkey, Poland and 11ungary are exceptions. The excess return series of government assets in these three 
countries are. relatively highly volatile with the standard deviation of 1.63,1.48 and 1.40, respectively. The 
mean excess holding yield of these countries is in the range of 0.02 to 0.46 percent annually. 
18 It is defined as the excess returns from holding 12-month treasury bills for 3 months compared to the 
return from holding 3-month treasury biRs. As mentioned earlier, the unit of time period in t stands for every 
3 months. Thus, the time t is actually 3 months ahead of time t+1. 
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2.3.2 The theoretical derivation of time varying risk premia 
The estimation of the risk premia, in my study bases on the model of the relation between 
risk and return in Engle, Lilien and Robins (1987). It is useful to discuss the theoretical 
derivation of the risk premid in their model as follows. The risk averse economic agents 
require compensation for holding risky assets. In this model, the risk'is measured by the 
variance of return from holding assets and the compensation by the rise in the expectation 
of the return. The relation between the mean and the variance of returns which will insure 
that the asset is fully held in equilibrium will depend on the utility function of the agents 
and the supply condition of the assets. 
The variance of the payoff of the risky assets is assumed to be able to change over 
time and consequently the price offered by risk averse agents will change over time. This 
equilibrium price determines the relation between mean and variance of excess returns 
from holding risky assets and therefore how the risk premium is related to the variance of 
retums. 
Ile model assumes two assets economy (risky and safe assets). Assuming that r is 
the rate of return on the safe assets with the price of unity; q is a random total return on 
the risky assets with the price of p. The random return has mean 0 and variance 0. Agent's 
wealth, W can be expressed as 
IV = PS + X, 
where x is share of the safe assets and s is the share of the risky assets. The excess return 
per pound invest in shares of the risky asset is 
y= (qlp) - r, 
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and the mean and variance of the excess return is given by 
E(y) = ji = (01p) - r, 
V(y) = 0,2 = 0/p2. 
Assuming constant absolute risk aversion, agents maximize expected utility of the end-of- 
period wealth. The expected utility of the agent is 
EU --2E(qs + rx) - bV(qs + rx), 
Agents maximise the utility by choosing 
ps=p ba 
2). 
The equilibrium can be written as 
p= [-r + 
Vr-2 + -4bsa2O]l2l 
so that for i large variance, the mean is proportional to the standard devation. Equation 
above shows that there is a relation between observed means and variances of return which 
move them in the same direction but not proportionally. 
The econometric model that best suits the risk return trade off is the ARCH-in-mean 
model. This model allows the conditional variance to affect the mean. In this way, changing 
conditional variances directly affect the expected return on a portfolio. 
Engle, Lilien and Robins (1987) construct an ARCII-M model where the conditional 
variance of excess return detennines the current risk premium. They then test their model 
by applying it to quarterly data on 3-month comparing to 6-month US Treasury bill rates 
from 1960: Ql to 1984: Q2. 'Me data are obtained from Salomon Brothers. The results 
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imply that the risk premia vary systematically over time with agent's perceptions of under- - 
lying uncertainty. 
In this section we generate measures of the term premium by estimating the ARCH- 
M model of excess holding yields for 6 month treasury bills over 3 month Treasury bills 
over the sample period of 1994: 12 to 2006: 2. The formulation closely follows Engle, Lilien 
and Robins (1987) and specifies that the contemporaneous expected conditional standard 
deviation of the error term be included in the mean equation of the excess holding yield. 
This specification follows from a micro-founded model with risk averse agents. 
Firstly, the excess holding yield can be decomposed: 
yt = tit + ect, (2.3) 
where (yt) is the excess holding yield on 6 month zero coupon treasury bills. The 
non-stochastic term pt is the risk premium or the expected return that the risk averse in- 
vestor would demand for holding the (riskier) long-term assetAn contrast, et is the differ- 
ence between the ex ante and ex, post rate of return which is unforecastable in an efficient 
market. This means that the expected excess return from holding the. longer-tcrm asset is 
just equal to the risk premium [Et-lyt = yt]. 
The equation for risk premium is expressed as 
m, -m= ß -i- vhi, v>0, (2.4) 
where ht is the conditional standard deviation of the unforecastable shocks (et) to 
the excess return on the long term asset. The term v is the coefficient of relative risk 
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aversion. The risk premium is assumed to be an increasing function of the conditional 
standard deviation of the unforecastable shocks (, -t). 
The conditional variance of the error term is h, ' and is a function of the information 
set available to investors. 
h2= Var (et I all available infonnation) t (2.5) 
We note here that the model takes the mean as a linear function of the standard de- 
viation (ht) instead of the variance (h'). This represents the assumption that changes in t 
the variance are reflected less than proportionally in the mean. This specification has been 
widely used by other papers such as Domowitz and Hakko (1985), and Bollerslev, Engle 
and Wooldridge (1988). 
Follovving Engle, Lilien and Robins (1987), it is assumed that the conditional vari- 
ance is a weighted sum of past squared innovations, 62 j. This conditional variance follows t- 
an ARCII(P) process as follows: 
p 
h2= ao + ci, Ewjý 
2 (2.6) 
Here, the variance of the error term depends on the intercept ao and the weighted 
average of past squared innovations, where wi are the weighting parameters. Using monthly 
observations", the ARCH specification has 12 months lags" as we assume that information 
from the past year is useful for predicting the mean. We discount the older information 
Engle, Lilien and Robins (1987) use quarterly formulation and use four lags. 
20 The conditional variance follows a 12-order autoregressive process. 
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using a linearly declining weight scheme where wi = (13 - i)/78, and i=1- 12. This 
declining weight scheme on lag structures also helps cope with the collinearity of the past 
2 square innovation terms, et-i [see Engle (1982)]. The equation can therefore be written 
as 21 
h2 
12 2 11 212 
t= cvo + a, 
(7-8 
et-, + T-8 Et-2 +-+ 78 Et-12 
(2.7) 
From the specification above (equation (2.3)-(2.5)), we can conclude that the condi- 
tional mean of the excess holding yield E (yt) depends on the conditional standard devia- 
tion of the unforecastable error term. Given that the variation of return measures riskiness, 
as Et-lyt = yt, the risk premium is an increasing function of the conditional standard 
deviation of the returns. 
The model specification above is used to generate risk premiO for our entire sample. 
2.4 The variables 
This section describes characteristics of the dependent variable, the risk premia and the 
explanatory variables. 
21 We use monthly data and assume that the useful information for predicting the mean comes from the past 
year. 7bus, in the conditional variance equation, we specify the declining weight on lag structure of past 
square innovations as in equation (2.7). However, Engle, Lilien, and Robins (1987) use quarterly data, the 
lag structure is instead characterised by hl = Cto + Ct, (AC2 I+ AC2 -2.62 _LC2 t 10 t- 10 t-2 + 10 1-3 + 10 t-4) 
22 Initially, I attempted to use a more general specification i. e. the GARCII-M model but (presumably 
because of small samples) results were quite noisy. There were problems of flat log-likelihood. 
Generally the GARCII-M methods are very data- intensive. The ARCH-in-mean model with the declining 
weighted lag structure makes minimal demands of the. data. 
There's a trade-off between bias and efficiency. ARCII-M is better from the point of view of efficiency. 
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2.4.1 Dependent variable: Risk premia 
This section describes the risk premia data which is the dependent variable in the cross 
section regression and the panel data analysis sections. The risk premia, generated from 
volatility of excess holding yield is referred to as the ex-post term premia or liquidityý premia 
since the excess holding yield represents the realised, or expost premium from holding the 
long-term as compared to short-term securities. 
In this section, we present the estimation of the risk premia for 43 countries" derived 
from the ARCH-M model in equations (ý. 3)-(2.6). The time series plots of estimated risk 
premia (together with the excess holding yield) are presented in figures 2.1 to 2.43. This is 
to illustrate their characteristics over time and across countries. Figure 2.44 gives broader 
view; it shows average risk premia over the period of 1994-2006 for all 43 countries. 
It is useful to first consider the descriptive statistics of the estimated risk premia. 
Table 2.4 gives descriptive statistics of the risk premia of 6 month versus 3 month treasury 
bills across the sample period of 1994-2006. The risk premia appear to be highest in the 
23 The data is country level and expressed in different currencies. One may argue that all of the excess 
holding yield and risk premia data should be in a common currency. 
Ideally we would like to be able to separate out risk from return and risk from exchange rate volatility. 
Although there is an issue of currency risk, the reality is rather problematic. Sovereign risk, currency 
risk, and interest rate risk are all highly correlated in many emerging countries (which are the majority of 
the sample countries considered in my thesis) and hence by gaining exposure to currency and interest rate 
risk one is still primarily taking one decision: a decision about the macro risk, just as one does with dollar- 
denominated debt. 
Also, there is an issue of differences in maturity. The objective of this study is to measure the risk of 
government short term assets. Dollar-denorninaýied debt has an average duration of 4 to 5 years, whereas 
local currency debt typically comes with interest rate duration of as little as 6 weeks. Moreover, dollar 
denominated debt is not widely available in developing countries. 
One may argue that the local currency debt is not protected against sudden currency devaluation. However, 
a sudden devaluation is rarely an altogether unforeseen event, not Jeast as the macro-economic factors that 
eventually lead to such drastic policy action builds up over a period of time and can be foreseen. 
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Philippines with average value of 1.98 percent annually. The risk premia in this country 
are also highly volatile with standard deviation of 0.58. 
The risk premia are also highly volatile in the Latin American countries. The stan- 
dard deviations of risk premia within this country group is in the range of 0.52 (Mexico) to 
1.94 (Uruguay). On the other hand, the risk premia is relatively low in almost all European 
countries and the series are much less volatile. Excluding the Czech Republic, the average 
risk premia in the EU is in the range of 0.06 to 0.27 percent annually with standard devia- 
tions ranging from 0.10 to 0.23. Hence, there seems to be a relationship between economic 
as well as financial development and the risk premia. 
Table 2.5 illustrates estimated coefficients from the ARCH-M estimations in equa- 
tions (2.3)-(2.6) and their t-statistics for each of the 43 countries. The results can be sum- 
marised as follows. Firstly, there is an ARCH in mean relationship in 16 out of the 43 
countries. The ARCH in mean relationship exists when the disturbances are heteroscedas- 
tic and the standard deviation of each observation is found to affect significantly the mean 
of that observation (a, 3ý 0 and v: 74 0). Additionally, the ARCH-M coefficient shows the 
correct sign (v > 0) in 34 out of the 41 countries; the risk premia is an increasing function 
of the conditional variance of returns". 
Secondly, from the result of ARCH-M estimation in table 2.5, the conditional vari- 
ancq of ARCH (12) process is constant (i. e. a, =0 and thus v= 0) in China, Hungary, 
24 We can conduct the sign test to see whether there is a significant positive relationship between the risk 
premia and the conditional variance of return. The null hypothesis to be tested here is that there is no sig. 
nificant positive relationship between them. This hypothesis implies that both the positive and negative of v 
in equation (2.4) are equally likely to be larger than the other. The results show zero p-value, which indi. 
cates that there is a strong positive relationship between the risk premia and the volatility [ Pr (k >- 34) 
0.0000 13, Pr (k <- 34) - 0.999998, given N=4 1, k=34 ]. 
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Indonesia, Korea, and Sri Lanka. The models show relatively flat and less volatile risk 
premia in Indonesia and Sri Lanka as are illustrated in figures 2.19 and 2.26, respectively. 
However, this does not imply that the risk premia of government assets in these countries 
are constant. 
From the plots of the excess holding yields and estimated risk premia, the series of 
excess holding yield in these five countries are so noisy" that a systematic pattern of condi- 
tional heteroscedasticity does not hold given the quite short time-horizon under considera- 
tion. T'hus, the conditional variance cannot be predicted by the past squared innovations as 
is suggested by Engle, Lilien and Robins (1987). We also find that the excess return series 
shows extreme volatility in Hungary (Figure 2.18) and Korea (Figure 2.25). The excess re- 
turn swings wildly (with periods of both negative and positive excess return) without any 
systematic pattem in Indonesia and Sri Lanka. We cannot find information for the risk pre- 
mia in China (Figure 2.8) and Slovak Republic (Figure 2.36). Again, this can be attributes 
to the short horizon of the observations in China and Slovak Republic (see table 2.1 for 
data sources, definitions and period of observations). 
I 
Lastly, for some countries, although the disturbance is heteroscedastic (a, ýA 0), the 
data are not suggestive of an ARCH-M process i. e. the conditional standard deviation 
does not affect the mean. Ilese countries are Norway, Sweden, Finland, Greece, Ireland, 
Turkey, South Affica, Argentina, Uruguay, Israel, Hong Kong and Hungary. From figures, 
there is no period of stability in the excess holding yield in any of these countries. Hence, 
the estimated risk premium is characterised by a relatively flat line. Good examples here are 
25 'There is no variation in volatility of the excess holding yield. In other words, the series are constantly 
highly-volatile. 
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the excess holding return series in Sweden, South Africa, Israel and Ireland. In Sweden, 
the variance of the excess return is very stable as illustrated in Figure 2.37. The excess 
return series in South Africa (see Figure 2.43) fluctuates around the constant mean with a 
brief shock in 1998. In Ireland, the excess return is also volatile throughout (see Figure 
2.21). The excess return in Israel is severely volatile around the constant mean (see Figure 
2.22), the series distributed evenly between positive and negative values. This reflects a 
fairly unstable financial condition in this country. The risk premia is unsurprisingly high 
throughout. The problem therefore is that the time period under consideration is not long 
enough to observe both periods of stability and volatility e. g. Engle, Lilien and Robins 
(1987) look at the risk premia in USA during 1960-1985, wherein there is a period of 
stability followed by a volatile period. In order to find an ARCH-M process, the samples 
must contain both. 
The excess holding yield in some other countries swings unsysternatically and the 
past innovation does not contain information of the risk premia such as Turkey and Uruguay 
(see Figure 2.3 9 and 2.4 1). For Argentina (see Figure 2.1), there is too large shock in 2001 
following period of stability, thus it mimics the predictive ability of the past innovations. 
Similarly, surrounded by periods of stability in excess holding yield, there is a large shock 
1997-1998 in Hong Kong (see Figure 2.17) according to the Asian financial crisis. 
In Finland, there is. a negative time trend during late 20th century (see Figure 2.14). 
The mean and variance of the excess return are trending downward over the period of 
studies. On the other hand, there is no trend in the excess return in Greece and Norway, but 
the series is highly volatile that the risk premia is unpredictable. 
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As mentioned above, there is a significant ARCH in mean relationship in 26 countries 
(a, >0 and v> 0) in our study. The characteristics of the excess return are quite similar 
to the case of the USA during 1960-1985. From Engle, Lilien and Robins (1987)'s work, 
over the period of analysis there are a few interesting shocks in the US economy. There 
was an oil price shock in 1973 and 1980, and the severe economic recessions in early 
1982. During these periods, there was instability in financial and economic conditions, and 
people lost confidence in the assets markets. They were unable to forecast future returns 
and demanded more return from holding long-term assets. The volatility in the excess 
holding yield produces a higher risk premium in these periods. However, during the more 
stable period (1960-1967), we find that the risk premium is quite low and the long run value 
of the excess return is constant. In our work, the excess returns of 6 month treasury bills 
in France (Figure 2.15), Mexico (Figure 2.27), Malaysia (Figure 2.28), and New Zealand 
(Figure 2.3 1) follow the same pattern as the USA case in Engle, Lilien and Robins (1987): 
there is a period of tranquillity followed by a period of volatility. Brazil (Figure 2.5) also 
follows this pattern, but the volatility in the excess holding return is more drastic. 
In Australia (Figure 2.2), Austria (Figure 2.3), Belgium (Figure 2.4), Czech Republic 
(Figure 2.10), the'excess holding return is characterised by a negative time trend in short 
run (during late 20th century) and fluctuates around the constant mean in the long run. In 
Spain (Figure 2.13), the mean of eNcess return fluctuates up and down but the variances 
have large swing. There are time trends in the excess return and its variance is not constant 
throughout the period of. studies with shocks in some periods in Germany (Figure 2.11), 
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Switzerland (Figure 2-7), Canada (Figure 2.6), Colombia (Figure 2.9), Denmark (Figure. 
2.12), and India (Figure 2.20). 
Figures 2.1-2.4 illustrates the average risk premia for all 43 countries over the period 
of 1994-2006. Figure 2.44 is the average risk premia for holding 6 month treasury bills 
(comparing to 3-month treasury bills). Figure 2.45 is the average risk premia for holding 
12 month treasury bills (comparing to. 3-month treasury bills). The purpose of figure 2.45 
is to show that the difference in average risk premia across countries is consistent across 
maturities. We find that the risk premia is generally low in countries with better financial 
development and economics conditions. Government assets in Singapore, Australia and 
Japan are relatively less risky compared to other countries in the study. Government assets 
in the Philippines and all Latin American countries are considered to be more risky than 
the rest. We can also perform country comparison of the risk premia. by considering the 
countries' income and economic development. Figure 2.46 presents risk premia (for hold- 
ing 6 month treasury bills) comparisons by country group. We find that the risk premia of 
government assets in the non-OECD countries are relatively higher than the OECD country 
group. Figure 2.47 presents risk premia (for holding 6 month treasury bills) comparisons 
by country's income. The higher income countries have relatively safer government assets. 
From a rough comparison of risk premia in 43 countries in this study, it is useful to 
extend an analysis by doing the cross section ajid panel data analysis. In sections 2.5 and 
2.6, we examine whether the country's macroeconomic variables affect the risk premia. 
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2.4.2 Explanatory variables: 
This section defines our control and explanatory variables used in the risk premia regres- 
sion and discusses the expected sign of relationships with the risk premia. The macroeco- 
nomic variables we examine are economic growth (GGDP), the inflation rate (INFL), 
the real effective exchange rate (REER), and the volatility of real effective exchange rate, 
(VREER). The goverment fiscal variables pertain to government debt as a percentage 
of GDP (DEBTGDP) and the fiscal deficit as a percent of GDP (DEFGDP). The in- 
stitutfonal variables consist of political constraints (POLCON5) and a political risk index 
(ICRG) 
. These variables will 
be defined subsequently. The sources and definition of data 
are detailed in the data appendix in table 2.2. 
A preliminary examination of these relationships is presented by using the bar charts 
of the explanatory variables and bivariate regression plots of the risk premia and explana- 
tory variables. The bar charts of average value of each explanatory variables are presented 
in figures 2.48A-2.48I. The bivariate regression plots of the mean value of country's risk 
premia and explanatory variables are presented in figures 2.49A-2-49I. 
The initial income level (GDP94) is our control variable for differences in initial 
development levels. The initial level of income is derived from the natural log of real gross 
domestic product per capita in year 1994 of each country. Initial income also is a proxy 
for the financial development. We might expect that there is less risk premia in holding 
government assets in countries with higher initial income and better financial development. 
To control for heterogeneity among groups of economies, the regression analysis 
also include 3 groups of dummies, namely, EMU, NEMU-RICH and POOR. The 
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dummy variable EMU stands for member countries of the European Monetary Union 
(EMU). We can refer to these countries as the Eurozone 26 . The second dummy variable, 
NEMU-RICH stands for other high income countries outside the Eurozone such as Den- 
mark, Sweden, United Kingdom", USA, Canada, Japan, etc. Lastly, the dummy variable 
POOR stands for the low to middle income countries such as Czech Republic, Slovak 
Republic, Hungary, Poland", Malaysia and Thailand, etc. The partitioning of these three 
groups is presented in the variable list in table 2.2. 'Me definition of high/low income 
countries is obtained from the World Bank. (2006). Using dummy variables also allow us 
to compare these 3 countries groups in the regression analysis. We discuss the reason for 
adding these three dummy variables in paragraphs below. 
In our context, the inclusion of a Euro-zone dummy variable could be particularly 
relevant. Ile inflation and exchange rate risk associated with their government assets are 
closely aligned, given their common currency. We begin our analysis in 1994 which is 
the second stage of the implementation of the European Economic and Monetary Union 
(EMU)". At this stage, economic convergence criteria among member countries had been 
26 The Eurozone (also called Euro, Area, Eurosystem or Euroland) is the subset of European Union member 
states which have adopted the euro, creating a currency union. The European Central Bank is responsible for 
the monctary policy within the eurozone. 
27 Denmark, Sweden and the UK are countries in the European Union that do not use the Euro. 
28 Czech republic, Slovak republic, Hungary and Poland joined the EMU on I May 2004. However, we do 
not include them in the group of Eurozone due to the early stage of membership and their income level. 
29 The first stage on the EMU (started on I July 1990) was to provide complete freedom for capital transac- 
tions, to improve economic convergence and to raise co-operation between central banks. Tlere was also a 
free use of the European Currency Unit (a forerwmer of the Euro currency) [European Central Bank, 2006]. 
The second stage (I January 1994) is to strengthen co-ordination and economic convergence, to establish 
European Monetary Institute and to foster the process leading to the independence of the national central 
bank. 
The last stage (I Jan 1999) is to officially introduce Euro, to conduct the single monetary policy by the 
European System of Central Banks and entry into effect of the intra-EU exchange rate mechanism (ERM II) 
and into force of the Stability and Growth pact. 
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in process, although the official launch of the Euro -was not until 1 January 1999. The 
EMU had a major impact on the European financial markets and the management of the 
economic policies. It was argued that the currency risk would be reduced following EMU. 
Goverment assets will instead be subjected just to the default risk. 
"Government assets among EMU member countries would mainly differ with re- 
spect to their credit worthiness, liquidity and tax treatment since intra-EMU exchange 
risk should be zero and inflation risk would be the same for every country in the Euro 
zone" [Lemmen and Goodhart, 1999]. 
1hus the principal source of relative risk in government debt markets in EMU is credit 
risk. The variation in interest rates and exchange rates, which we regard as the market risk is 
no longer involved at least in intra-EMU [IBCA, 1996]. We thus may expect no significant 




Basically, the initial income and these dummies are similarly functioning as control 
variables. They are employed to control for the financial development in general. The 
countries' initial incomes take the economic convergence into account when we measure 
the economic growth. The dummy variables help enhance the predictability of the model by 
taking into account the income difference and the inflation and exchange rate agreements". 
An interesting research question is to examine whether EMU member countries have lower 
risk premia as a result of their exchange rate arrangement. This issue will be unfolded in 
cross section and panel data analysis section. 
30 We note that, however, the exchange rate risk still exists externally. The EMU member that trades exter- 
nally has more risk than a member that does not i. e. it depends on extent of external trade, 
31 Including income dummies tends to enhance the predictability of the model. Figures 2.47A and 2.4713 
show that countries with high incomes tend to have lower risk premia. We partially control for income by 
using dummy variables, NEMU_RICH and POOR 
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Next, we discuss the characteristics of the explanatory variables. Countries with 
superior macroeconomic conditions, less exchange rate volatility, better fiscal conditions 
and more reliable political conditions, are expected to have lower risk premia. The superior 
macroeconomic conditions are characterised by low inflation rate and high output growth. 
The government will have a good fiscal condition if it has low debt and budget deficit in 
proportion with the gross domestic product. The political conditions are relatively more 
reliable if there is less political risk in the country and more stable -government policy. 
The percentage increase in gross domestic product (GDP) during one year defines 
economic growth, GGDP. Economic growth is defined as 
GGDPit =1 log(GDPitlGDPit-4)- 4 
The GDP data are available on a quarterly basis. GGDPit is the rate of change in the gross 
domestic product of country i at quarter t comparing to the same quarter last year, t-4. 
In the risk premia regression, we use the natural log of the average GDP growth of each 
particular country over 1994 to 2006 as an explanatory variable. We expect that a good 
economic performance comes along with stable financial market conditions. Alternatively 
slow economic growth might make the government asset in that country. is more risky. 
The GDP growth data suggests that there tends to be convergence across the economies 
in our sample. Figure 2.48B is bar chart of economic growth on average over 1994-2006. 
It suggests that lower income or developing countries (labelled by POOR) expenence 
significantly higher growth rates than the higher income group (labelled by EMU and 
NEMU_RICH). Comparing this figure with the bar chart of each country's initial level, 
of income measured by the gross domestic product in 1994 (figure 2.48A), it suggests that 
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the less advanced economies with lower value of initial income (and initial capital) have 
higher growth rate of income (and capital). 
In the bivariate regression in figure 2.49A, there is a strongly negative relationship 
between initial level of income (GDP94) and the risk premia as suggested earlier. On the 
other hand, the bivariate regression in figure 2.49B shows a strongly positive relationship 
between the risk premia and economic growth. This relationship is somewhat contradict to 
our prior that the better economic growth leads to less risk premia required. Referring back 
to the chart of average risk premia over 1994-2006 (figures 2.44 and 2.45), the estimated 
risk premia for the developing countries are quite high. However, during this period the 
more backward economies have higher economic growth rate than developed countries as 
suggested by the convergence. This shows the importance of including the initial level 
of income variable to control for other factors determining the risk premia apart from the 
economic growth. 
Inflation is also a potential determinant of risk premia. Investors protect themselves 
by requiring nominal interest rates that compensate them for expected inflation as well as 
for the risk that the inflation deviates from their expectations. The higher prices rise, the 
lower will be the purchasing power of the principal and nominal interest payments corre- 
spondingly must be higher. Not only do investors want to be compensated for the inflation 
they expect, they also want to be compensated for the risk that inflation could increase 
during the tenn of their loan. Inflation (INFL) is defined as the percentage change of 
consumer price index over the corresponding period of previous year. In the cross section 
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regression, we use the natural log of the mean inflation for each country over 1994-2006. 
We expect a positive relationship between the inflation rate and the risk premia. 
The data suggest that the attempt to stabilise inflation among member countries in 
EMU seems to be successful. This can be seen in the charts of average country's inflation 
over 1994-2006 in figure 2.48C. Within the Eurozone (excluding Greece"), the country's 
average inflation over the period varies between the minimum value of 1.88 percent" in 
France to maximum value of 4.89 percent in Italy (excluding Greece, the mean inflation of 
this group is 2.83 percent). 
As mentioned earlier, the inflation levels of the Eurozone members tend not to be dif- 
ferent from each others possibly due to the single currency convergence criteria. The higher 
income countries (both inside and outside Eurozone) have lower inflation rate than the 
lower income group. Comparing inflation level between countries in EMU and NEMU-RICH, 
the difference between these 2 groups is not obvious". However, there is slightly higher 
variation in inflation rates in the latter group. The developing countries group (POOR) 
has highest levels of inflation and the variation of inflation rates is quite substantial. 
32 The average inflation over 1994-2006 of Greece is 8.21 percents which is substaintially higher than the 
rest 9f countries in the Eurozone . This 
is partly because Greece if the last country thatjoin this group. Greece 
was , qualified as an EMU memeber state in 2000 and was admitted on I January 2001. 
33 In the cross section regression, we use the natural log of this value instead. 
34 Additionally, we find that the mean inflation in the UK, Denmark and Sweden are not very much different 
from the Eurozone (see figure 2.48C). This is reasonable. These three countries are reluctant to join the 
Eurozone on political ground; it is not because these three countries have problem qualifying for membership. 
However, one might diink of the Black Wednesday. It is useful to note that the pcriod of study in this 
chapter is from 1994-2006. The Black Wednesday refers to 16 Sept. 1992 when the conservative government 
in the UK was forced to withdraw the Pound from the European Exchange rate mechanism (ERM) due to 
pressure by currency sp 
' 
eculators; as a result the UK economy went through recession. However, it began a 
sustained recovery few years later and the economy has been significantly stronger than that of the Eorozone, 
despite the damage caused to the economy in the short term. 
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The scatter plots illustrating the relationship between risk premia and the inflation 
are presented in figure 2.49C. From the figure, the EMU members are clustered around one 
another. The majority of countries in the POOR group are more dispersed in terms of both 
the risk premia and inflation. Overall, the fitted line shows a clear upward trend, which 
reflects a strongly positive relationship between the risk premia, and the level of inflation. 
The t statistics from the single regression in both figures are significant at the I percent 
level. 
Tle real effective exchange rate (REER) provides a measure of a country's com- 
petitive position over time by taking the effect of price movements into accounfl. Move- 
ments in real effective exchange rates provide an indication of the evolution of a coun- 
try's aggregate external price competitiveness since it measures the currency's apprecia- 
tion/depreciation against a weighted basket of foreign currencies and adjusts for relative 
prices between countries. The goods and services produced in particular country may not 
find buyers in both foreign and domestic markets if there is a fall in competitiveness. An 
improvement/fall in international price competitiveness affects the country's international 
trade position, national production, employment and income. We might expect that a rise 
in the REER (a fall in international competitiveness) resplts in an economic contraction as 
3 '5 To expkin the concept of real effective exchange rate, we first refer to the real exchange rate. The 
real exchange rate is the nominal exchange rate adjusted for relative prices between the countries under 
consideration. It is expressed as: 
EP Er. 1 P. 
where E,.,, is the index of the real effective exchange rate, E is the nominal exchange rate (foreign 
currency per unit of domestic currency) in index form, P is the index of the domestic price level, and P* is 
the index of the foreign price level. Instead of using a single foreign currency, the real effective exchange rate 
is concerned with what is happening to it against a basket of foreign currencies with whom the country trades 
[Pilbeam, 1998, pp. 13-16]. 
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suggested in the Mundell-Fleming model. This in turn might be expected to be associated 
with a rise in the risk premia for holding government bonds in that country. 
We also link real effective exchange rate volatility (VREER) to the risk premia of 
government treasury bills. We measure real exchange rate volatility as the natural log of 
the standard deviation of the real effective exchange rate over 1994-2006. Using monthly 
data (t) of REER in country i, we define the annual standard deviation of the real effective 
exchange rate as 
RE R=1 VREER = ai E Tj: (REEIý-t - REE 
I 
t=l 
In this analysis, more volatile real effective exchange rates imply more uncertainty in the 
country's competitiveness position. 'Mus, we would expect a positive relationship between 
real effective exchange rate volatility and the risk premium. 
Differences in the country's competitive'position, as measured by the real effective 
exchange rate (REER), between the three countries groups is less clear-cut in the data. 
The charts of the country's average real effective exchange rate over 1994-2006 are pre- 
sented in figure 2.48D. On the other hand, the exchange rate volatility (VREER) over the 
period is generally higher in the POOR group than the higher income group (EMU and 
NEMU_RICH). Additionally, the majority of countries in the EMU group have rela- 
tively lower exchange rate volatility than the rest. The charts of the real effective exchange 
rate volatility are presented in figure 2.48E. 
The plots of the relationship between the risk premia and the real effective exchange 
rate are presented in figure 2.49D. The impact of the country's competitive position on the 
risk premia on holding 6-month treasury bills is unclear. Figure 2.49E presents data for 
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the relationship between the risk premia and the volatility of the real effective exchange 
rate. There is a strongly positive relationship between the risk premia and the volatility of 
the real effective exchange rate which is consistent with our prior. The t statistics from the 
single regression is significant at the I percent level. 
Government debt as a percentage of gross domestic products can be considered as a 
determinant of government default risk. The higher the existing debt stock to GDP ratios, 
the greater the debt service obligations and the lower the government's capacity to borrow 
and roll over debt declines. This ultimately may result in an increase in the risk of default. 
We thus might expect a positive relationship between the risk premia and the government 
debt. The regression uses the natural log of the mean government debt as a percentage of 
GDP over 1994-2006. 
An increase in the fiscal deficit might impact the risk premium for two reasons. 
Firstly, fiscal expansion may worsen future public. debt and increase the probability of a 
debt crisis. Secondly, it affects public trust and investors' expectations. The ability to 
control fiscal deficits reveals information about government preferences, the importance of 
lobbies (which expect tax cuts or expenditure increases) and the degree of reform imple- 
mentation (i. e. future public deficits. ). Hence, we might expect the risk premia is increasing 
with the government budget deficit. In the regression, we use the mean of the deficit as a 
percentage of GDP for country i over 1994-2006, DEFGDPi. 
The data for government budget deficit and debt as a percentage of GDP over 1994- 
2006 are presented in figures 2.48F and 2.48G. There is not much different across the 
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groups. In figure 2-48F, the negative value represents the government budget deficiel. 
On average of 1994-2006, majority of sample countries have government budget deficit. 
The exceptions are Ireland, New Zealand, Brazil, Hong Kong, Singapore, Thailand, and 
Slovak Republic, which have government budget surplus. Due to the high variation among 
samples, we normalize this variable by taking the natural log of (1 + 0.1 * DEFGDPj) in 
the regression. 
-A scatter plot of the risk premia, and the government 
budget deficit data is presented in 
figure 2.49F. There is no significant relationship between these two variables. We suspect, 
however, that the budget deficit does not strongly drive risk due to the existence of the 
outliers e. g. Norway, Sri Lanka, India, Philippines and Singapore. We will leave this issue 
until the next section. 
Figure 2.49G contains data on the risk premia and government debt. The predicted 
cocfficient of goverment debts is not statistically significant. Surprisingly, the plots show 
negative relationsMp between government debts and the risk premia. It can be argued that 
government debts are not al%vays bad. Debts reflect the demand for government assets by 
investors. The greater demand for them (given that there is no constraint on the supply 
side) may also mean that they are safer bet than private assets or foreign assets. Ilus, it 
doesn't always mean that countries with high proportion of public debt will have inferior 
fiscal stance and economic condition. For example, Belgium and Philippines both have 
I 
high goverment debt (see figure 2.48G) but the risk premia for holding securities in the 
36 'Mis rule applies for figure 2.48F only, to give clearer illustration. In the analysis beyond this point, such 
as in the bivariate regression plots, cross section and panel regression analysis; the government budget deficit 
has positive sign. 
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former is less than the latter country (see figure 2.44). On the other hand, there are low 
government debts in Australia and Colombia. Unsurprisingly, the risk premia in Australia 
is lower. 
'Me political variables used in this paper are the political risk index (ICRG) cre- 
ated by the PRS group and the political constraints index (POLCON5) by Henisz (2000, 
2002). 
The political risk index (ICRG) measures the political stability of countries on a 
comparable basis. The index is based on 100 points. The higher number of points indicates 
lower potential political risk e. g. 80-100 points represent very low risk and 0-49.5 points 
represent very high risk. In the political risk assessment, the number of points depends on 
the fixed weight of the political risk components. The political risk components and their 
weights in the parentheses are Government stability (12), Socioeconomic Conditions (12), 
Investment Profile (12), Internal Conflict (12), External Conflict (12), Corruption (6), Mil- 
itary in Policies (12), Religion in Policies (6), Law and Order (6), Ethnic Tensions (6), 
Democratic Accountability (6) and Bureaucracy Quality (4). The data for ICRG are avail- 
able annually. in the regression, we take natural logs of the mean of the political risk index 
over 1994-2006. We might expect a negative relationship between ICRG and RP3_6. In 
other words, lower risk premia for holding government assets should be positively related 
to the ICRG rating. 
The POLCON5 measures the effective political restrictions on executive behaviour. 
It accounts for the veto powers of the executive whether or not there are, two legislative 
chambers, sub national entilies and an independent judiciary. The index ranges from zero 
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to one, where the higher value indicates stronger political constraints on the government. 
We take the natural log of the average values of POLCON5 over 1994-2006. The stronger 
political constraint reflects a more stable government policy, which may in turn result in 
reduced risk premia. 
Higher income countries tend to have lower political risk ratings (higher score) and 
stronger political constraints than the lower income group, as shown in figure 2.48H and 
2.481. From the scatter plots in figures 2.49H and 2.491, the risk premia exhibit negative 
correlations with both political variables as expected. The scatter plot of the risk premia 
and the political risk rating is presented in figure 2.49H. The political risk index negatively 
determines the risk premiA as we expected. The predicted coefficient is highly significant 
(at the I percent level). The scatter plot of the risk premia and the political constraint 
is illustrated in figure 2.491. The determinant of the political constraint index on the risk 
premia is less strong but the sign of the predicted coefficient is correct. The predicted 
coefficient is significant at the 12 percent level. 
The next section is to present the result from the cross section regression analysis. 
2.5 The cross section regression 
This section examines the determinants of risk prýmia on holding 6-month treasury bills in 
43 countries using cross section regression analysis. We test whether macroeconomic vari- 
ables, government fiscal variables and political variables determine the risk premia. The 
dependent variable in the regression is the average risk premia for holding 6-month trea. 
sury bills comparing to 3 month treasury bills (RP3_6) for different countries over the 
2.5 The cross section regression 50 
period 1994-2006 (as depicted in figure 2.44). In general, investors who hold these as- 
sets are mainly financial institutions. These financial institutions are assumed to minimize 
investment risks by spreading assets among different investments both nationally and inter- 
nationally. The difference between these 2 assets is that holding shorter term treasury bills 
is less subjected to liquidity risk. In other words, the ability to sell or convert a security 
into cash is obviously greater for the shorter term treasury bills. 
A small sample version of heteroskedasticity consistent covariance matrix estimator, 
HC3 proposed by MacKinnon and White (1985)" is applied to correct for heteroskedas- 
ticity in the cross-sectional data analysiO. The following paragraphs present the results of 
the risk premia, cross-section regression on the macroeconomic and political variables. 
The starting point for the risk premia cross-section regression" is to regress the risk 
premia on the macroeconomic variables, initial level of income and the country's economic 
and income group dummies. The results are presented in column (1) of table 2.7. The 
results show that inflation (INFL) and the economic growth (GGDP) are significant 
at the 5 percent level". The budget Deficit as a percentage of GDP (DEFGDP) has 
predictive power at the 10 percent level. Initial level of income is significant at the 15 
percent level. Central government debt as a percentage of GDP (DEBTGDP) and the 
'7 Long and Ervin (2000) produced an extensive study of small sample behaviour and arrive at the conclusion 
that I IC3 provides the best performance in small samples (less than 250 observations) as it gives less weight 
to influential observations. 
38 When the variance of the errors varies across observations, OLS becomes inefficient and the estimates of 
the standard errors are inconsistent. Ibis results in incorrect inferences. For a careful data analysis, we thus 
c6rrect for heteroskedasticity in the cross sectional data analysis by using MacKinnon and White (1985)'s 
110. 
39 The regression is based on the hetcroscedasticity consistent covariance matrix (IICMM) version 110 by 
Mackinnon and White 1985. 'Ibis helps correct hcteroscedasticity in the small sample size model (n :5 250). 
40 The magnitude will be presented in the preferred model. It will be discussed in the latter paragraphs. 
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real effective exchange rate volatility (VREER) do not statistically determine the risk 
premia. Approximately 74 percent of the variability of the risk premia is accounted for by 
the explanatory variables in the model. 
Column (2) of table 2.7 adds the political variables, POLCON5 and ICRG to. the 
model. The economic factors are robust to the inclusion of additional explanatory variables. 
However, the economic factors highly dominate in the risk premia regression, thus the 
political variables have limited explanatory power". The sign of the predicted coefficients 
are as expected although are not significant. We can conclude from the regression in column 
(2) that the short run macroeconomic circumstances do most of the work in explaining 
the risk premia e. g. the higher inflation and government budget deficit, and the lower 
economic growth lead to higher risk premia. In contrast, the level of long run development 
as illustrated by the institutional variables, i. e. the political risk index and the political 
constraint index, and the public debt12 do not determine the risk premia. 
Column (3) of table 2.7 excludes the insignificant explanatory variables. The results 
from the previous section are unchanged. The effect of the deficit (as a percentage of GDP), 
DEFGDP become stronger and is significant at the 5 percent level. The variables eco- 
nomic growth (GGDP) and inflation (INFL) are once again significant at the 5 percent 
level". The standardized coefficien0l (beta value) of this model is also presented in-table 
41 Adding political variables POLCON5 and ICRG separately into the model in column (1) of table 2.7 
also does not improve the explanatory power of each political variable in the regression. 
42 A good example is again in Belgium. The average goverrument debt as a percentage of gross domestic 
product over 1994-2006 is high in this country (as illustrated in figure 2.48G). However, the risk premia for 
holding government assct is quite low (see figure 2.44). For the case of this country, high debt may be a sign 
that a country is a safe bet. 
43 Note that in column (3), o; nitting DEBTGDP and REER volatility, VREER yields 9 more observa- 
tions which are Argentina, Brazil, Greece, Mexico, Sri Lanka, India, Indonesia, Korea and lbailand. 
44 'ne standardised regression coefficients (Beta value) are computed by STATA to compare the relative 
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2.7. It indicates the size of the change in the risk premia, RP3-6 (in tenn of its standard de- 
viation) with respect to a one standard deviation in the explanatory variable. For example, 
based on the estimates in column (3), a one standard deviation increase in INFL (from 
Germany to Portugal's level) raises the risk premium by 1.29 of a standard deviation (from 
Gennany to Indonesia's level"). 
Finally, it is possible that these outlying observations might skew our test for het- 
eroseedasticity in column (3). We thus identify influential observations by DFITS mea- 
Sure 46 of Welsch and Kuh (1977). Tle measure suggests removing observations in Ar- 
gentina, Brazil, Norway, Sri Lanka, Indonesia, Philippines and Singapore". We omit these 
7 countries from regression in column (3) and present the result in column (4). Compar- 
ing the previous column with the latter, dropping observations reduces the variation and 
standard errors of all estimated coefficients. Additionally, column (4) suggests the model 
strength of various predictors within the model. These beta coefficients are measured in standard deviations 
instead of units of variables. The Beta values are presented for models in column (3) and (4) of table 2.7. The 
results are present at the bottom part of the table. 
43 Ile rank of countries by the average risk premia for holding 6 month treasury bill (comparing to those 
with 3 month maturity) over 1994 to 2006 can be found in figure 2.44. 
4(1 We assess "Influence" of the observations by DFITS measure by Welsch and Kuh (1977). An observa- 
tion is said to be influential if removing the observation substantially changes the estimates of coefficients. 
Influence can be thought of as a product of leverage and outlier. Ile former measure how far an indepen- 
dent variable deviates from its mean. These leverage points can have an effect on the estimate of regression 
Coefficient. The latter is an observation with large residual which may indicate a sample peculiarity or may 
indicate a data entry error. The DFITS measure summarise the information in the size of the residuals and 
the size of leverages (hj). Following Dollen and Jackman (1990), the equation for DFITS is 
J-hi 
DFITS, = ri hj' 
where ri are the studentized residuals. Large residuals or large leverage increases the value of DFITS. Belsley, 
Kuh and Welsch (1980) suggest that DFITS values greater than 2Vk--ln deserve further investigation (where 
A; - number of independent variables and n- number of observations). 
47 Omitting observations from these 7 countries are reasonable. Firstly, there are limited observations in de. 
riving risk premia for Argentina (from 1998: 07-2002: 0 1), Sri Lanka (from 1994: 12-2001: 0 1) and Indonesia 
(1994: 12-2001: 01). Lastly, the excess holding yield series in these 7 countries show the statistically insignif. 
icant ARCII-M. This is partly due to the economic crisis which generates large shocks to the excess holding 
yield series, for example, the large economic shock in Argentina in 2002. 
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does not suffer from heteroskedasticity (based on Breusch-Pagan and White tests") and 
Omitted variable bias (based on Ramsey's RESET statiStiCS)49. Column (4) is thus the pre- 
ferred model. In this regression, the power of INFL and DEFGDP becomes stronger 
and are both significant at the I percent level. GGDP is once again significant at the 5 
Percent level. A one-standard-deviation increase in INFL would raise the risk premia by 
71.92 percentage points" (or a 1.23 standard deviation increase in the predicted risk pre- 
nlia). Additionally, a one standard deviation increase in an economic growth would yield 
a 0.91 standard deviation decrease (or 53 percent reduction) in the predicted risk premia. 
Lastly, a one standard deviation increase in the deficit as a percentage of GDP would yield 
a 0.55 standard deviation increase (or 32.3 percent increase) in the predicted risk premia. 
The scatter plots of the risk premia regression of the preferred model (column (4) of 
table 2.7) are presented in figure 2.50. These figures show scatter plots of natural log of 
inflation, natural log of government budget deficit (% GDP) and economic growth, con- 
ditional on the natural log of initial level of income, and other control variables. All the 
three explanatory variables are in correct sign and are statistically significant. Empirically, 
risk averse investors appear to require less risk premia for holding government securities in 
countries with a sound and stable financial market condition, i. e., the lower level of infla- 
tions and the government deficits and higher economic growth. Referring back to section 
48 Ile test on heteroskedasticity given by the Dreusch-Pagan test and the White's test. Both test the null 
hypothesis that the variance of the residuals is homogenous. From table 2.7, column (4), there is no evidence 
against the null hypothesis. 
49 71c omitted variable bias test (ovtest) command performs a regression specification error test (RESEI) 
for omitted variables under the null hypothesis that model has no omitted variables. From table 2.7, column 
(4), the null hypothesis is not rejected. 
50 ibis figure is also another form of the standardised regression cocfficients. It represents the unit change 
in the dependent variable (natural log of risk premia) with a one standard deviation change in the explanawry 
variable. The figure is not shown in the table 2.7. 
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2.4.2, the bivariate regression plots of risk premia and economic growth (figure 2.4913) sug- 
gested a strongly positive relatiohship between the two variables. It is interesting to note 
here that after controlling for the initial level of income, there is a negative relationship be- 
tween the risk premia, and economic growth as suggests in our priors. The regression plots 
are presented in the upper right panel of figure 2.50. 
We can also compare the scatter plotsfirom, a single cross section regression of risk 
premia, on the DEFGDP (in figure 2.49F) with its conditional plots (in second picture of 
figure 2.50). We observe that after cutting outliers (Argentina, Brazil, Norway, Sri Lanka, 
Indonesia, Philippines and Singapore), the DEFGDP is statistically significant in the risk 
premia regression. 
We can also undertake the risk premia analysis by country group from column (4) 
of table 2.7. Lower income countries", are estimated to have. risk premia about 19 per- 
cent" more than in the high income countries outside the Eurozone, holding other variables 
constant. In the high income countries outside the Eurozone, the risk premia on holding 
government assets is predicted to be 10 percent more than those in Eurozone. 
The results of the standard cross section regression tell us the relationship between the 
risk premia and the macroeconomic and political variable on average of time during 1994- 
2006. In the next section, we consider how changes in the macroeconomic and political 
variables over time affect the phange in the risk premia over the same time period. This can 
be done by the panel estimation of the risk premia. 
81 In the preferred model (column 4 of table 2.7), we include dummy variables EMU and POOR in the 
model. The coefficient (and t-statistics) of dummy variables are -0.10(0.20) and 0.19(0.38), respectively. 
52 The dependent variable (the risk premia) is measured in natural logs, thus we can interpret the coefficients 
of the dummy variables in percentage. 
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2.6 Panel Data Analysis 
2.6.1 Methodology 
In this section, we employ panel data analysis to study the behaviour and determinants 
Of government asset risk premia in 43 countries over the period 1994-2006. In the panel 
regression, we examine annual datzO'. The risk premia and explanatory variables data are 
annualised by taking average value of the monthly observations. 
In the panel regression analysis, there are 3 critical methodological considerations. 
Firstly, the panel regression analysis allow us to take into account the arguments that the 
risk premia is time varying (as stated in sections 2.1 to 2.4). Additionally, it accounts for 
omitted variables and unobserved heterogeneity by incorporating the fixed country effect 
into the model. Ec'onometrically, the Hausman test indicates that the fixed effects model are 
More suitable for the data i. e. there is a systematic difference in the coefficients between 
the random effects and the fixed effects modeli (p=0.00). 
The second methodological consideration concerns how the risk prcmia is modelled. 
Choosing the dynamic panel model by taking the lagged dependent variable as an additional 
regressor is appealing in econometric sense. The Augmented Dickey Fuller test reveals 
that the risk premia RP3_6it series follow a stationary first order autoregressive process. 
Intuitively, the behaviour of the current risk prcmia partly depends on the measured value in 
t3 We move to the use of annual data in the Panel analysis because many series of the explanatory variables 
are only available annually such as political constrain index (POLCON), international country risk guide index (ICRG), government debt (%of GDP) and government deficit (% of GDP). - 
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the recent past". Thus, including the lag dependent variable accounts for partial adjustMent 
of risk premia behaviour over time". 
To examine the deten-ninant of the risk premia, the following model is estimated: 
Yit 7yit-I + Xito + 77i + wt + fit, (2.8) 
given Jy I<1; i=1, ..., N and t=1, ..., T. The time effect is wt. The unobserved individ- 
ual and time invariant country's fixed effect is 77i. An unobserved white noise disturbance 
is cit. The subscripts fand t represent country and annually observed time period from 
1994-2006, respectively. Following Bond (2002), we assume that the disturbances cit are 
serially uncorrelated and are independent across individuals; 
cr, 
.ý (ei, t, ej,. ) = 0; i0j or t 54 s, 
ej,. ) = 0; Vi, j, t, s. 
The term yit is the dependent variable RP3_6it, the risk premia for holding 6 month trea- 
sury bills (compared with 3 month treasury bills). We normalise" it by taking natural 
54 Intuitively, people form their expectation about the risk premia in the future for holding government bonds based on its past. For example, if the risk premia has been higher than expected in the past, people would 
revise expectations for the future. Ibis can be referred to the theory of adaptive expectations. 
55 Another motivation for including lags would be to account for exogenous shocks that are believed to 
have continual effects over time. The coefficients on lagged dependent variables imply whether these factors 
have a greater impact over time or whether their impact decays and the rate at which it decays. Including 
lags of dependent variables as regressors is a parsimonious way of accounting for the persistent effects of 
explanatory variables in the past and can also help eliminate serial correlations in the disturbance tenn (Bcck 
and Katz, 1996, and Wawro, 2002). 
" There is high variation in the samples. Ile risk premia data and other explanatory variables are thus nor- 
rnalised to correct for the relatively favourable and unfavourable economic conditions and other influences, 
which affect the risk premia difference among countries. The normalisation is implemented by taking natural 
log to the variables. However, in the raw data, some observations have negative value such as risk premia. 
(minimwn value is -1.94), inflation rate (minimum value is -3.96) and deficit as a percentage of GDP (mini- 
rnum value is -20.79), the normalisation for such case is to take natural log to (I+O. IRP3-6), (I+O. IINFL) 
and (1+(DEFCDPI30)). 
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log to (1 + O. lRP3_6)it. The vector of strictly exogenous explanatory variables is xit 
, which consists of natural log of inflation [In (1 + UINFL)itl , natural log of real effec- 
tive exchange rate [In REERt] and its annualised standard deviation, the economic growth 
[GGDPit] 
, natural 
log of debt and deficit as a percentage of GDP [In DEBTGDPit and 
In (1 + (DEFGDP130))it], natural log of the political risk index [In ICRGit] and the nat- 
ural log of the political constraint index [In POLCOlVit]. The descriptive statistics of these 
variables after normalisation is presented in table 2.8. 
The last methodological consideration concerns the choice of estimators to accom- 
Inodate the joint presence of dynamics and unobserved heterogeneity in individual coun- 
tries. We employ Bruno's (2005a, b) bias-corrected least squares dummy variable (LSDVC) 
approach to model the risk premia. The rationale for using this estimator over the rests is 
presented in the following paragraphs. - 
Although the autorcgressive panel data model helps account for dynamic partial ad- 
justment of the dependent variable, it also introduces bias into the model (Nickell, 1981 and 
Bond, ; 002). According to the standard results for omitted variable bias, the OLS estima- 
tor of -y (in equation (2.8)) is inconsistent and biased upwards since the lagged dependent 
variable is positively correlated with the error term due to the presence of the fixed effects. 
Ile Within group or fixed effect estimator (LSDV) is instead biased downwards in case of 
small T panel even when N is large (Bond, 2002). This is bcqause the within group trans- 
formation induces a correlation between the transformed lagged dependent variable and the 
transformed error term in the case of small time period data (Nickell, 198 1). In this study 
the time dimension of the panel is small (T = 11) thus estimating the least square dummy 
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variable model with a lagged dependent variable results in biased estimates. In estimating 
the dynamic panel data model, Judson and Owen (1999) found that the bias of the LSDV 
can be large even when T= 20. 
The candidate consistent estimator will lie between the OLS and LSDV estimates. 
In previous literature, the first difference-IV estimators (Anderson and Hsiao, 1981 and 
1982), the General Method of Moments (GMM) estimators (Arellano 1989; Arellano and 
Bond, 1991; Arellano and Bover, 1995) and system. GMM (Blundell and Bond, 1998) 
are usually applied to solve the first order dynamic panel data models. However, these 
methods are only efficient asymptotically and thus are not suitable for small sample data. 
Druno (2005a, b) pointed out that the. weakness of these estimators is that their properties 
hold for large N, so they can be severely biased and imprecise in panel data with a small 
number of cross-sectional units, such as most macro panels. 
A method for implementing the corrected least square dummy variable (LSDVC) 
gained popularity in recent literature and was introduced by Kivict (1995 and 1999) for 
balanced panels. ' Bruno (2005a, bj extended the LSDVC estimation to unbalanced panels 
with a strictly exogenous selection rule. The LSDVC offers a method to correct the bias in 
LSDV estimator for samples where N is small or only moderately large. The Montecarlo 
evidence in Judson and Owen (1999)" showed that the LSDVC estimator is preferred to the 
GMM estimators when N is small or only moderately large. This argument is supported 
by Kiviet (1995) and Bun and Kiviet (2001). 
57 Judson and Owen (1999) use an RMSE criterion to evaluate different techniques for estimating dynamic 
panel models in macroeconomic balanced panel datasets. The study found that for panels of all sizes, a 
corrected LSDV (LSDVC) is the most preferred estimator since it generally has the lowest RMSE compared 
with OLS, LSDV, GMM (both one-step and two-step estimators by Arellano and Bond, 1991), Instrumental 
variables (by Anderson and I Isiao; 198 1) estimators. 
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Ilere are three consistent estimators available to initialise the bias correction in the 
LSDVC estimation, which are as follows. The first one is the Anderson and Hsiao estimator 
(AH), with the dependent variable lagged twice used as an instrument for thefirst difference 
Model with no intercept. The second estimator is a standard one step Arellano and Bond's 
estimator (AB) with no intercept. Lastly, the standard Blundell and Bond estimator (BB) 
With no intercept. Considering the nature of the risk premia data in this, *study, the AH 
estimator is chosen to initialise the correction procedure. The data are characterised by 
small cross section observations, the BB estimator tends to perform badly since BB imposes 
more instrument and more moment conditions. The AB estimator performs better than AH 
if the estimated coefficient of the lagged dependent variable, -y (in equation (2.8)) in the 
LSDV estimation is persistent. However, from table 2. '9 columns (3) and (4), -Y is only 
approximately 0.26 in this study. Thus the All estimator is the best choice". Additionally, 
the statistical significance of the LSDVC coefficients has been tested using bootstrapped 
standard errors (with 200 iterations). 
It is useful to point out that in the corrected least square dummy variable (LSDVC), 
Kiviet's bias correction assumes strict exogeneity in the explanatory variables, xit. If the 
the explanatory variables are not strictly exogenoug, the bias correction term is invalid". In 
the risk premia measures, there is one concern about the exogeneity of the right hand side 
variables i. e. economic growth, GGDPt'O. We can do a robustness check for the Porrect 
58 However, we note that based on the finding by Bun and Kiviet (2001), differences in the initial estimators 
have only a marginal impact on the LSDVC performance. 
59 Iluang (2005) correct the weakness of this methodology by using the lag of explanatory variables instead 
inthercgression. Ilowcver, this case cannot be applied to the risk premia measures. Intuitivelythe risk 
prcmia is sensitive and reacts quickly to the shock in macroeconomic circumstances. 
C'o If the CCDP varible is proved to be endogenous, it is more proper to apply instrumental variable regres. 
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LSDV estimators by implementing Instrumental Variables estimation of the fixed effects 
Panel data models (IV-FE), allowing possibility of endogenous regressors. The rest of the 
variables are treated as strictly exogenous. 
We perform instrumental variables regression (or two stage least squares) to estimate 
the structural model for the risk premia, RP3_6t (equation (2.8) ). In the structural model, 
-RP3_6 is the endogenous dependent variable, GGDPt is an endogenous regressor, and the 
rest are exogenous variables. The first stage regression is modelled as 
t=a+, 8, DUBIt + -82DUBI; 
GGDP 2+ 03yt + Vi, t (2.9) 
where DUBIt is the natural log of crude oil price" (Arab Gulf Dubai) in US dollars per 
barrel, DUBI, 2 is the square of natural log of crude oil price and Yt is the real Gross 
Domestic Product per capita relative to the United States". We postulate that economic 
growth variable (GGDPt) is a function of DUBIt, DUBI, 2, and Yt. The variable Yt re- 
flects the degree of economic convergence. The change in oil price has short run impact6l 
on the economy. A significant increase in oil price ca n slow down the economic growth 
in oil importer countries through its effects on spending, or aggregate demand. It also si- 
multaneously create inflationary pressures through increased prices of oil products used by 
Sion. The limitation of the Kiviet's correction in the LSDVC measures is that it does not allow instruments. 
The oil price data are obtained from Datastream, 2006. 
62 Ile current per capita GDP expressed relative to the Unite4 states (US=100) is obtained from the Penn 
World Table, 2006. 
63 Under the assumption that the oil prices do not increase sharply and become higher than their already 
high levels, their long run effect can be manageable. Ibe impact of higher oil prices in the long run is that 
they possibly reduce the production capacity. However, dealing with the higher oil price in the long run can 
take place in many ways such as developing alternative energy sources and conserving the oil. Moreover, 
productivity gains from diverse sources, including technological improvements and a more highly educated 
workforce, are likely to exceed by a significant margin the productivity losses created by high oil prices 
(Berriankc, 2004). 
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consumers, such as gasoline and heating oil and prices of alternatives such as natural gas. 
T'hus GGDPt is expected to have significant negative relationships with the oil price. The 
nonlinear relationships are examined as well. GGDPt is also expected to have inverse re- 
lationship with the economic convergence variable, Yt. The country's real output relative 
to the United States implies the rate at which the economy catches up the United States. 
Countries with lower GDP per capita relative to the United States are expected to grow 
significantly faster than rich countries and they tend to catch up or converge to those with 
higher real per capi ta output in a faster speed. 
The IWE is introduced as a robustness check estimator instead of being the best 
estimator because the IWE estimator also has a weakness. Its properties hold for large 
number of cross sectional units (N), so it can be biased and imprecise in panel data with 
small number of N, such as most macro panels including this work. In conclusion, the 
Kiviet corrections address the problem of small sample bias, but it is invalid if there is 
endogeneity problem. In contrast, the IV can correct the endogeneity, but it is problem- 
atic in the small cross sectional samples. The rationale for choosing best estimators here 
is to compare the results of the IWE and the fixed effect regressions (LSDV). If the esti- 
mated coefficients and standard errors are not systematically different, we can emphasise 
the Kiviet approach based on the bias correction of the LSDV estimator. Then the initial 
guess that the economic growth variable is cndogenouS' is proved to be invalid as it does 
not change the results in the fixed cffect estimations. 
In the next section, we present the results of the risk premia regression using OLS, 
LSDV, IV-FE and LSDVC estimators. In the OLS, IV-FE and LSDV estimators, the stan- 
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dard errors computed are asymptotically robust to heteroskedasticity and serial correlation. 
'Me results will be presented in aggregate and subgroup estimates. The subgroup is deter- 
Mined by the country's income level. To pick up unobserved time effects, year dummies 
(zz7t) 
are included in all regressions in this study. 
2.6.2 The Regression results 
2.6.2.1 Whole sample results 
The panel regression results for the whole sample are presented in table 2.9, including 
estimation by OLS, LSDV, IV-FE and LSDVC. Estimated p-values are given in parentheses 
below point estimates of parameters. For each estimation procedure, the first column is the 
baseline specification. In these, we control for the impact of macroeconomic variables in 
the risk premia regression. In the second column, we add political variables to the baseline 
Model 
The results from the pooled regression (OLS) [in columns (1) and (2)] and the LSDV 
or the dynamic fixed effects estimator [columns (3) and (4)] are presented for comparisons 
With the result from the -best estimates, LSDVC [(columns (7) and (8)]. Before discussing 
the result from the LSDVC estimates, we check the robustness of these measures by IV-FE. 
The risk premia regression by IWE can be presented by columns (5) and (6). We test 
the validity of instruments in equation (2.9) by the Sargan-flansen test for over-identifying 
restriction". The results does not reject the null hypothesis that the instruments (DUBIt, 
DUBI, 2, and Yt) in equation (2.9) are valid instruments (p-value =0.973 and 0.960 in mod- 
64 See Ilayashi (2000) page 227-228,407,417 for fiather discussion. 
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els in columns (5) and (6), respectively). Thus the instruments are indeed exogenous and 
correctly excluded from the estimated equation. We also perform the Anderson (1984) 
canonical correlations test. It is a likelihood ratio test of whether the equation is identified, 
i. e. that the excluded instruments are relevant, meaning correlated with the endogenous re- 
P. ressors. We reject the null hypothesis that the equation is under-idcntified (p-value =0.00 
in both models in columns (5) and (6)). Thus, it indicates that the model is identified. 
We then compare the coefficients of parameter in LSDV and IV-FE regressions. The 
results suggest the effect of the economic growth is weaker after being instrumented. How- 
ever, the resulting coefficients of the lag dependent variables and the explanatory variables, 
and the standard errors in both measures are unchanged. We then employ the Hausman test 
to check whether there is a sufficient difference between the coefficients of the instrumental 
variables regression (IV-FE) and those of the standard fixed effect (LSDV). The Hausman 
test clearly indicates that coefficients estimated by IV-FE are not statistically different from 
those estimated by LSDV (the null hypothesis that different in coefficients is not system- 
atic is not rejected, with X2(7) = 0.45 and prob. > X2= 0.9996). This suggests that we can 
Ictriphasise on the results of the LSDVC estimates. We can now proceed the analysis of the 
estimated results from the preferred estimators, LSDVC. 
Ile estimated results from the LSDVC are as follows. First, the estimated coeffi- 
cients of the lagged dependent variable estimated by LSDVC lie between the OLS and 
LSDV estimates as proposed in the methodology section. 
Secondly, the greater real effective exchange rate volatility (VREER) and the lower 
economic growth (GGDP) are strongly suggestive of the higher the risk premia for hold- 
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iing government's short term assets (RP3-6). In both the baseline model and the second 
Model specifications (columns (7) and (8) of table 2.9, respectively), the real exchange rate 
Volatility (VREER) is a highly significant determinant of the risk premia and is significant 
at the I percent level. The results are robust across all estimates. In both the baseline spec- 
ification and the second model of the LSDVC estimates, the coefficients of the volatility 
'Of real effective exchange rate (VREER) in the risk premia (RP3_6) regression is 0.01. 
The interpretation is that as VREER increases by I unit, RP3-6 rises by 0.0372 percent 
annually'5- 
Economic growth (GGDP) significantly determines the risk premia (RP3_6) at the 
7 percent and the 5 percent levels in the first and second models, respectively. The results 
are consistent with the LSDV estimates. The coefficients of economic growth (GGDP) in 
the risk premia (RP3_6) regressions are -0.461 and -0.481 in the baseline specifications 
and in the second model of LSDVC estimates, respectively. In the baseline specification, 
as the economic growth increase by I percent annually", the risk premia decline by 1.4642 
Percent annually. In the second model, the risk premia decline by 1.5442 percent annually 
With respect to I percent increase in the economic growth". 
The finding that economic growth has an important explanatory role for the dynamics 
Of the yield curve corresponds to the work of Ang and Piazzesi (2003) which suggest that 
65 71is figure is obtained by anti-log procedure. The detailed calculation is presented in the Appendix to 
1hesis; Appendix A, section A. 1.1. 
Go We calculate the economic growth variable by initially using quarterly data. The unit of growth i's percent 
quarterly. Tic economic growth at quarter t is'CGDPg. It is defined as (In CDPt - In GDP&-4)14.71is is 
to avoid the seasonal effects. Intuitively, this chapter calculates the economic growth by comparing GDP at a 
Particular quarter this year with GDP at the same quarter in the following year. To convert it to annual data, 
We average the GDP growth of each quarter with , 
in a year. 
67 nese figures arc obtained by anti-log procedure. The detailed calculation is presented in the Appendix 
to 'Mesis; Appendix A, section A. 1.2. 
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macro factors explain up to 85 percent variation in bond yields"', and Hordahl, Tristani and 
Vestin (2006). 
It is interesting to note that coefficients of the economic growth are not statistically 
significant irr the OLS regressions (columns (1) and (2) of table 2.9). However, they are 
statistically significant in the regressions that include country fixed effects, qj (in equation 
(2.8)), which can be seen in columns (3) to (8) of table 2.9. Referring back to figures 2.4813 
and 2.49B, 'countries with higher average risk premia are growing faster perhaps due to 
convergence. In contrast, countries with lower risk premia tend to have slower economic 
growth. The economic growth rate thus correlates to the fixed country effects. For example, 
assets in the US have low risk because of a highly developed financial system, economic 
stability and relatively high market confidence. However, the economic growth rate in the 
US is not as high as in Mexico, which is less financially developed. The OLS fails to dis- 
tinguish the country specific factors, it thus bias coefficients of the economic growth in the 
risk premia regression back down to zero. This explains why the coefficients of GGDP 
are not statistically significant in the OLS regression. In contrast, fixed effect estimation 
distinguishes institutional features of high and low income countries. Fixed effect estima- 
tion allows the influence of economic growth on the risk premia, holding country effects 
constant. 
68 Considering a reverse relationship between the risk prcmia and the economic growth, some other works 
use the yield curve to predict the macroeconomic conditions such as Ang, Piazzesi and Wei (2006). illese 
studies find that the term spread has limited power in forecasting GDP growth but the short tem interest 
rates perform better in predicting GDP growth. Accordingly, we check for the causal relationships between 
the risk premia and the economic growth and found that the risk prcmia does not determine the risk premia. 
Thus, we can be safe from the endogeneity problem. 
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A key finding is the strong statistical relationship between exchange rate volatility 
(VREER) and risk premia (RP3_6). Intuitively, an investment decision is made under 
uncertainty over the economic environment such as exchange rates, and future tax and reg- 
ulatory policy. An uncertainty in assets return and foreign exchange is generally captured 
by their series volatility. The risk averse investors tend to require higher risk premia for 
holding assets denominated in the higher volatile currency. 
We found that government debt (DEBTGDP) and the fiscal deficit (DEFGDP) 
do not detennine the risk premia in the panel regression". Ibis corresponds to Larnfalussy 
(1989) who argued that the fiscal stance of goverrunents is often insufficiently reflected in 
risk premia. 
In the OLS regression, the coefficients on DEBTGDP are significant at the 6 per- 
cent and the 7 percent levels, respectively (see columns (1) and (2) of table 2.9). However, 
the fixed country effects eliminate the importance of DEBTGDP. From these results, we 
can infer that DEBTGDP may be important but it correlates with the fixed effects. It is 
likely to be the data problem since the series observed are quite short and do not vary much 
over time. 
Finally, the political variables (POLCON and ICRG) have limited explanatory 
power to the risk premia. In a preliminary test using a simple pair-wise correlation, both 
variables appear to be individually significant at the I percent level. However, the effect 
of these two variables is weak in the panel regression. This is partially because of the 
69 Even though the risk premia appear to be significantly positively relate to the government debt as a per. 
centage of GDP (DEBTCDP) at the 10 percent level in OLS regression (columns (1) and (2) of table 2.9). 
However, the estimates do not wipe out all the country's time invariant fixed effects that can influence the 
dctenninant of the risk prernia. Thus the results from the OLS regressions are subjected to bias. 
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time dummies (cut) in the regression. Adding time dummies is a conventional way to pick 
up unobserved time effect. However, it is important to note that with the time dummies, 
we cannot identify variables whose change across time is common to each country. It is 
possible that the ICRG index is collinear with the time dummies. As a result, the political 
risk index does not significantly determine the risk premia when the time dummies are 
included (Note that removing the time effects from the LSDV and LSDVC estimations in 
table 2.9, we found that the ICRG index become significant at 5 and 12 percent level, 
respectively". ). 
We can conclude" that risk-averse investors tend to require less risk premia for hold- 
ing government assets in countries with good economic performance e. g. high economic 
growth and stable external price competitive position e. g. low volatility of real effective ex- 
change rate. Although with caveats, the political variable and government fiscal conditions 
have limited ability to explain the risk premia. 
2.6.2.2. Sub-samples 
In this subsection, we split the data according to income groups (high income and 
lower income groups) to restrict the income heterogeneity across countries. The definition 
of high/lower income countries is according to the World Bank (2006) country classifica- 
tion72. The details of this classification are presented in the last column of table 2.1. This 
71 Removing the time dummies from LSDV and LSDVC models, the coefficients (and probability) of ICRC 
are -0.068 (p=0.04) and -0.062 (p=0.12), respectively. 
71 Lastly the results for a reduced panel where the countries with no time-variation in volatility are omitted 
is presented in appendix to table 2.9. Comparing with the panel regression with full sample in table 2.9, the 
results are quite similar. To maintain the sample size, we keep results in table 2.9 as the main finding. 
72 For operational and analytical purposes, the World Bank's main criterion for classifying economies is 
gross national income (GNI) per capita. Based on its GNI per capita, every economy is classified as low 
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definition is consistent with the cross section regression in the previous part. We start with 
the panel estimations of the countries in the high income group. 
High income group 
The panel regression results for the high income countries are presented in table 2.10. 
The data set consist of 21 countries. We find that the country's real effective exchange 
rate (REER) highly positively determines the risk premia (RP3_6) across all estimates 
and model specifications. The estimated coeffficient of this variable is significant at the I 
percent level in LSDV and LSDVC estimators. Comparing with the full sample regression 
in previous part, the impact of the real effective exchange rate volatility (VREER) become 
less strong here and is significant at about the 10 percent level in LSDVC (see columns (5)- 
(6) of table 2.10). 
The strong positive relationship between real effective exchange rate and the risk pre- 
mia in the sub-sample is intuitively reasonable'. As mentioned earlier, REER measures 
the currency appreciation/ depreciation against weighted basket of foreign currencies and 
adjusts for relative prices between countries. A real depreciation lowers the country risk 
prernia in financial robust country by shifting demand toward domestic goods as in the 
Mundell and Fleming model. This in turn raises output and the return earned by entrepre- 
neurs. This also corresponds to Cespedes, Chang and Velasco (2004) which suggest that in 
the financial vulnerable countries, a real depreciation raises the country risk premium; in 
income, middle income (subdivided into lower middle and upper middle), or high income. 
73 Ile real effective exchange rate (REER) does not appear to significantly determine the risk prcmia in 
the full sample regression. This is possibly due to the income heterogeneity across samples as we primarily 
find that initial income is an important determinant of the risk premia in the cross section regression. 
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contrast, country with financial robustness, the opposite happens. In the LSDVC estimates, 
the coefficients of REER in the risk premia regressions are 0.059 and 0.058 in the first 
and second models, respectively (see columns (5) and (6) of table 2.10). The interpretation 
is as follows, a basis point increase in REER index associates with 0.224 percent increase 
annually in the risk premia in the baseline model (and 0.220 percent increase annually in 
the risk premia in the second model)". 
The effect of VREER is weaker in this sub-sample. The coefficient of VREER in 
the risk premia regression is 0.005 in both the first and second models using LSDVC esti- 
mates (see columns (5) and (6) of table 2.10). Thus, we can infer that as the VREER increases 
by I unit, the risk premia increase by 0.0 18 units" (the size of coefficients on VREER is 
half of those in the whole sample regression). 
Other macroeconomic variables also determine the risk premia such as economic 
growth (GGDP), inflation (INFL) and government budget deficit as a percentage of 
GDP (DEFGDP). 
Economic growth (GGDP) negatively determines the risk prcmia and is significant 
at the 10 percent level in the LSDV and LSDVC models (columns (3)-(6) of table 2.10). In 
the LSDVC estimates, the coefficients of GGDP in the risk premia regression are -0.337 
and -0.319 in the first and second models, respectively" (columns (5) and. (6) of table 
2.10). As economic growth increase by I percent per annum, the risk premia decline by 
74 These figures are obtained by anti-log procedure. The detailed calýulation is presented in the Appendix 
to Thesis; Appendix A, section A. 2.1. 
75 These figures are obtained by anti-log procedure. The detailed calculation is presented in the Appendix 
to Thesis; Appendix A, section A. 2.2. 
76 Ilese figures are obtained by anti-log procedure. The detailed calculation is presented in the Appendix 
to Thesis; Appendix A, section A. 2.3. 
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1.002 percent annually in the first model and 0.940 percent annually in the second model, 
respectively. 
In the OLS regression using a whole sample, the coefficient of GGDP is found to be 
statistically insignificant (as shown in table 2.9 columns (1) and (2)). However, using the. 
sample of high income country group, the coefficient of GGDP become significant at the 
5 percent level in OLS regressions (see columns (1) and (2) in table 2.10). This is because 
using the sub-sample helps restricting the income heterogeneity across countries. Since 
high income countries tend to have high economic growth and vice-a-versa, the growth 
data is also less heterogenous here". The dividing samples by income group helps partially 
control for the country fixed effect and thus it allows the data to explain more variation in 
the risk premia. 
Inflation (INFL) and government budget deficit as a percentage of GDP (DEFGDP) 
positively determine the risk premia and are significant at the 10 percent level in the LS- 
DVC estimates. The coefficients of INFL in the risk premia regression are 0.029 and 
0.027 in the first and second models, respectively (see columns (5) and (6) of table 2.10). 
As the inflation increase by I percent per annum, the risk premia increase by 0.017 per- 
cent annually in the first model and 0.016 percent annually in the second model". The 
coefficients of DEF in the risk premia regression are 0.021 in both the first and second 
77 This support our argument earlier that the OLS regressions fail to distinguish the association of the low 
ri 
, 
sk and low growth countries in the full samples. 
78 These figures are obtained by anti-log procedure. The detailed calculation is presented in the Appendix 
to Thesis; Appendix A, section A. 2A. 
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models. As deficit increase by I percentage of GDP, the risk premia increase by 0.004 
percent annually". 
Medium to Low income group 
The panel regression results for Medium to low income groups are presented in table 
2.11. The sample size in this group is very small'O. We thus consider dropping the dynamic 
analysis and the time dummies in the regression of the lower income group (as presented 
in table 2.11). This section therefore only roughly explains the relationship between risk 
premia and explanatory variables in these countries. The results from the OLS regression 
and the LSDV estimates are presented in table 2.11. 
The fixed effect estimations in column (4) of table 2.11 show that the volatility of 
real effective exchange rate (VREER) and inflation (INFL) are the main determinants 
of the risk premia. The coefficients of VREER and INFL are significant at I percent 
and 5 percent level respectively. Although the real effective exchange rate (REER) does 
not significantly determine the risk premia, it is interesting to discuss the sign of the co- 
efficient of this variable (see column (4) of table 2.11). There is a negative relationship 
between the risk premia and REER which is in contrast to the results from the high in- 
come country group. One possible explanation here is that the medium to low income 
countries are countries with vulnerable financial systems. According to Cespedes, Chang 
79 These figures are obtained by anti-log procedure. The detailed calculation is presented in the Appendix 
to Thesis; Appendix A, section A. 2.5. 
80 Initially, there are 13 countries in medium to low income group. However, 5 countries such as Turkey, 
South Africa, Uruguay, Hungary, and Poland are outliers. We drop observations of these 5 countries. After 
cutting outliers, there are 8 countries left for examinations which arc Brazil, Colombiý, Czech Republic, 
India, Malaysia, Mexico, Philippines and Thailand. 
2.6 Panel Data Analysis 72 
and Velasco (2004) a real depreciation has positive relationship with the country risk pre- 
mium in financial vulnerable countries. In conventional textbook, expansionary monetary 
policy and depreciation of the currency are optimal in response to an adverse foreign shock. 
In practice, if an economy has a large debt denominated in foreign currency then a weaker 
local currency can also exacerbate debt service difficulties and wreck the balance sheets 
of domestic banks and firms. Ibis channel may cause devaluations to be contractionary, 
not expansionary. As documented by Hausmann, Panizza and Stein (2001) and Calvo and 
Reinhart (2002), balance sheet effects have emerged as a prime reason why many central 
banks are reluctant to allow their currencies to devalue in response to external shocks. 
Although the coefficient of GGDP is significant at the 10 percent level in the fixed 
effects estimation in column (4), its predictive power is not strong after omitting other in- 
significant variables. The model in column (5) is the result of omitting all insignificant 
variables; VREER and INFL are still significantly determine the risk premia and are 
significant at I percent and 10 percent level respectively. In the regression of columns (4) 
and (5), there are only 4 countries observed here which are Colombia, Malaysia, Philip- 
pines and Czech Republic. This is because the data for REER are not available in Brazil, 
Mexiýo, India, and Thailand. 
In column (6), if we omit REER from the regression, we can observe data for 8 
countries which are BTazil, Colombia, Czech Republic, India, Malaysia, Mexico, Philip- 




This study generates monthly risk prcmia data using zero coupon govcnuncnt treasury bills 
for 43 countries over the period of 1994-2006. The measure of risk premia is based on the 
ARCH-in-Mean (ARCH-M) model introduced by Engle, Lilien and Robins (1987). We 
show that the risk premia are time varying and also vary considerably between countries. 
This study also examines the macroeconomic and political determinants of the risk premia 
by using cross section regressions and dynamic panel regression analysis. 
The cross section regression shows that on average through 1994-2006, the risk pre- 
mia for holding government assets required by risk averse investors is positively influenced 
by the level of inflation and the deficit as a percentage of GDP and is negatively detennined 
by the country"s economic growth. Additionally, lower income countries are estimated to 
have risk prcmia about 19 percent more than in the high income countries outside the Euro- 
zone, holding other variables constant. In the high income countries Outside the Eurozonc, 
the risk premia on holding government assets is predicted to be 10 pcrcent more than those 
in Eurozone. 
Using panel regression analysis, we found that economic growth and the volatility of 
the real effective exchange rate are the main determinants of risk premia in the full sample 
regression. Risk averse investors require lower risk premia for holding government assets 
in countries with good economic performance e. g. high economic growth and stable ex- 
ternal price competitive position e. g. low volatility of real effective exchange rAte. If we 
split the sample by income group, the real effective exchange rate which rcflects country's 
external price competitiveness plays important role in high income countries. In the high 
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income countries, the devaluation of currency brings in the favorable result to the economy. 
This is consistent with the Mundell-Fleming model. There is a better price competitiveness 
which in turn reduces the country risk premia. The opposite relationship is found in the re- 
gression, of lower income countries. The possible explanation is that in financial vulnerable 
countries, weaker local currency can exacerbate the external debt service difficulties which 
result in economic contraction. Thi. s in turn raises the country risk premia. However, the 
impact of the level of real effective exchange rate is less strong in the low income group. 
For lower income countries, the volatility of the real effective ýxchange rate which reflects 
uncertainty in the exchange rate market plays important role in determining the risk pre- 
mia. The higher real exchange rate volatility, the greater risk premia require for holding 
government assets in that country. 
The institutional variables and the government fiscal conditions have limited power 
in explaining the risk premia in this study. This is possibly due to the measurement errors. 
Lastly, it is useful to discuss the policy recommendations as follows. The member- 
ship of the European Monetary Union is proved to reduce the risk prcmia in this study. 
The economic growth is good as it associates with lower risk premia. On the average of 
time (using cross section regression), the inflation and the budgetary positions tend to have 
strong effect on the economy which is on contrary to the IMF conventional wisdom. 
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Table 2.3: Descriptive Statistics for Excess holding yield for the 3 month 
comparing to 6 month Treasurv bills rates. 
Country Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Obs* 
USA 0.35 0.40 -0.33 1.90 130 
UK 0.20 0.38 -0.56 1.38 131 
AUSTRIA 0.15 0.28 -0.46 0.95 131 
BELGIUM 0.16 0.37 -1.42 1.57 131 
DENMARK 0.22 0.37 -0.70 1.35 131 
FRANCE 0.14 0.41 -1.49 1.74 131 
GERMANY 0.09 0.27 -0.46 0.91 131 
ITALY 0.23 0.48 -1.81 1.74 131 
NETHERLANDS 0.16 0.29 -0.46 1.09 131 
NORWAY 0.03 0.67 -3.15 1.66 131 
SWEDEN 0.28 0.39 -0.83 1.50 131 
SWITZERLAND 0.21 0.40 -0-88 1.20 131 
CANADA 0.34 0.56 -0.95 2.68 131 
JAPAN 0.11 0.39 -1.73 1.57 190 
FINLAND 0.16 0.43 -0-73 2.02 131 
GREECE 0.11 0.22 -0.47 0.83 63 
IRELAND 0.10 0.43 -1.45 1.44 131 
PORTUGAL 0.20 0.50 -1.11 1.97 131 
SPAIN 0.17 0.32 -0-58 1.11 131 
TURKEY 0.11 1.63 -5.03 5.33 35 
AUSTRALIA 0.12 0.46 -0.75 2.17 131 
NEW ZEALAND 0.14 0.74 -1.44 3.49 131 
SOUTH AFRICA 0.79 1.58 -7.49 5.88 131 
ARGENTINA -3.95 18.09 -71.72 52.48 42 
BRAZIL 1.00 4.27 -9.80 22.75 89 
COLOMBIA 0.57 1.73 -4.49 5.69 89 
MEXICO 0.56 1.23 -2.42 7.91 89 
URUGUAY -0.99 9.73 -38.55 20.22 64 
ISRAEL 0.03 1.26 -3.67 2.62 108 
SRI LANKA 0.14 0.37 -0.53 1.13 71 
HONG KONG 0.34 1.06 -3.51 4.93 131 
INDIA 0.36 0.56 -1.54 1.81 84 
INDONESIA 0.17 0.36 -0.47 1.18 71 
KOREA 0.59 0.44 -0.39 1.56 74 
MALAYSIA 0.18 0.37 -1.04 1.56 74 
PHILIPPINES 1.91 2.10 -7.36 9.33 121 
SINGAPORE 0.11 0.77 -1.87 2.64 131 
THAILAND 0.19 0.44 -1.20 1.27 131 
CHINA 0.02 0.03 -0.04 0.07 26 
CZECH REPUBLIC 0.46 0.73 -0.51 4.18 90 
SLOVAK REPUBLIC 0.28 0.64 -0.56 1.42 23 
HUNGARY 0.02 1.40 -3.36 3.62 89 
POLAND 
. 
0.17 1.48 -4.28 6.86 90 
* Obs stands for number of months observed. 
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Table 2.4: Descriptive Statistics for the estimated risk premia for holding 3 
month comparing to 6 month Treasury bills (RP3 6) 
Country Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Obs* 
USA 0.24 0.21 -0.04 0.87 133 
UK 0.18 0.20 -0-07 0.78 133 
AUSTRIA 0.13 0.06 0.03 0.27 133 
BELGIUM 0.17 0.10 0.05 0.40 133 
DENMARK 0.20 0.15 0.00 0.59 133 
FRANCE 0.14 0.23 -0.09 0.84 133 
GERMANY 0.06 0.10 -0.09 0.34 133 
ITALY 0.19 0.10 0.06 0.41 133 
NETHERLANDS 0.14 0.05 0.07 0.30 133 
NORWAY 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.08 133 
SWEDEN 0.25 0.08 0.15 0.50 133 
SWITZERLAND 0.27 0.13 0.09 0.56 133 
CANADA 0.25 0.13 0.09- 0.65 133 
JAPAN 0.09 0.08 0.01 0.32 192 
FINLAND 0.13 0.05 0.05 0.31 133 
GREECE 0.10 0.04 0.06 0.22 65 
IRELAND 0.12 - 0.06 0.05 0.33 133 
PORTUGAL 0.16 0.10 0.04 0.42 133 
SPAIN 0.14 0.10 0.00 0.36 133 
TURKEY - - - - 38 
AUSTRALIA 0.10 0.25 -0.24 0.93 133 
NEW ZEALAND 0.11 0.16 -0-05 0.65 133 
SOUTH AFRICA 0.70 0.23 0.50 1.62 133 
ARGENTINA 0.80 1.01 0.03 3.33 45 
BRAZIL 0.88 0.85 0.08 3.07 91 
COLOMBIA 0.61 0.52 -0-03 1.90 91 
MEXICO 0.53 0.52 0.00 2.13 91 
URUGUAY 0.59 1.94 -4.32 2.57 66 
ISRAEL 0.15 0.16 -0.23 0.39 110 
SRI LANKA 0.16 0.03 0.07 0.20 74 
HONG KONG 0.42 0.11 0.32 0.75 133 
INDIA 0.36 0.29 0.06 1.31 86 
INDONESIA 0.17 0.00 0.16 0.17 74 
KOREA 0.54 0.21 0.22 1.05 76 
MALAYSIA 0.23 0.14 0.08 0.57 76 
PHILIPPINES 1.98 0.58 1.49 3.60 123 
SINGAPORE 0.09 0.16 -0-10 0.52 133 
THAILAND 0.21 0.12 0.08 0.66 133 
CHINA - - - 28 
CZECH REPUBLIC 0.41 0.38 0.03 1.63 92 
SLOVAK REPUBLIC - 24 
HUNGARY 0.16 0.56 -1-14 0.85 91 
POLAND 0.26 0.41 -0.88 0.68 92 
* Obs stands for number of months observed. 
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Oýt-'able 2.5: Results from ARCH-M regression using the excess holding yield of 3 month 
r. -qDmi)axing to 6 month. 
ARCH-M ARCH 
: No. Country CE o CE I 
USA -0.32 (-2.02)** 1.61 (3.49)*** 0.02 (0-80) 0.95 (3.79)*** 
UK -1.00 (-1.78)* 3.35 (1-99)** 0.06 (1.92)* 0.55 (1.86)* 
AUSTRIA -0.07 (-1.07) 0.75 (2.45)* 0.01 (2., 13)* 0.84 (4.10)*** 
BELGIUM 0.01 (0.28) 0.42 (3.02)*** 0.00 (0-32) 1.52 (9.27)*** 
DENMARK -0.24 
(-2-32)** 1.39 (3.63)*** 0.03 (2.57)*** 0.79 (3.78)*** 
FRANCE -0.20 
(-5.27)*** 1.06 (5.91)*** 0.01 (1.24) 1.07 (6.69)*** 
GERMANY -0.26 
(-2.92)*** 1.29 (3.11)*** 0.01 (1.38) 0.87 (3.89)*** 
ITALY 0.00 (0-03) 0.40 (1-90)* 0.01 (1.32) 1.27 (7.45)*** 
NETHERLANDS -0.01 (-0.17) 0.57 (1.67)* 0.01 (1-03) 0.89 (3.59)*** ýL 10 NORWAY 0.00 (0-03) 0.03 (0.26) 0.00 (0-15) 1.34 (9.45)*** 4-: 1 SWEDEN -0.32 








0.02 (0-90) 1.08 (7.12)*** 




0.28 (3-69) 0.00 (1.22) 1.13 (11.29)*** 








2 (0 53) 
0.60 (1.25) 0.01 (1.46) 0.77 (2-67)*** 






0.01 (1.13) 1.08 (5-68)*** 






0.01 (2.09)** 1.04 (6-13)*** 
U SPAIN -0.1 . 0.88 (2.91) 0.01 (0.80) 0.97 (4.31)*** 






. 0.11 (-0.57) 1.05 (5.05)*** 
I AUSTRALIA - . . ** 
1.94 (4.42) 0.04 (1.47) 0.82 (4.11)*** 






(2.29)** 0.03 (1.46) 0.96 (5.16)*** 
SOUTH AFRICA . . . 3 (0.81) 0.15 (0-99) 1-10 
"I ARGENTINA -0.05 
(409) 0.05 (0.26) 0.05 (0-03) 2.45 (4.88)*** 
BRAZIL -0.03 







0.01 (0-07) 1.15 (5.21)*** 
MEXICO -0. . 0.69 (3-94) 0.01 (0.41) 1.12 (6.31)*** 
URUGUAY 4.16 (1.49) -0.39 (-0.90) 14.79 (1.79)* 0.96 (4.47)*** 
ISRAEL 0.68 (1-13) -0.43 (-0-85) 0.42 (2.14)** 0.72 (3.74)*** 
tj SRI LANKA 0.32 (1-12) 
** 
-0.44 (-0-55) 0.06 (1-15) 0.61 (1.31) 
I 
IZII 
HONG KONG 0.28 (2.23) 
*** 




(-2.78) 1.64 (4-03)*** 0.10 (3.24)*** 0.68 (3.42)*** 
INDONESIA 0.18 (0-39) -0.04 (403) 0.07 (1.14) 0.49 (0.81) 
KOREA -0.66 
(-0.86) 3.01 (1.53) 0.05 (0.87) 0.67 (1.55) 
MALAYSIA 0.04 (1.25) 0.43 (2.12)** 0.00 (-0.14) 1.94 (5-07)*** 
PHILIPPINES -0-01 (-0.01) 1.02 (2.50)** 2.03 (7.60)*** 0-50 (3.27)*** 
SINGAPORE -0.26 
(-2.07)** 0.50 (2.27)** 0.06 (1.43) 0.92 (4.34)*** 
It 
! 
THAILAND -0.12 (-1.12) 
*** 5 6 





CHINA 2.31 . 8) 
( -82.78 (. ) 0.00 ( . 71) 0.04 (1.29) 1 CZECH R. -0.12 (-1.15) 0.98 (3.19)*** 0.01 (0.74) 1-19 (7.05)*** 
SLOVAK R. Flat Log likelihood 
HUNGARY 3.80 (1.54) -2.93 (-1.39) 0.80 
(1.85)* 0.49 (1.44) 
POLAND 0.86 (4.29)*** -0.49 (-2'. 02)** 0.03 (0.32) 1-07 L6-ý97ý* 
k%-, 10tes: 'Figures in parenthesis () are t-ratios. *** indicates that a coefficient is significant at the 1% level ý'rkificant at the 5% level, and * significant at the 10% level. 
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Appendix Table A: Descriptive Statistics for Excess holding yield for the 3 month comparing to 12 month Treasury bills rates. 
Country Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Obs 
USA 1.69 2.03 -1.88 7.26 124 
UK 0.83 1.44 -1.88 4.54 125 
AUSTRIA 1.10 1.35 -1.61 4.59 125 
BELGIUM 1.07 1.70 -2.73 6.58 125 
DENMARK 1.90 1.70 -1.44 7.34 125 
FRANCE 1.04 1.41 -1.43 6.10 125 
GERMANY 0.76 1.45 -2.17 5.18 125 
ITALY 1.63 1.89 -3.73 7.11 125 
NETHERLANDS 1.07 1.45 -1.61 5.77 125 
NORWAY 0.47 2.84 -9.02 6.37 125 
SWEDEN 2.10 2.00 -1.57 7.40 125 
SWITZERLAND 1.31 1.65 -2.89 5.90 125 
CANADA 1.98 2.08 -1.04 7.16 125 
JAPAN 0.89 1.61 -3.63 6.36 184 
FINLAND 1.19 1.98 -2.13 7.71 125 
GREECE 0.98 1.10 -1.56 3.84 57 
IRELAND 0.81 1.86 -3.46 5.95 125 
PORTUGAL 1.22 2.17 -4.16 8.04 125 
SPAIN 1.33 1.68 -1.55 6.02 125 
TURKEY 1.67 4.95 -5.59 20.51 29 
AUSTRALIA 0.90 1.92 -2.28 7.28 125 
NEW ZEALAND 0.31 2.82 -5.76 9.65 125 
SOUTH AFRICA 2.06 5.44 -17.63 17.56 125 
ARGENTINA -19.79 48.96 -189-72 22.96 36 
BRAZIL 5.07 14.68 -35.00 80.73 83 
COLOMBIA 3.51 5.42 -4.39 26.22 83 
MEXICO 3.22 3.81 -2.07 22.94 83 
URUGUAY -10.97 35.15 -112.44 47.69 58 
ISRAEL 1.21 4.37 -11.92 9.46 102 
SRILANKA 0.82 1.69 -2.09 5.59 65 
HONG KONG 1.98 3.60 -7.11 16.71 125 
INDIA 1.96 1.99 -2.51 7.35 78 
INDONESIA 0.99 1.77 -1.79 6.27 65 
KOREA 3.04 2.10 -1.26 7.89 68 
MALAYSIA 1.03 1.05 -1.88 3.77 68 
PHILIPPINES 7.42 7.40 -14.38 28.98 115 
SINGAPORE 0.74 1.89 -3.75 7.96 125 
THAILAND 1.39 1.74 -3.79 6.75 125 
CHINA 0.14 0.12 -0.06 0.32 20 
CZECH REPUBLIC 2.74 3.31 -0.74 15.80 '84 
SLOVAK REPUBLIC 2.19 2.07 -2.02 . 
4.12 17 
HUNGARY 0.40 5.38 -16-06 8.81 83 
POLAND 0.63 7.13 -17.17 18.11 84 
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Appendix Table B: Descriptive Statistics for the estimated risk premia, for holding 3 month comparing to 12 month Treasury bills (RP3 12) 
, 
Country Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Obs 
USA 0.81 1.77 -2.06 5.96 133 
UK - - - - - AUSTRIA 0.93 0.27 0.53 1.57 133 
BELGIUM 0.87 0.33 0.40 1.87 133 
DENMARK 1.87 0.90 0.84 4.56 133 
FRANCE 0.72 0.54 -0.11 2.46 133 
GERMANY 0.84 0.58 0.13 2.58 133 
ITALY 1.22 0.52 0.43 2.45 133 
NETHERLANDS 0.89 0.32 0.41 1.74 133 
NORWAY 0.76 0.01 0.72 0.77 133 
SWEDEN 1.74 0.56 1.12 3.39 133 
SWITZERLAND 1.16 0.32 0.73 1.94 133 
CANADA 1.25 0.79 0.29 3.14 133 
JAPAN 0.71 0.65 0.04 2.36 192 
FINLAND 0.90 0.40 0.39 2.18 133 
GREECE - - - 
IRELAND 0.73 0.17 0.50 1.20 133 
PORTUGAL 1.07 0.55 0.46 2.35 133 
SPAIN 1.02 0.42 0.45 2.05 133 
TURKEY - - - - - 
AUSTRALIA 0.50 1.23 -1.19 4.45 133, 
NEW ZEALAND 0.08 0.87 -1.10 2.82 133 
SOUTH AFRICA 2.57 0.07 2.49 2.79 133 
ARGENTINA 3.42 3.03 0.69 9.86 45 
BRAZIL 5.05 5.16 0.75 20.15 91 
COLOMBIA 2.66 2.33 -0.36 9.85 91 
MEXICO 2.48 2.30 -0.33 9.68 91 
URUGUAY -1.34 22.07 -51.18 22.46 66 
ISRAEL 2.38 1.12 -0.40 3.84 110 
SRILANKA 0.90 0.37 -0.03 1.42 74 
HONG KONG 2.45 0.53 1.84 3.70 133 
INDIA 1.36 1.68 -1.61 5.85 86 
INDONESIA 1.16 0.25 0.58 1.53 74 
KOREA 2.43 1.74 -0.08 6.89 76 
MALAYSIA 1.25 0.87 0.36 3.47 76 
PHILIPPINES 7.46 1.54 5.77 12.25 123 
SINGAPORE 0.46 1.10 -1.22 3.96 133 
THAILAND 1.71 2.09 -(L16 10-51 133 
CHINA - - - - - 
CZECH REPUBLIC - - - - 
SLOVAK REPUBLIC - - - - 
HUNGARY - - - - 
POLAND 1.60 3.90 -8.43 5.48 92 
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Appendix Table C: Results from ARCH-M regression using the excess holding yield 
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ARCH-M 
-14.07 (-1.76)* 







































Flat Log likelihood 
Flat Log likelihood 
Flat Log likelihood 
Flat Log likelihood 
7.55 (7.46)*** 
ARCH 
v ao ai 
10.60 (1-89)* 0.93 (1-51) 0.54 (1.76)* 
0.47 (3.24)*** . 0.11 (1.17) 0.97 (4.28)*** 
0.39 (3.14)*** 0.04 (0.48) 1.11 (5.74)*** 
1.01 (7.19)*** 0.12 (1.54) 1.01 (4.93)*** 
1.04 (4.83)*** 0.07 (0.65) 0.99 (4.33)*** 
0.69 (6.59)*** 0.04 (0.38) 1.06 (4.81)*** 
0.62 (4-84)*** 0.06 (0.58) 1.07 (5.81)*** 
0.48 (4.2)*** 0.06 (0.88) 1.05 (5.81)*** 
-0.01 (-0.04) 0.91 
(3.03ý*** 0.92 (5.19)*** 
0.86 (2.06)** 0.46 (1.29) 0.80 (3-32)*** 
0.41 (2.27)** 0.18 (1.86)* 1.03 (5.10)*** 
0.97 (2-36)** 0.24 (0.97) 0.92 (3.51)*** 
0.68 (7.23)*** 0.00 (1.36) 0.99 (8.41)*** 
0.44 (3.02)*** 0.11 (0.80) 1.00 (4.40)*** 
0.20 (1.04) 0.15 (1.27) 0.98 (4.79)*** 
0.43 (2.90)*** 0.10 (1.68)* 1.03 (6.06)*** 
0.57 (3.15)*** 0.12 (0.97) 0.98 (4.13)*** 
34.07 (0-05) 19-32 (2.15)** 0.03 (0.05) 
3.16 (3.24)*** 0.65 (1.57) 0.77 (3.50)*** 
0.73 (4.20)*** 0.27 (1.08) 1.01 (5.44)*** 
0.03 (0.11) . 2.35 (0.88) 0.97 (3.98)*** 
0.05 (0.15) -2.16 (-0.08) 2.55 (2.83)*** 
0.65 (2.71)*** 13.57 (3.51)*** 0.99 (5.37)*** 
1.08 (3.16)*** 1.44 (0.91) 1.08 (5.43)*** 
1.10 (6.52)*** -0.18 (-0.49) 1.39 (7.88)*** 
-2.35 (-1.97)** 145.22 (0.59) 0.78 (1.99)** 
-0.58 (-1.92)* 2.23 (1.70)* 1.02 (4.27)*** 
-0.57 (-1.87)* 0.30 (0.80) 0.95 (2.93)*** 
0.23 (1.48) 0.43 (0.87) 1.26 (5.64)*** 
21.71 (0.78) 1.40 (2.73)*** 0.22 (0.77). 
-0.42 (-1.11) 0.46 (1.01) 0.91 (2.85)*** 
15.74 (0.98) 0.95 (1.42) 0.39 0.97) 
0.93 (4.15)*** 0.01 (0.55) 1.55 (5.16)*** 
0.46 (2.02)** 7.39 (2.55)** 0.91 (4.74)*** 
2.46 (3.44)*** 0.46 (1.72)* 0.82 (3.87)*** 
2.66 (6.63)*** 0.18 (1.10) 1.23 (7.24)*** 
-1.20 (-4.65)*** -1.90 0.90 (3.90)*** 
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Appendix Table D: Variables and Definitions used in the Cross section regression 
for the risk premia (RP3_6). 
Variable Description Source 
RP3 
-6 
Natural log of country's mean risk premia, 1994-2006 Calculation 
GDP94 Natural log of Gross domestic product in 1994 (national currency) IFS, 2006 
INFL Natural log of mean inflation, 1994-2006. IFS, 2006 
REER Natural log of mean REER, 1994-2006. IFS, 2006 
Natural log of standard deviation of Real effective exchange rate over 1994- 
VREER 2006. Calculation 
GGDP Natural log of mean GDP growth, 1994-2006. Calculation 
DEFGDP Natural log of (1+0. lDEFIGDP). Nalculation 
DEBTGDP Natural log of mean debt as a percentage of GDP, 1994-2006 Calculation 
POLCON5 Natural log of mean POLCON5,1994-2006. Heinsz, 2005. 
The PRS group, 
ICRG Natural log of mean ICRG, 1994-2006 2006 
Appendix Table E: Variables and Definitions used in the Panel regression analysis 
for the risk premia (RP3_6). 
Variable Description Source 
6 RP3 Natural log of (1+0. lRP3_6) Calculation 
- ODP94 Natural log of Gross domestic product in 1994 (national currency) IFS, 2006 
INFL Natural log of (1+0. lINFL) IFS, 2006 
REER Natural log of REER IFS, 2006 
The annually observed VREER is calculated by taking natural log to 
VREER standard deviation of REER over 12 month periods. Calculation 
GGDP Annually observed GDP growth. Calculation 
DEFGDP Natural log of (1+(DEFGDP/30)) Calculation 
DEBTGDP Natural log of government debt (%GDP) Calculation 
POLCON5 Natural log of POLCON5 Ileinsz, 2005. 
The PRS group, 
ICRG Natural log of ICRG 2006 
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Figure 2: Excess holding yield of 6 month Treasury Bills and estimated risk 
premia for 43 countries 
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Figure 2.34: Portugal 
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Figure 2.44: Average risk premium for 3 months versus 6 months treasury 
bills (1994-2006). 
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Figure 2.45: Average risk premium for 3 months versus 12 months treasury 
bills. 
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Figure 2.46: Risk premia for 3 months versus 6 months treasury bills: 
comparisons by country groups 
A: Risk premia for non-OECD countries 
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B: Risk premia for OECD countries 
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Figure 2.47: Risk premia, for 3 months versus 6 months treasury bills: 
compaxisons by income 
A: Risk premia, for lower income countries 






B: Risk premia for high income countries 
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Figure 2.48: Vaxiable plots, average 1994-2006 
Figure 2.48A: Initial level of income 
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Source: IFS. 2006 
Figure 2.48B: Average economic growth over 1994-2006. 
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Figure 2.48C: Average inflation over 1994-2006. 
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Figure 2.48F: Government budget deficit (% GDP), 1994-2006. 
Mean budget deficit(-)/surplus(+) (% of GDP), 1994-2006 
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Figure 2.48H: Average political risk rating from International country risk 
guide (ICRG), 1994-2006. 
Mean political risk index, 1994-2006 
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Figure 2.481: Political constraint index (POLCON5), 1994-2006. 
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Figure 2.49: Bivariate regression plots of mean value of country's risk premia 
and explanatory variables (1994-2006)- 
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Figure 2.491: The average risk premia and the political constraint index 
(POLCON5). 
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Chapter 3 
Fractional integration and the forward 
premium Puzzle 
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter revisits the empirical literature testing the efficiency of forward markets for 
foreign exchange. In previous work, forward rate unbiasedness has been rejected. Gener- 
ally, the literature has found that the future exchange rate change is negatively related to 
the forward premium. This chapter assumes rational expectations and attempts to explain 
the forward premium anomaly by firstly the presence of foreign exchange risk premia and 
secondly statistical artifacts of the data. 
This chapter focuses on the statistical artifacts of the data and finds the conditional 
mean of the forward premium series to be fractionally integrated while the return on the 
spot exchange rate is stationary. This yields an unbalanced test regression of the Uncovered 
Interest Parity, which causes the violation of the hypothesis. This study also pays attention 
to the relationship of the exchange rate risk premia and the test of the forward market 
efficiency. 
The contribution of this paper to the literature can be divided into two parts. First, this 
paper examines the time series properties of the forward premium in the 10 most commonly 
traded currencies using daily data from 1994 to 2007. This paper applies both parametric 
and serniparametric estimation methods to examine the fractionally integrated behaviour 
112 
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of the forward premium series. The results confirm earlier finding (namely, Baillie and 
Bollerslev, 1994; Maynard and Phillips, 2001 and Choi and Zivot, 2005) that there is frac- 
tionally integrated behaviour in the forward premium series. Moreover, we found that the 
spot return in all currencies are stationary and follow 1 (0) process. Thus, it is inappropriate 
to apply conventional regression analysis to test the hypothesis of the forward rate being an 
unbiased predictor of the future spot rate. Additionally, we found that even controlling for 
regime shifts, the fractional integrated behaviour still persists. However, there is evidence 
that structural breaks cause spurious long memory in the forward premium series of some 
of the sample currencies analysed in this study. 
Secondly, the rejection of the unbiasedness hypothesis is also generally attributed to 
the presence of a time varying risk premia, which has led to an intensive search for their 
proper specification. This-chapter introduced a new methodology to model the exchange 
rate risk premia. In contrast to Baillie and Bollerslev (2000) who suggested that the time 
varying foreign exchange risk premium 
is extremely small at the monthly level, this chap- 
ter argues that the time varying risk premium is significant at the daily level. The risk 
premia estimation of this chapter 
is related to that of Baillie and Bollerslev (1990) who at- 
tempted to estimate time varying foreign exchange risk premium models in the forward rate 
forecast error series. They use the multivariate Generalised Autoregressive Conditionally 
Heteroskedastic (GARCH) model to describe thq. behaviour of the forward rate forecast er- 
ror. However, we argue that the 
forward rate forecast error process appears to have a long 
memory feature in the conditional variance 
for all of the currencies in this study. Thus 
this chapter suggests using the Fractionally Integrated GARCH (FIGARCH) models in es- 
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timating the exchange rate risk premia. An implication of the robustness of the FIGARCH 
model and importance of the long memory volatility parameter strongly suggests that the 
FIGARCH model is the best model to explain the long memory property in the forward 
rate forecast error series. 
The organization of the paper is as follows. Section 3.2 reviews the concept of the 
unbia§edness hypothesis in exchange rate markets and surveys several empirical studies 
that investigate this hypothesis. Section 3.3 reviews some of the important advances in the 
theoretical modelling of the exchange rate risk premium. Section 3.4 describes the data 
sources and their time series properties. Section 3.5 provides empirical evidence of the 
forward premium anomaly by performing basic rolling regression analysis. The causes of 
the forward premium anomaly are addressed in sections 3.6 to 3.8. Sections 3.6 and 3.7 
explain the forward premium anomaly by the evidence of persistence mismatch between 
the spot return and the forward premium. Empirical estimates of the fractional differencing 
parameter (correcting for multiple structural 
breaks) are provided in section 3.6, followed 
by the stationarity test for the spot rate retums in section 3.7. Section 3.8 explains the 
forward premium anomaly by the existence of the exchange rate risk premium. Lastly, 
section 3.9 gives out the summary remarks and conclusions. 
3.2 The tinbiasedness hypothesis 
Interest arbitrage refers to the international flow of short-term liquid capital to earn higher 
returns abroad (Salvatore, 1998). Ile test of the market unbiasedness hypothesis generally 
considers the Covered Interest Parity condition, the Uncovered Interest Parity, and the For- 
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ward Rate Unbiasedness hypothesis. These hypotheses will be discussed in detail in the 
following section. 
Covered Interest Arbitrage refers to the spot purchase of foreign currency required for 
investments in assets market and offietting simultaneous forward sales (swaps') of foreign 
currency to cover the foreign exchange risk (Salvatore, 1998). The Covered Interest Parity 
condition (CIP) states that there should be no profitable covered arbitrage opportunity. The 
CIP condition compares two assets which are identical in every relevant respect (such as 
default and political risk) except currency of denomination in the market and assumes no 
barriers to arbitrage across international financial markets. The standard log-lincar form of 
the CIP condition is defined as follows: 
ft, k - St "": 
(it, k - 't*, k) ) (3.10) 
where ft, k is the natural log of the forward rate for a contract expiring k periods in the 
future, st is the exchange rate - defined as the natural log of the price of foreign currency 
in units of domestic currency at time t, it, k is the k-period yield on the domestic financial 
instrument, and 't;, k is the corresponding yield on the foreign instrument. Equation (3.10) 
is an equilibrium condition that holds regardless of investor preferences toward risk since 
it is based on riskless arbitrage. 
Early studies usually tested the CIP by examining the arbitrage condition among 
countries that have comparable economic and political risk aspects * such as EU member 
countries (Aliber, 1973; Dooley and Isard, 1980; Frankel and MacArthur, 1988; Sarno and 
81 A currency swaps (or cross currency swap) is a foreign exchange agreement between two parties to ex- 
change a given amount of one currency for another and, after a specified period of time, to give back the 
original amounts swapped. A swap is considered to be a foreign exchange transaction (short leg) plus an 
obligation to close the swap (far leg) being a forward contract. 
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Taylor, 2002a; Taylor, 1987 and Taylor, 1989). These studies use OLS regression analysis 
of the equation (ft, k - SO =a+b (it, k - i; A) + ct. The null of CIP is HO :a=0, b=1, t, 
and if there are transactions costs, these may show up as a : /- 0. These studies found that 
the data strongly support the covered interest parity and efficient market hypotheses i. e. 
there were no profitable covered arbitrage opportunities. The recent work on CIP employ 
more advanced econometric analysis such as Balke and Wohar (1998) and Peel and Taylor 
(2002) which examine the dynamic behavior and significance of deviations from CIP using 
non-linear Threshold Autoregressive (TAR) models. The results of this work suPport the 
earlier finding Le- the arbitrage profits from CIP is very small if it exists. 
As mentioned earlier, equation (3.10) is a risk free arbitrage condition that holds re- 
gardless of investor preferences. However, if investors are risk averse, the forward rate can 
differ from the expected future spot rate by a premium that compensates for the perceived 
riskiness of holding domestic versus foreign assets as follows; 
ft, k - EtSt, t+k : -- ? 7t, t+kt 
where EtSt, t4k is market expectation at time t of exchange rate that will prevail at time t+k 
and i7t, t+k is the risk premium associated with 
investment in foreign assets when the future 
foreign currency receipts are not covered in the forward market. If77t, t+k equals zero, there 
are two implications. Firstly, agents are risk neutral. Secondly, 
it gives an econometric 
implication that the forward rate is an unbiased predictor of the future spot rate. This 
condition is called Forward Rate Unbiasedness 
(FRU). Under risk neutrality, if FRU does 
not hold, there would be profitable opportunities available 
bý speculating in t4e forward 
market. 
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Substituting equation (3.11) into (3.10) yields a relationship between the expected 
change in the spot exchange rate, the interest rates differential and the risk premium, 
EtSt, t+k - St ý 
(it, k - 't*, k) - 77t, t+k* If the risk premia term, ? 7t, t+k equals zero, the re- 
lationship defines the uncovered interest parity condition (UIPj, 
EtSt, t+k - St ý-- 
(it, 
k - it*, k) - (3.12) 
From equation (3.12), investment in foreign assets is risky because the future foreign 
currency receipts are not covered in the forward market as in (3.10). Moreover, -it can 
be inferred that the UIP is the condition for equilibrium in the capital account under the 
assumption of risk neutrality" when agents only consider the expected return. Equation 
(3.12) is not directly testable since market expectations of future exchange rate movements 
are difficult to observe in practice. 
According to Chinn and Meredith (2005), the concept of UIP is tested jointly with 
the assumption of rational expectations in exchange markets. Under rational expectations, 
future realizations of exchange rates at time t+k can be expressed as the sum of its value 
expected at time t and a white noise error term &, t+A; that is uncorrelated with all informa- 
tion known at time t, including the interest differential and the spot exchange rate: 
St+k : -- 
EtSt, t+k + &, t+1v (3.13) 
Substituting equation (3.13) into equation (3.12) yields Ast, t+k = (it, k - it*, k) +. 
An empirically testable equation for the realized change in the exchange rate from t 
82 'Me UIP condition assumes that the market is dominated by risk-neutral investors and that neither risk 
averse rational speculators nor noise traders have a powerfW 
influence on market prices (Cuthbertson and. 
Nitzsche, 2004). 
See Engel (1996) for the approximations and simplifying assumptions of the risk neutrality. 
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to t+k can be written as 
ASt, 
t+k =a+b (it, k - it*, k) 
+ Et, t+k7 (3.14) 
where Et, t+k is a rational expectation forecast error term, ASt, t+k : -- St+k - St is the percent- 
age depreciation of the currency over k periods and ('t, k - 't*, k) is the difference between 
current k period domestic interest rates and foreign interest rhtes. From equations (3.13) 
and (3.14), we can infer that the UIP hypothesis is founded on the joint assumptions of ra- 
tional expectations and risk neutrality. Thus the UIP is sometimes referred to as the risk 
neutral efficient market hypothesis (RNEMM. Additional assumptions are that there is free 
capital mobility and an absence of taxes on capital transfers. The UIP condition holds if 
a=0, b=1 and -t, t+k is serially uncorrelated with information available at time t. The 
unit slope coefficient implies that high interest rates in the foreign country should not im- 
ply high returns to foreign investment but should signal an equal expected depreciation of 
the foreign currency. 
fjowever, empirical studies generally find that UIP is rejected. b in the regression 
equation (3.14) is frequently found to be negative which implies that in periods when the 
interest differential in favour of the foreign currency is positive, the foreign currency tends 
to appreciate. Cuthbertson and Nitzsche (2004) suggested that the negative slope coeffi- 
cient does not necessary imply profit on average by holding assets in countries that have 
interest rates higher than domestic countries. Their explanation is that the intercept may 
offset the impact of the interest differential term. Nonnally, financial assets in highly risky 
countries offer higher interest rates than normal. These countries tend to have monetary 
instability, political unrest, a weak and non-diversified export base, then the high expected 
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return to invest in these countries may be a payment for these systematic risk. Another in- 
teresting point is that the R-squared in the regressions is usually quite low. Cuthbertson and 
Nitzsche (2004) interpret these phenomena that the bets are highly risky, although they do 
pay off in terms of positive returns over a run of bets. 
Note that the specification of the UIP condition in equation (3.14) does not require the 
CIP condition to hold. An alternative specification of the UIP condition can be presented 
below (in equation (3.15)). It implies that the forward premium should be equal to the 
market expectation of the exchange rate depreciation, given that the covered interest parity 
condition holds. Combining equation (3.10) with equation (3.12) and assuming that there 
is no risk premia in holding foreign assets (77t, t+k = 0), the UIP condition can be expressed 
as follows; 
EtAst, t+A; = 
(ft, k - st) = 
(it, 
k - it*, A; 
) 
, (3.15) 
where EtAst, t+k = Etst, t+k- st+A; and the term ft, j, - st is defined as the forward premium, 
or the percentage difference between the current forward and spot exchange rates. By 
arbitrage, the forward premium must equal the interest differential. If it did not, a strategy 
of borrowing in the foreign currency, then changing the proceeds 
into domestic currency, 
investing the domestic currency and then selling forward would yield a riskless profit (Froot 
and Thaler, 1990). The market respects this arbitrage condition; for example, banks allow 
forward rates to be set by interest differentials. Froot and Thaler (1990) further conclude 
that under risk neutrality and rational expectations, the forward premium should also be an 
unbiased estimate of the subsequent exchange rate changes. The UIP in this form implies 
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that the forward premium should predict changes in the exchange rate". The test of UIP is 
then defined as 
ASt, t+k =a+ 
b(ft, k - St) + Et, t+k. (3.16) 
Again, the test is under the null hypothesis of HO :a=0, b=1. If the forward rate 
embodies all information available at time t, then it should also be true that Et, t+k is serially 
ý4 uncorrelated. Generally and perhaps surprisingly, empirical work finds that b: 1 and 
is usually negative e. g. Frankel, 1980; -Fama, 
1984; Bekaert and Hodrick, 1993. These 
works use a variety of exchange rates against the US dollar. Froot (1990) provides an 
extensive literature review and also found that b is frequently estimated to be less than 
zero. Froot and Thaler (1990) find that the average coefficient across some 75 published 
estimates of equation (3.16) is -0.8 8. In these, a few are positive, but none of them have the 
coefficient, b statistically greater than or equal to unity. The finding that b is negative and 
often significantly different from zero may be interpreted that one can make predictable 
profits by betting against the forward rate (Obstfeld and Rogoff, 1999). 
Much research effort has been devoted to explaining the rejection of the UIP condi- 
tion or the risk neutral efficient-market hypothesis (RNENM). Generally, the explanations 
can be classified into three groups. The first explanation states that it is due to expectational 
errors. The second explanation states that it is due to the foreign exchange risk premium. 
The third explanation is a modem view and focuses on the statistical properties of the data. 
83 Equivalently, UIP and CIP together imply FRU which states that the forward rate should equal to the 
market expectation of the future spot rate, 
Etst+A; = ft, k. 
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In the expectational errors explanation, there is a failure of the rational expectations 
component of the joint hypothesis. The literature identifies at least four possible issues": 
rational bubbles; learning about regime sMfts (Lewis, 1989a, b), the peso problem (Rogoff, 
1979; Evans and Lewis, 1995), or inefficient information processing (Bilson, 198 1). 
The research presented in this chapter focuses on the second and the third views, 
namely, the foreign exchange risk premium and the statistical properties of the data. A 
detailed discussion of these two explanations will be presented in the following paragraphs. 
The foreign exchange risk premium explanation is theoretically based and states that 
the forward rates are biased predictors of actual exchange rate movements because there 
exists a risk premium on one country's currency relative to another's. In order to specify 
the relationship between the risk premium and the forward premium, we first consider the 
risk premia equation in (3.11). The risk premium term can be re-specified by subtracting 
and adding the spot rates on the left hand side of equation (3.11) as follows 
i7t, t+k == (ft, A; - st) - (Etst, t+k - st). (3.17) 
The forward premium now consists of two parts which are expected depreciation and the 
risk premium. The risk premium term is the payment for incurring risk of buying foreign 
currency. 
Previous literature finds that the beta coefficient from ordinary least squares (OLS) 
estimate of equation (3.16) is negative. Fama (1984) originally attempted to explain this 
anomaly by arguing that the time varying risk premium term can lead to bias and inconsis- 
tency in the OLS estimates of b. 
84 A detailed discussion of these issues can be found in Samo and Taylor (2002b) and Lewis (1995). 
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Combining equations (3.13) and (3.17), the equation for the forward rate unbiased- 
ness now becomes 
A$t, t+k =a+b 
(ft, 
k - St) + 
(ýt, 
t+k - 77t, t+k) + Et, t+k. 
If ? 7t, t+A, and (ft, k - st) are correlated, then the 
OLS estimates are inconsistent. 
A small positive or a negative slope coefficient in equation (3.16) might be explained 
by a rational expectation risk premium that is extremely variable (this is explained below). 
To better understand Fama's result, the asymptotic ordinary least square (OLS) estimate of 




CO'U(ft, t+k - Sts A66St, t+k) (3.19) Var(ft, k - st) 
Following Obstfeld and Rogoff (1999)15, define the risk premium, ? 7t, t+k as the bias in the 
(log) forward premium, as in equation (3.11) and (3.17), with the implication that 
(ft, A; - st) = 
(EtSt, t+k - St) + 77t, t+A; - 
(3.20) 
Again, under rational expectations, the difference between the expected and the realised 
exchange rate or ýt, t+k in equation (3.13) must 
be uncorrelated with all variables observable 
on date t, including that date's 
forward premimn. In particular, 
Etj(ft, k - St)(St+k - EtSt, t+k)} -"2 
0- 
Thus, equation (3.19) under rational expectations can 
be rewritten as 
plim(bOLS) = 
Cov(ft, A, - s,, Etst+k - st) 
Var(ft, k - st) . 
85 pages 588-591, Obstfeld and Rogoff (1999). 
3.2 The unbiasedness hypothesis 123 
Fama's argument has 2 aspects. Firstly, if the resulting-b from the OLS regression 
is negative in a large sample, then there must be negative covariance between the risk 
premium and the expected change in the spot rate. This can be illustrated by replacing 
(ft, k - st) in equation (3.21) with the right hand side of equation (3.20). Therefore, the 
numerator of equation (3-21) can be rewritten as 
COI)(ft, k - Stj 
EtSt+k - St) = Var(EtSt+k - 150 + 
COV(EtSt+k 
- St) 77t, t+k)' 
Hence, p liM(bOLS) can be negative if Cov(EtSt+k - Sts 77t, t+k) < 0- 
Secondly, Fama (1984) argues that if the beta coefficient is estimated to be below 1 in 2 
large sample, then the risk premium must be more variable than the expected change in the 
exchange rate. To illustrate this, multiply both sides of equation (3.21) by Var(ft, A; - st), 
and again use equation (3.20) to substitute out for ft, k - st. Noting that Var(ft, A: - St) = 
Var[(EtSt, t+k-St)+? It, t+kl = Var(Etst, t+A; -st)+2Cov(Etst+k-st,? 7t, t+A; )+Var(77t, t+k), 
equation (3.20) can now be written as 
plim(bOLS)fVar(EtSt, t+k - st) + 2Cov(Etst+k - Sti 77t, t+k) + Var(77,, t+, )} 
= Var(EtSt+k-St)+COV(EtSt+k-St'77t, t+k I 
OLS) <1 implies that where plim(b 2 
1 
ý[Var(Etst, t+k - st) 
+ Vizr(? 7t, t+k)] > Var(EtSt, t+k - St), 
so that 
Var(, qt, t+A; ) > Var(Etst+A; - st). (3.22) 
Hence, the risk premium must be more variable than expected future exchange rate changes 
for the estimated beta coefficient to be less than -1. This is a significant challenge to attempts 2 
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to model the exchange rate risk premium. However, Obstfeld and Rogoff (1999) give warn- 
ing that the puzzle posed by inequality in equation (3-22) should not be overstated since 
the expected exchange rate change appears to be empirically small in major currencies. It 
16 is not easy to reject the hypothesis that the log exchange rates follow a random walk , in 
which case Var(Etst+k - st) = 0. Thus the surprising fact may be that the expected ex. 
change rate change are typically very small, and not that the variance of the risk premium 
is so large. 
Generally, inference from empirical analysis of equation (3.16) has been conducted 
under the assumption of a short memory forward premium and exchange rate retum. How- 
ever, this assumption is incorrect if one of these two series are empirically nonstationary. 
Recent research has cast doubt on the validity of the conventional wisdom that the forward 
premium is stationary; see e. g. Crowder, 1994; Evans and Lewis, 1995; and Mark, Wu 
and Hai, 1993. The empirical evidence shows that the forward premium series are in fact 
highly persistent. This leads us to the last view of the explanation for the rejection in UIP 
hypothesis. 
The last view explains the rejection of the UIP hypothesis by focusing on the statis- 
tical artifacts of the data. As the modem literature pays more attention to the time series 
properties of the returns on the nominal spot exchange rate and the forward premium, a 
possible explanation for a negative beta coefficient in equation (3.16) is based on 1) the 
long memory behaviour of the forward premium; and 2) the existence of structural breaks 
in the forward premium. Baillie and Bollerslev (2000) proposed that the anomaly is caused 
86 See Obstfeld and Rogoff (1999) page 591. 
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by a very persistent autocorrelation in the forward premium. Ile forward premium series 
tend to follow fractionally integrated (long memory) process, while the rate of return on 
the spot exchange rate is a stationary process. This creates an unbalanced test regression 
in equation (3.16). Maynard and Phillips (2001) also found evidence of fractionally inte- 
grated behaviour in the forward premium. They supported Baillie and Bollerslev's (2000) 
argument that the traditional asymptotic regression for unbiasedness may not be suitable 
due to the difference in persistence between the two series mentioned above. Recently, 
Choi and Zivot (2005) pointed out the importance of structural breaks and confirmed that 
both explanations are important. 
To illustrate this further, we refer back to equation (3.18). The return on the spot 
exchange rate, Ast, t+k and the forecast error, 6t, t+A; are widely accepted to be stationary 
(Cornell, 1977; Meese and Singleton, 1982; Corbae and Ouliaris, 1986, Baillie and Boller- 
slev, 1989; Baillie and Bollerslev, 1993; Maynard and Phillips, 2001; Choi and Zivot, 
2005). Empirically, the logarithm of the spot rate is found to be a non-stationary I(1) vari. 
able, and hence Ast, t+k is 1(0). The rational expectation forecast error, &, t+k itself must 
be stationary 1(0), so that it would not be forecastable from the past information. 
The study of the persistence of the forward premium has recently gained substantial 
interest from researchers. Initially, the studies of Crowder, 1994; Evans and Lewis, 1995; 
and Mark, Wu and Hai, 1993, argued that the forward premium is non-stationary. However, 
later work rejects the yiew that the forward premium has a unit root. Instead, the forward 
premium is found to follow a fractionally integrated process (Choi and Zivot, 2005; Baillie 
and Bollerslcv, 1994a; Maynard and ýhillips, 2001). 
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Among the first group of papers that suggested a unit root process in the forward pre- 
mium, Crowder (1994) tested for unit root in daily forward premium data from 1980-1985 
in British pound, German Deutsche mark and Canadian dollar, all relative to the US dol- 
lar. He found that the null of an 1(0) process in the forward premium is rejected using the 
KPSS test of Kwiatowski, Phillips, Schmidt and Shin (1992) while the unit root hypothe- 
sis was not rejected in these three forward premium series using augmented Dickey-Fuller 
(ADF) teStS87. 
Baillie and Bollerslev (1994a) argued that Crowder's findings do not necessary guar- 
antcc a unit root in the forward discount. This is because the test methodology in Crowder's 
work forced a choice between 1(0) and I(i) processes. They suggested that the degree of 
persistence has led Crowder's and other studies to erroneously conclude that the forward 
premium consists of a unit root process. Their study also provided a good literature re- 
view that calling for a careful interpretation of the KPSS and ADF tests. To quote Baillie 
and Bollerslev (1994a, pp. 566) "... although 
Crowder's KPSS test statistics are providing 
evidence against 1(0) behaviour, this should not automatically 
be interpreted as being sug- 
gestive of an I(l) process. Similarly, as 
demonstrated by Diebold and Rudebusch (1989), 
the conventional ADF test for a unit root, or I(1) behaviour, has very low power against 
fractionally integrated alternatives. " 
Baillie and Bollerslev (1994a) allow for a fractionally integrated I(d) process in the 
forward premium, for 0<d<1: They use the same data as Crowder (1994) to compare 
87 The other two papers that argue 
in favour of unit root in the forward premium are Evans and Lewis (1995) 
and Mark, Wu and Hai (1993). 
However, they dispense the unit root test and proceed the test for cointegraiting 
relationship between the spot and 
forward rates which is the main objective of their papers. 
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the correlograms of the spot exchange rate, the return on the spot exchange rate, and the 
forward premium, and then estimate ARFIMA models of the forward premium. Monthly 
exchange rate data for Canada, Germany and UK are used from January 1994 to December 
199 1. The spot rate (st) itself showed strong evidence of a unit root while the degree of per- 
sistence in the forward premium rate's (ft - st) autocorrelations is substantially less. Al- 
though the effects of innovations in the forward premium series are moderately persistent, 
these innovations eventually die out at a slow hyperbolic rate of decay. Thus ARFIMAs 
models are suggested to be better estimators for the forward premium. The models re- 
port the point estimate for the order of fractional integration, equal to 0.445,0.767, and 
0.551 for Canada, Germany and UK, respectively (each exchange rate series is in terms of 
number of US dollars per unit of foreign currency). Interestingly, Baillie and Bollerslev's 
results imply a prediction for the risk premium series. As the forward premium follows 
a fractionally integrated process while the spot rates is 1(1); therefore, the risk premium 
itself should be fractionally integrated according to equation (3.18). 
Maynard and Phillips (2001) joined Baillie and Bollerslev (1994a) in finding evi- 
dence of a fractionally integrated process in the forward premium using ARFIMA models, 
for the case of higher frequency data. The data in their study are daily from November 
1986 to March 1988. The samples are from 6 major currencies, in particular AUS, CAD, 
FR, DM, YEN, GBP against the US Dollar. The results show that there is evidence of 
non-stationary long memory behaviour in the forward premium. The model reports that 
all estimates of the fractionally integrated Parameters are between 0.858 d<1. Their 
paper concluded that the principal failure of unbiasedness. hypothesis is the mismatch in 
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persistence between the spot return and the forward premium series. Additionally, they 
argued that traditional asymptotic theory may not be applicable to test forward rate unbi- 
asedness hypothesis. The non-standard nature of the limit theory is primarily attributable 
to the long memory of the forward premium. They propose new hypothesis test statistics 
which have nonstandard limiting distributions with long left tails, which may explain the 
forward premium anomaly as statistical artifacts. 
Choi and Zivot (2005) suggested that the long memory property in the data may be 
due to the presence of structural breaks or regime switches. They test for and estimate 
the multiple mean break model by Bai and Perron (1998,2003a) and then adjust for the 
structural breaks in the forward premium. Allowing for structural breaks drastically reduces 
the degree of persistency in the forward premium. However, evidence of (stationary) long 
memory in all of the forward premium series still persists. They use monthly exchange 
rate data in terms of US dollars for five G7 countries: Germany, France, Italy, Canada and 
UK over the period January 1976 to January 1999. The corresponding estimated value of 
the fractional differencing parameters after adjusting for structural breaks are 0.284,0.332, 
0.374,0.516 and 0.357, respectively, which are lower than previous estimates that don't 
incorporate structural breaks. 
3.3 Risk premia 
This section aims to present the literature reviews for the estimation of the foreign exchange 
risk premium. There are two approaches used within the literature in interpreting the risk 
premia. 
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The first approach is a traditional approach which examines various specifications 
of the fundamental determinants of risk premium. The explanation of the risk premia is 
through the standard discrete time consumption-based asset pricing (CAPM) model of Lu- 
cas (1982), which takes into account the real returns to forward market speculation. Studies 
using this approach generally proxy the risk premia (in equation (3.11)) by the conditional 
heteroskcdasticity or time dependence between the conditional covariances of the exchange 
rate and the fundamental variables such as consumption and prices e. g. Engel and Ro- 
drigues (1989), Hodrick (1989), Kaminsky and Peruga (1990), Mark (1988) and Baillie 
and Bollerslev (1990). First of all, agents optimize their consumption plan (Ct, Ct+A; ) such 
that the expected real returns of the current and future consumption streams of the repre- 
sentative investor in the forward market must be zero". That is, 
Et 
[( Ft - St-4-k )( 
(3.23) pD t+k U, A) 
D* 
where Pi+l is the time t+k domestic price level, U' (Ct+k) / U' (Ct) equals marginal rate 
of substitution in terms of utility derived from current and future consumption, and Ft and 
St+k are forward exchange rate and future spot exchange rate. If the utility function is 
characterized by the constant relative risk aversion", equation (3.23) can be rewritten as 
Et 
[( Ft - St+k ) '] 
=0 pD 1 (3.24) 
t+k 
Ct+k 
where x is the coefficient of relative risk aversion. Assuming that all variables in equa- 
tion (3.24) are jointly log normally distributed (Sarno and Taylor, 2002), the Taylor series 
88 See Sarno and Taylor (2002b) page 22-23 for the full derivation. 
89 In case of a constant relative risk aversion, agent's utility function can be written as 
U(Ct) = (I - >c)-, Ct, -N. 
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expansion to the second order of this equation is as follows, 
ft, k - EtSt+k = 0.5vart(st+k) - covt 
(st+k, ptD+k) - xcovt 
(st+k, qtD+k), (3.25) 
D*D 
where Pi+k is a natural log of the domestic price level, qi+k denotes the logarithm of in- 
tertemporal marginal rate of substitution (U' (Ct+k) / U' (Ct)) of domestic agents and vart 
and covt denote conditional variance and covariance based on information available at time 
t. According to equati on (3.11), ft, k - EtSt+k is the foreign exchange risk premium. Thus, 
using CAPM methodology, the risk premium can be estimated by the right hand side of 
equation (3.25). 
Note that despite the expected real profit from forward rate speculation being zero 
(as in equations (3.23) and (3.24)), there is a wedge between the expected spot rate and 
the forward rate when they are expressed in log form (as in equation (3.25)). The wedge 
contains 3 conditional second moment terms as expressed on the right hand side of equation 
(3.25). FRU is violated if any or all of these three terms are significantly different from zero. 
The simple asset pricing model assumes that agents are completely risk neutral and 
care about the real returns, hence ;c=0. 
Equation (3.24) then reduces to 
Et 
Ft, t+I, - St+k 0. (3.26) 
pD t+k 
Assuming again that prices and exchange rates are jointly lognormally distributed, equation 
(3.26) can be written as follows, 
D ft, k - 
EtSt+k = 0.5vart(st+k) - covt(st+k, p, +k), (3.27) 
Note that even under rational. expectations and risk neutrality (;, C = 0), the right hand side 
of equation (3.27) still contains the two conditional second moment terms. These are called 
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Jensen Inequality terms (JIT). Including the JIT terms, the FRU does not hold even if agents 
are risk neutral. These two terms imply that risk neutrality does not imply the UIP (see 
Frenkel and Razin, 1980 and Engel, 1984 for a more detailed discussion). 
Some papers define the term COVt(St+k, qtD+k) in equation (3.25) as the time depen- 
dent risk premium. However, using this measure when derived from the CAPM model is 
largely unsuccessful in explaining the deviations from UIP. Kaminsky and Peruga (1990) 
estimated equation (3.25) using monthly data on consumption and prices and proxying 
D the conditional covariance Of St+k with qi+k using an ARCH model. Unfortunately, it is 
found to be negligible. Other researches also support their view such as that by Baillie and 
Bolicrslev, 1989,1990; and Bekaert and Hodrick, 1993. They argue that the time paths 
of consumption and prices are relatively smooth and the foreign exchange rate data show 
little evidence of conditional heteroskedasticity, thus the influence of the second and third 
terms on the right hand side of (3.25) should be empirically small. Moreover, Lewis (1995) 
finds that empirically the covariance between exchange rates and inflation, covt (St+k, pD t+k) 
is quite small and near zero. Engel (1984) and Cumby (1988) have also found that the be- 
havior of the excess return in real terms (the term on the left hand side of equation (3.26)) 
is not very much different from the nominal term'O. Thus it is unlikely that this term can 
help explaining important fraction of excess return behaviour. 
other works that apply the Luca5 model in equation (3.24) in explaining the risk 
premium are Hansen and Hodrick, 1980; Hodrick and Srivastava, 1984,1986; Giovannini 
and Jorion, 1987; Bekaert and Hodrick, 1992 and Bekaert, 1994. This research in general 
90 When taking the Taylor series expansion of equations (3.24) and (3.26) to obtain the risk premium D 
expression, we obtain covt(st+k, pt+k). Engel (1984) and Cumby (1988) argue tfiat this term is small. 
3.3 Risk premia 132 ' 
finds that the model has limited success in explaining the risk premium. A key problem 
is that the risk premium model is not robust across different datasets and time periods 
(Lewis, 1995). Moreover, as in the equity premium puzzle, it is difficult to rationalize 
a large absolute value risk premium because the consumption series is not that variable. 
For the risk premium to explain a significant portion of the forward rate forecast error 
or excess returns, either there must be a very large coefficient of relative risk aversion 
x, or consumption must be highly correlated with the exchange rate. Sarno and Taylor 
(2002b) provide a rationale for this latter possibility by arguing that the less that the forward 
exchange position provides a hedge against variations in future consumption, the greater 
the covariation between the consumPtion and exchange rate. However, they also point 
out that consumption empirically tends to be 
fairly smooth in advanced economies, while 
the nominal exchange rate in these countries is typically a lot more volatile. Thus the 
covariations between price and consumption, and exchange rate are empirically found to 
be small. 
Moreovcr, Baillie and Bollerslev (1989,1990) and Bekaert and Hodrick (1993) es- 
timate equation (3.27) by using alternative forms of ARCH, and GARCH in mean speci- 
fications for vart(St+k)- They found that vart(st+A; ) is not statistically significant and that 
omitting it from the UIP regression 
does not affect the estimates of b in equation (3.18), 
which remains negative. Cuthbertson and Nitzsche (2004) also 
find that in general the AT 
in the foreign exchange market are small and can be ignored in practice. Thus, we can con- 
clude that estimating the 
foreign exchange risk premium by CAPM model does not yield 
satisfactory results in the 
literature. 
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Obstfeld and Rogoff (1999) pointed out the problem in understanding foreign ex- 
change risk premium that it changes sign as expected depreciation does (as illustrated in 
equation (3.16)). Sometimes the risk premium runs against a country's currency and some- 
times in favour of it. The extension of the simple CAPM analysis is to relate the stochastic 
properties of global output to forward premium anomaly. Under assumption that each 
country consumption growth is proportional to world income growth with CRRA utility, 
they suggested replacing the former with the growth rate of per capita global output" in the 
Euler equation (3.24) as follows, 
Et 
[ (Ft- St+k) ( ytw ) N] 




where Yt' is per capita global output at time t. Approximate equation (3.28) by Taylor 
series expansion yields 
w (3.29) ft, k - EtSt+k = 0.5vart(St+k) - CoVt(St+k)PtD+k) - UCOVt(St+ky Yt+k)i 
where Ytw+k is the natural 
log Of Ytw+k and the covariance term covt (St+k I Ytw+k) can change 
sign over the course of the world 
business cycle. However, no study has yet succeed in 
using the equation (3.29) 
for regression analysis. This is not surprising. Finding the per 
capita global output 
is straight forward but data is only available annually. Thus there is 
problem of a limited number of observations 
in the regression. 
The second approach specifies "statistical" models of-the risk premium. This ap- 
proach tests for certain patterns 
in or across excess exchange rate returns. This approach 
is introduced by Dornowitz and Hakkio (1985) who give an explanation of the risk premia 
91 See detailed derivation in Obstfeld and Rogoff (1999) page 580. and592. 
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through the conditional variance of the market forecast error. Their work proceeds test to 
the UIP condition using data from the United Kingdom, France, Germany and Switzerland 
during Jun. 1973- Sept. 1982 using monthly data". They argued that the inter-temporal 
capital asset pricing model is highly stylised, however, it is quite restrictive in its assump- 
tion on preferences and technology, and the direct estimation and testing of the model is 
difficult. They thus suggested using the econometric model to capture some major aspects 
of risk in a foreign exchange contract. The risk premia are defined as a function of the 
conditional variance of the error in forecasting the spot rate using the forward rate, 
77t, t+k = vart(ft, k - St+k)i (3.30) 
where the conditional variance of the forecast errors 
(ft, A; - St+k) were assumed to follow 
the ARCH in mean process introduced by Engel, Lilien and Robins (1987). The test for 
UIP is to add the risk premium term to equation (3 . 16) and perform an OLS regression but 
again it was still rejected for the majority of currencies. For this study, the monthly data in 
United Kingdom and Japan exhibit a significant risk premium in the regression, while the 
data in Germany, France and Switzerland did not reject the null hypothesis of no risk pre- 
mium. Furthermore, thd sign of the risk premium varies 
for different time periods. Finally, 
the authors suggest two alternative approaches for future research. The first suggestion is 
to specify the risk premium as a 
function of the conditional covariance matrix for all cur- 
rencies. Baillie and Bollerslev 
(1990) explore this possibility. The second suggestion is to 
define the risk premium as the conditional variances of the forecast errors of the domestic 
and foreign money supplies. 
Up to my knowledge, no work pursues this methodology. 
92 This was a floating currency period. 
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Baillie and Bollerslev (1990) suggest that the reason for the lack of success in us- 
ing measures of the risk premia to explain the rejection of the UIP is probably because of 
the assumption that the conditional covariance of future spot rates are time invariant as in 
Domowitz and Hakkio (1985). Instead of testing for the unbiasedness hypothesis by per- 
forming the OLS regression as in Domowitz and Hakkio (1985), the main objective of their 
research is to find proper specification of the foreign exchange risk premium and explain 
the possibility that the rejection of the unbiasedness hypothesis is due to the existence of a 
time varying exchange rate risk premia. They examine the conditional variance and covari- 
ance of the forward rate forecast error using a multivariate GARCH model. The forward 
rate forecast error is defined as the difference between the future spot rate and the forward 
rate, . 5t+k - 
Ak. The equation for forward rate forecast error is 
st+k - ft, k -: ý ? 7t, t+k + ut+k, 
when i7t, t+k is the 
foreign exchange risk premia and ut+k is a random innovations in the 
period between the market setting the 
forward exchange rate and the actual realisation of 
the spot rate k periods later. The risk premia 
is proxied by the conditional variance of the 
multivariate GARCH(l, l) model of the 
forward rate forecast error9l. Tley consider the 
time series modelling of ut+A; as the 
[k]th-order moving average process such that 
[k] 
Ut+k ý-- E DjEt+k-i + 6t+k) (3.32) j=1 
93 Baillie and ]301, erslev (199o) proxy the risk premium 
by the first term of equation (3.25) i. e. the condi. 
tional variance of the future spot exchange rate 
(Vart(st+k)) is equivalent to the conditional variance of the 
forward rate forecast error 
(Vart(st+A; - ft, t+k)) 
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where the innovations, -t+A; are serially uncorrelated with mean zero and finite uncondi- 
tional variance. Data used in their study are weekly spot and one-month maturity forward 
rates (approximately 4 weeks maturity). They thus set the autocorrelation structure for ut+A, 
as the 4th order moving average (k = 4). 
They suggested that the weekly exchange rate data should possess more ARCH type 
behavior than the monthly data used for example by Dornowitz and Hakkio (1985)94. and 
examines 4 currencies: Pound sterling, Swiss Franc, German Mark, and French Franc, all 
of them are against the US dollar from Mar. 1980 to Feb. 1989. Thus, 5j is generalised to 
be a matrices of four sample currencies in the multivariate framework. 
In deriving the implied model for the forward rate forecast error using MA(4), three 
assumptions must hold, namely, risk neutrality 
(t7t, 
t+k), rational expectation [Et (Ut+k) = 0), 
and that the first differences in nominal exchange rates follow an uncorrelated process. The 
purpose for parametrising the forward rate forecast errors as the moving average process 
(MA(4)) is to use it to provide some bounds on the magnitude of the risk premium. They 
then perform the check for the presence of the time varying risk premia by comparing sam- 
ple estimates of the residual variances with those implied by the MA(4) process. 
In testing for the significance (of the proxy) of the time varying risk premia, they 
use the Lagrange Multiplier (LM) test for the inclusion of the own conditional variance in 
explaining any deviation of the forward rate forecast error from the fixed MA(4) process. 
Unfortunately, the test for the presence of the time varying risk premium gains little support 
94, The frequency matters in characterising the ARCH effect. Bailie and Bollerslev (1989) note a sharp 
decline in ARCH effects, as the sarnpling frequency declines from weekly, fortnightly, and monthly. Other 
studies such as Booth and Glassman 
(1987), Domowitz and Hakkio (1985), and Hodrick (1989) studied the 
monthly spot exchange rate 
data and observed only minimal ARCH effects and approximate normality. 
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which confirins the finding in Dornowitz and Hakkio (1985). Although the ARCH effects 
appear to be much more pronounced with weekly data, the conditional variance remains 
an insignificant determinant of the forward rate forecast error for three of the four cur- 
rencies. Using the conditional covariance between the currencies as proxies for the other 
components of the time varying risk premia also shows no much support to the idea the 
risk premium is a simple linear function of the corresponding covariances. Only the UK 
data shows some evidence that the conditional covariances give explanation to the data in 
addition to the own conditional variances. 
From the literature, we can make some concluding remarks and provide research 
agenda as follows. 
The estimation of the risk premium by the CAPM model does not gain much suc- 
cessfulness due to the limitation of the 
data, e. g., a small covariation between consumption 
and exchange rate since the data of the 
former is fairly smooth (Kaminsky and Peruga, 
1990; Sarno and Taylor, 2002; Baillie and Bollerslev 1989,1990; and Bekaert and Ho- 
drick, 1993)), and a small covariation between exchange rate and inflation (Lewis, 1995; 
Engel, 1984; and Cumby, 1988) and the foreign exchange rate data show little evidence 
of conditional heteroskedasticity 
(Baillie and Bollerslev 1989,1990; and Bekaert and'Ho- 
I drick, 1993). 
The second approach which specifies "statistical" models of the risk premium is not 
yet Yery much successful; 
however, there is a room for new research. Although the test 
for the presence of time varying risk premium gains little suPPort when using monthly data 
from 1973-1982 in Domowitz and Hakkio (1985). We argue that there is a possibility that 
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using the higher frequency data and longer time span would give more information to the 
model. Moreover, in estimating the conditional variance of the forecast error, we can find a 
model that fits the data better than the ARCH-in-mean model and the multivariate GARCH 
model. Thus, this chapter employ the second approach in estimating the risk premium (in 
equation (3.30)) to the test of UIP (in equation (3.18)) hypothesis as follow 
ASt, t+k =a+b 
(ft, k - st) + ; <var(St+k - 
ft, A; 
) + Ct, t+k- 
The next section aims to study the time series properties of the three variables in 
equation (3.33). 
3.4 The Variables and their time series properties 
This section aims to describe the time series properties of three variables in equation (3.33) 
which are the return on the spot rate, the 
forward premium and the forward rate forecast 
error and their source of data. 
The first two are variables in the regression for the uncovered interest parity. Ast, t+k 
St+k- st is defined as t4e realised exchange rate 
depreciation. It is the difference between 
natural log of the spot rate at date t and natural log of the spot rate at date t+k, where k 
equals to I month maturity. 
(ft, A; - st) is the forward premium which is the difference be- 
tween natural log of the time t forward rate with maturity k and natural log of the time t 
spot rate. We multiply the natural 
log of all rates by 100, so that the forward premium and 
the spot rate return are in percentages95. 
95 ioO*(Inft, k- in st) and 100 * (In St+k - In st), respectively. 
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The third variable is the forward rate forecast error which is defined as St+k - ft, k- 
Again, we multiply it by 100 so that the forward rate forecast error is the percentage devi- 
ation of the realized spot exchange rate k period later from the forward contract rate. The 
conditional variance of the forward rate forecast error is the proxy for the time varying 
exchange rate risk premia (i7t, t_,, k in equations (3.17) and (3.18)). This is in line with Do- 
mowitz and Hakkio (1985) and Baillie and Bollerslev (1990). The maturity of the forward 
rate forecast error, k in this study is I month. 
The foreign exchange rates and the forward rates data were provided by Bloomberg. 
These data are market rates provided by the central bank of each country. We consider 
the exchange rate data on the eight most traded currencies in the foreign exchange market 
which are the Eurozone Euro (EUR), the British Pound (GBP), the Japanese Yen (JPY), the 
Swiss ]Franc (CHF), the Austral ian Dollar (AUD), the Canadian Dollar (CAD), the Swedish 
Krona (SEK), and the Norwegian Krone (NOK). Two additional sample countries are the 
New Zealand Dollar (NZD) and the Danish Krone (DKK)- The base currency is the United 
States Dollar (USD). The sampling interval is from January 1994 to June 2007, except for 
the EUR, NOK and SEK, which starts in January 1999. The sampling frequency of the 
exchange rate data is daily. The spot and forward exchange rate data are the average value 
of the day. However, these daily data are available on trading days only i. e. excluding 
weekends and holidays. The length or maturity of the forward rate contract k, is defined as 
I month or approximately 20 working days. 
Considering that the sampling interval of the forward rate forecast error series (St+k - ft, k) 
is daily which is finer than the forecast interval (monthly), the forward rate forecast errors 
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will be serially correlated (see Hansen and Hodrick, 1980; Hakkio, 1981; Baillie 1989; 
and Baillie and Bollersley, 1990). In order to deal with this problem, this chapter models 
the conditional mean of the forward rate forecast error as the k-th order moving average 
process. This is in line with Baillie and Bollerslev (1990) as stated in equation (3.32). This 
chapter analysed one month forward contracts and daily data, the maturity of the contract 
equals 20 working days, we thus apply MA(20) to filter out the serial correlation from the 
forward rate forecast error series. This case also applies to the spot return, Ast, t+A; series 
which will also be filtered by MA(20) process. 
Table 3.1 provides a brief description of the exchange rate data and the summary sta- 
tistics for the calculated I month return on the spot exchange rates or the realised exchange 
rate depreciation ASt, t+k, the calculated I month forward premium (ft, k - st), and the cal- 
culated forward rate forecast error 
(St+k - ft, k). Before proceeding to the empirical results, 
it is also useful to discuss the time series properties of these three series by observing their 
time series graphically and the sample autocorrelation functions. 
Plots of the 
-forward 
premium (ft, k - St) series in the 10 sample countries are pre- 
sented in figures 33A-11J. Most of series show structural breaks and persistence in the 
mean. The plots of the autocorrelation function (ACF) of the forward premium series of 
these countries are presented in figures 3.2A-3.2J. The ACF of the forward premium series 
all countries have the similar 
behaviour. There is no evidence of seasonality or any cyclical 
patterns and the series are not white noise since at least one autocorrelation coefficient in 
each case is different from zero. 
However, the series tend to be nonstationary as the auto- 
correlation coefficients 
decays less than exponentially as the lag length increases. Instead, 
3.4 The Variables and their time series properties 141 
the autocorrelation coefficients at various lags are very high even up to a lag of 200-300 
working days. Considering the Box-Pierce Q statistics, one can reject the null hypothesis 
that all the true autocorrelation coefficients up to lag 200-300 are equal to zero. In facts, all 
the lags are highly significant. This indicates that the forward premium series may display 
long memory. It is best modelled by a fractionally integrated ARMA process. 
- Plots of the spot return 
(IýSt, t+k :` st+k - st) filtered by the MA(20) process are 
presented in figures 3.3A-3.3J. The series tend to be stationary. Plots of the autocorrelation 
coefficients for the spot return in figures MA-3.0 also show that they do not have long 
memory behaviour. To further confirm this finding, the stationarity of the spot return series 
will be examined in the next section using ADF and KPSS tests. 
Figures 3.5A to 3.5J present time series plots of the forward rate forecast error 
(St+k - 
ft, k) on 10 currencies (in term of US Dollar) filtered by MA(20) process. The 
volatility of the forward rate forecast error appears to be serially correlated. The individ- 
ual series vary wildly, but they do so within a range which itself changes slowly over time. 
orccast error lies in the range between -2 percentage points to 2 percent- In general, the f 
age points, excluding CAD where the range of the series variability is much narrower. For 
CAD, the series ranges from around -1 percentage points to I percentage points. This is 
not surprising, since the US and Canadian 
dollar follow each other very closely. 
The volatility of the series in AUD, CAD, and NZD during 1998-2007 appears to be 
higher than the, previous periods. Considering figures 3.6A-3.6J which are time series plots 
of the absolute value of the 
forward rate forecast error, the fat periods for these 3 currencies 
become more clearly visible. For JPY, during the period around 1997-1998 when the Asian 
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economic crisis took place, volatility is higher than in the other periods. However, all the 
currencies show clear evidence of changing volatility through time. Moreover, the series 
are characterized by volatility clustering where high volatility tend to be surrounded by 
other high volatility days (and vice versa). This is a clear sign of presence of ARCH effects 
in the series. 
Figures 3.7A-3.7J illustrate plots of the autocorrelation coefficients for the forward 
rate forecast error after filtering for the MA(20) process. Generally the series of the for- 
ward rate forecast error shows no trend behaviour or seasonality. The decay of the sample 
autocorrelation coefficient does not indicate nonstationary in the series. Thus, there is no 
evidence of positive predictability from past values of the forward rate forecast error to its 
current value (a short memory process in the level). However, considering the autocorre- 
lation coefficients of the absolute value and the squared value, the errors are strongly time 
dependent, the autocorrelations tend to be fairly large even for large values of lags which 
confirrns the volatility clustering in the series. 
3.5 Empirical evidence of the forward premium anomaly: the 
rolling regression 
In this section, we perform an empirical analysis of the forward premium anomaly during 
19904-2007 using traditional regression methodology. We perform the forward market 
efficiency test and ask whether one can reject the null hypothesis that a=0, b=1 in 
equation (3.16). If the forward rate contains all available information at time t, then et, t+k 
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should be serially uncorrelated. Hence, 
Ast, t+k =a+b (ft, k - St) + Et, t+k- (3.34) 
As described earlier, the sampling frequency of the exchange rate data is daily. The length 
or maturity of the forward rate contract is specified by k, which is defined as I month 
or approximately 20 working days. Thus, ASt, t+k = St+k - st is defined as the realised 
exchange rate depreciation or the difference between the spot rate at date t and the spot 
rate at date t+ 20. (ft, k - 8t) is the forward premium or the difference between the time 
t forward rate and the spot rate. The null hypothesis tested is that a=0, b=1 and et, t+k 
has a conditional mean of zero. 
When using daily data in the UIP regression, one needs to be careful with the data 
overlapping issue. If the sampling frequency is equal to the maturity time of the forward 
contract, so that k=1, then Et, t+k will be serially uncorrelated. If k>1, this gives rise 
to the overlapping data problem and (k - 1)th order serial correlation (autocorrelation) in 
ct', +k. When Ct, t+k 
is serially correlated, the usual OLS standard errors estimates are biased 
(Greene, 2000). Consequently, one needs to adjust the standard errors'of the regressors. We 
use the Newey-West (1987) Heteroskedasticity and Autocorrelation Consistent estimator 
(HAc)91. This is a robust, consistent estimator for autocorrelated disturbances. 
In this case the sampling frequency is daily but the maturity of the forward contract is 
I month, hence. the data overlap. 1bus, the HAC is employed to correct the heteroskedas- 
96 See Greene (2000), pages 464 and 537 for finther details of the Newey-West consistent estimator. Using 
IIAC, it must be determined in advance how large is the lag order (k) of the series. The maximum lag, k 
must be large enough that the autocorrelations at 
lags longer than k are small enough to ignore. 
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ticity and autocoffelation issue. The organisation this section is that: we first perform the 
UIP regression using the HAC methodology, and then we perform the rolling regression. 
Table 3.2 presents the estimated slope coefficient b coefficients of the UIP regression 
(in equation (4-64)) based on the daily data for 10 currencies and their standard error ad. 
justed by Newey and West (1987). The last column of the table presents the test statistics 
for the null hypothesis of estimated beta equal to untiy. The results base on 95 percent 
3 
confidence interval. The results show that the estimate for b significantly different from 
the UIP hypothesis of unity in all currencies except in the case of GBP. Moreover, the esti- 
mated beta coefficients show negative sign in all sample currencies. The implication for the 
negative beta coefficient is that a positive 
forward premium was, over the period of studies, 
associated with their currency depreciation 
(in unit of US dollar) for all currencies. This 
finding is consistent with previous literature such as Frankel, 1980; Fama, 1984; Bekaert 
and Hodrick, 1993; and Baillie and 
Bollerslev (2000). At the same time, the R2 is very low 
in all currencies, and it is in the range of 
(0.001,0.043). This indicates that the forward 
premium actually explains very 
little of the spot rate return in the UIP regression (equation 
(4.64)). This finding is the same as other literatures mentioned above using other cuffen- 
cies and sampling frequencies. 
Thus, the regression results in all sample currencies confirm 
the earlier finding of the forward premium anomalies. 
We next perform the rolling regression to test for the UIP hypothesis. Sarno and 
Taylor (2002b) point out that the regression based UIP test used in the previous literature 
assumes that the beta coefficient 
is constant over some interval of time and therefore that it 
shows the parity condition over 
the period of time. The rolling regression in thi's study par- 
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tially corrects this imperfection. With the rolling regression, the beta coefficient measured 
over the subsample moves forward through tim e. 
In every country, the estimates of 0 are from 5-year rolling regression? ' (or 1,300 
trading days). This approach first estimates equations (3-16) using data from day I through 
day 1,300 of the dataset, then using data from day 2 through day 1,301, day 3 through day 
1,302, and so on9s. In other words, in the rolling regression, the number of observations is 
held constant and the starting and ending points are shifted. 
The resulting beta coefficients from the rolling regressions and the 95 percent con. 
fidence interval based on the HAC standard errors arc plotted in figures 3.8A-3.8J. The 
beta equal to unity line is drawn which represents the Point. where the uncovered parity 
condition holds. Using the 95 percent confidence interval, the beta coefficients for the re- 
gressions with one month maturity are significantly different from unity in most of the 
period of study in all currencies, except GBP99. Additionally, the beta coefficients from the 
rolling regression are also less than zero in most cases. This is consistent with the empirical 
research discussed in the previous section. 
Other research that performs the rolling regression t. o test for the unbiasedness hy- 
pothesis is in Baillie and Bollerslev (2000). They test for the parity condition in Gennan 
DNV US dollar using monthly data from Mar. 1973 to Nov. 1995. The results show that 
97 Alternatively, one could also perforni recursive and reverse recursive analyses, in which the starting or 
ending time period is held fixed and the s=ple size grows. I did not select these 2 analyses. Recursive 
analyses are often used in forecasting situations as 
information become more available with time (see Kmenta; 
1997, page 423-424) and this is a different application. 




Note that initially, I also study the case for maturity of I week, 3 months, 6 months and 12 months. The 
results show that the longer the maturity, 
beta becomes less closer to unity. In most cases, beta becomes even 
more negative. 
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the estimated slope coefficient in equation (4.64) significantly different form unity and it is 
also significantly less than zero using 5 year rolling regression. 
The concluding remarks for this section is that the estimated slope coefficients in 
equation (4.64) is likely to be uninfonnative about the true value of b, resulting in a forward 
premium anomaly. 
In the next section, we consider an empirical evidence of "Mismatch in persistence", 
which is the main source of the forward premium anomaly. The purpose of the following 
sections is to argue that the principal 
failure of the unbiasedness hypothesis (as in equa- 
tion (4.64)) is the difference in persistence between the spot return series and the forward 
premium series. The spot return 
(ASt, t+k) series is stationary while the forward premium 
(ft, k - SO series has 
long memory. Thus, the UIP regression is invalid and the slope co- 
efficients from OLS regression are 
highly biased. Additionally, the presence of structural 
breaks in the forward premium series is found to increase the persistence of the series. 
3.6 Empirical evidence of the fractional integration in the 
forward premium 
Empirical evidence (Baillie and Bollerslev, 1994a; Maynard and Phillips, 2001; and Choi 
and Zivot, 2005) supports the view 
that the forward premium series is fractionally inte- 
grated with a differencing parameter 
that is significantly different from zero and unity. In 
this section, we extend previous analysis 
by using the daily forward premium data for ten 
mostly traded currencies 
during Jan. 1994 - Jun. 2007. We find that a fractionally inte. 
grated model appears to 
fit the data quite well. The framework kor ARFIMA model, method 
3.6 Empirical evidence of the fractional integration in the forward premium 147 
of estimation and the model identification, and the results will be discussed in detail as fol- 
lows. 
3.6.1 The ARFIMA model 
This section closely follows Baillie and Bollerslev (1994a). For any covariance stationary 
time series process yt, the impulse response weights or moving average representation is 
given by, 
00 
Yt =E 'ki ct-j, 
j=o 
where t=T. -t is Gaussian white noise with mean zero, finite variance 0,2, and 
co 
serially uncorrelated, and r, < 00. j=ov)j 
The basic ARMA(p, q) model of the yt process is 
yt = olyt-i + .. - 
+ opyt-P + 6t + 016t-1 + 
... 
+ 016t-ql 
the J(0) property associated with stationary and invertible ARMA models imposes expo- 
ncntially decaying impulse response weights on the yt process and corresponding exponen- 
tially decaying autocorrelation coefficients. On the other hand, non-stationary I(1) process 
imply complete persistence on both the impulse response weights and the autocorrelation 
coefficients. 
A more flexible class of process is the ARFIMA(p, d, q) model, introduced by Granger 
and joyeux(1980), Granger 
(1980,1981) and Hosking (1981). This model is useful for se- 
ries that exhibit significant autocorrelation 
between observations vAdely separated in time, 
and for example is suitable 
for financial data such as inflation rates, exchange rates and in- 
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terest rates. In such a case, yt is said to display long memory (or long-term dependence) and 
may be best modelled by a fractionally integrated ARMA process. The ARFIMA(p, d, q) 
model for yt is written as 
ýý(L)(l - L)d(yt - p) = O(L), -t, (3.35) 
where /, i is mean of yt. E(ct) 0, E(, -t') = o, ', and E(ete. 
) =0 for s 34 t. L is a lag 
operator (Lyt = yt-1). -iDpLP) is the autoregressive polynomial and 
0 (L) + 01 L++ Oq Lq) is the moving average polynomial in the lag operator L. All 
the roots of D (L) and 0 (L) lie outside the unit circle. d denotes the fractional differencing 
parameter"', which determines the degree of long range persistence in yt. The yt process 
defined by equation (3.35) is said to be integrated on order d (or I(d)) for d ý4 0 if by 
differencing d times, it may be expressed as a stable and invertible ARMA process (Abadir 
and Taylor, 1999). A value of d=0 implies short memory stationarity, d=1 corresponds 
to a unit root, and for d<1, the impulse response weights are finite, which implies that 
shocks to level of the series are eventually mean reverting. An ARFIMA process is said to 
be covariance stationary when -0.5 <d<0.5, and it is invertible (with mean p) and has 
innovations that eventually disappear hyperbolically. There are 2 cases for the intermediate 
values of d. First, for 0<d<0.5, the process is called stationary long memory. Second, 
for -0.5 <d<0, 
it is called anti-persistent memory. For 0.5 <d<1, the yt process does 
not have a finite variance, thus, 
it is nonstationary (with initialization parameter p) and is 
100 Tbe* term (i - L)" is the fractional difference operator defined by the following binomial expansion: 
00 co (d 
, (1-L)d= r J=O j=0 
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recurrent but shocks are non-permanent and the unconditional variance grows at a slower 
rate than in the case of a unit root. 
3.6.2 Methodology and model identifications 
This section discusses the methodology in estimating the fractional differencing parame- 
ters, d. We first present the framework for the parametric and semiparametric estimators 
for d. 
Then, we consider correcting for the multiple structural breaks, using Bai and Per- 
ron's (1998,2003a) method, in the forward premium 
data in order to get better estimates 
of the long memory parameter, 
d. Their methodology in testing for and estimate multiple 
structural breaks will be presented as 
follows. 
Estimating the fractional differencing parameters 
We follow Maynard and Phillips (2001) in applying both the semiparametric and 
parametric frequency 
domain approach to estimate d. The main estimators in this study 
are the sernipararnetric estimators, whereas 
the parametric estimators are presented as a 
robustness check. 
The semipararnetric estimators are the modified log periodogram regression (MLP) 
estimators by Kim and 
Phillips (1999,2006), and the log-periodogram regression (LP) 
method by Geweke and Potter-Hudak 
(1983). The parametric estimator is the Exact max- 
imum likelihood estimator. These estiniators are applied in Maynard and Phillips (2001), 
and Choi and Zivot 
(2005). A detailed discussion of each estimator is presented as follows. 
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Comparing the parametric and semiparametric estimators, Maynard and Phillips (200 1) 
suggested that the advantages of the semi parametric estimator are its robustness to non- 
stationarity and its capacity to work well over the region 21 <d<2. However, the limita- 
tion of the serniparametric method is the possibility of finite sample bias in the estimation 
that may arise from the strongly autoregressive short memory (Agiakloglou, Newbold and 
Wohar, 1993). The parametric ARFIMA estimates are less robust in the large sample but 
on the other hand they are less prone to finite sample bias. However, Maynard and Phillips 
(2001) found that the two sets of estimates match fairly closely. 
The log-periodogram. regression (LP) estimators of the fractional differencing para- 
meter, d are widely used in economic applications since 
it involves a straight forward mod- 
ification to the periodogram. ordinates and it is easy to apply in empirical work. Diebold 
and Rudebusch (1989) studied the 
long memory process of quarterly post World WarlI US 
real GNP data using. the LP estimator. 
Cheung and Lai (1993) studied the purchasing par- 
ity condition and applied the LP estimator to test 
for cointegration of the series. Barkoulas, 
Baurn, and Oguz (1997) studied the persistency of five long term interest rates using the 
LP estimator. This semiparametric estimator 
is based on a regression of the ordinates of 
the log spectral density on a trigonometric 
function. Following the notation from Baillie 
(1996), we can estimate d by examining 
(1 
- L)d yt = Ut, 
where ut , 1(0). The spectral 
density of yt is given by 
_e (W)y = 
11 -i,,, 1-2df (W)u = [4 sin 
2 (wjl2)]-"f (W)U, (3.36) 
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where f (w),, and f (w). are spectral densities of yt and ut at frequency w respectively. 
th Rearrange equation (3.36) by taking logs, and adding and subtracting log f (0) to bo 
sides of this equation to yield 
log[fy (wj)] = log[f (0)] -d log[4 sin 2 (wj12)] + log[f (wj) lf (0)]. (3.37) 
Geweke and Potter-Hudak (1983), henceforth GPH, suggested estimating d from a re- 
gression based on (3.37) using the 
first m spectral ordinates WI, W2, ... ) Wmp 
from the pe- 
riodogram. of yt, that is 1. 
(wj). Hence, for j=1,2, 
log[l,, (wj)] =a+b log[4 sin(wjl2)] + vj, (3.38) 
where vj = log[f. (wj) 
If,, (0)] and vj is assumed to be i. i. d. with zero mean and vari- 
ance7r 2/6. From equation (3.36) and (3.37), the GPH estimator, d is the slope of the least 
squares regression, where the dependent and the explanatory variables are log[Iy 
(wj)] and 
log[4 sin 2(wjl2)], respectively in the sample j 2,..., m. The estimated long mem- 
AA 
ory parameter from LP is dLP = -b. 
If the number of ordinates m is chosen such 
that m= g(T), where g(T) is such that limT-,. g(T) = 00, limT., ý(T)/T] = 0, 
IiMT--.,, [(Iog(T)') Ig (T)l = 0, then the OLS estimator of d in equation (3.38) will have 
the limiting distribution 
(A ALP) ] 1/2 
dLP 
- d) / 
[var (d 




is obtained from the OLS regression formula, either using the regression 
residual variance or alternatively setting 
it as ir2 /6. GPH proVed consistency and asymp. 
A 
totic normality of dLPonly for 
d<0. Later on, Robinson (1990) proved the consistency 
A 
for 0<d<0.5. The disadvantage of the LP estimator is that dLPposses se'nous bias and 
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is very inefficient when ut is AR(1) or MA(1) and the AR or MA parameter is quite large 
(Agiakloglou, Newbold, and Wohar, 1993). 
The modified log periodogram (MLP) estimator"' is the -nonlinear version of the log- 
periodogram. regression (LP) method, where the non-stationarity range (d > 0.5) is allowed 
in the estimation and is also robust for AR(1) and MA(1) errors. Thus the best estimator 
for the fractional. differencing parameters in this work is the MLP estimator. In using this 
estimator, the dependent variable is modified to reflect the distribution of d under the null 
hypothesis that d=1. In case of MLP estimator, one can write the parallel equation to 
(3.38) as follow. From Kim and Phillips (2006), the MLP estimation'02 involves testing the 
presence of long memory when 0.5 <d<1 which is described as follows. 
log 1,.,, (wj) =c- 2d log 11 - e"J I+ b(wj), (3.39) 
where 
1,,. (wj; d) 
(w,; ) 
+Op b(wj) = a(wj) + log T- ji 
1d 
a(wj) = log [r,. (wj)If. (0)], c= log f (0). 
The MLP regression estimator of d is obtained by regressing log 1,,, (wj) on log 11 - &j 
over frequencies Jwj}, i=1,2,..., m. The estimator is defined as 
AI[ 7n 21 
-1 m 
100I dmLp =-r, E 
2 j=i xj 
[j=lxj 
101 The NILP shows a significant superiority over LP. The limit theory for the estimated d from MLp is the 
same as that of the LP estimator 
in the stationary case (Robinson, 1995; Hurvich, Dco and Brodsky, 1998). 
In contrast, the LP estimator has a mixed normal limit theory when 
d=1 (Phillips, 1999), and is inconsistent 
when d>I (Kim and Phillips, 
1999). Moreover, the simulations study by Kim and Phillips (1999) prove 
that the MLP is superior to LP in the nonstationary case where 0.5 <d<1. 
102 Tlie detailed derivation can be found in Kim and Phillips (2006). 
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'F -M wbere xj = log 11 - e"i log 11 - eil-'j I and og 11 - eiwj E log 11 - e"i 1. As in j=1 
A 
the case of the LP estimator, the distribution Of dMLP - N(d, 7r 2 /24m). 
The practical problem is the choice of the number of periodogram ordinates to be 
used in the regression, m where it is written as 
m=T, (3.40) 
where T is the sample size. There is no optimal bandwidth rule over the full range 0< 
d<1. Based on the simulation experiment, Kim and Phillips (2001) suggested that the 
optimal m is at 0.7 <a<0.8 for the MLP estimation method, and applied m= TO. 7, M= 
TO-75 andrn =T0.8 to analyse the extended Nelson-Plosser data in their work. Following 
this, Maynard and Phillips (2001) chose a=0.75 with 3,000 observations. Choi and 
Zivot (2005) used three different values of a which are 0.7,0.75 and 0.8. This chapter 
follows Kim and Phillips (2001) and Choi and Zivot (2005) to apply a bandwidth"' of 
ra =T0.7, yO. 75 , 
TO-8. 
The computation of the ARFIMA model using the log periodogram regression (LP) 
is implemented using the ARFIMAI. 04 package of Doornik and Oorns (2006) vvithin the 
Ox programming' suite (see Doornik, 2006). The code for the modified log pcriodograrn 
103 in the LP estimation, we apply the same bandwidth choice as in the case of MLP estimator. 
Geweke and Porter-Hudak (1983) suggested that the optimal bandwidth choice in the LP estimator of TI/2 
be used, and this choice has been widely adopted in the applied literature such as Diebold and Rudebusch 
(1983), and Chueng and Lai (1993). HoWever, it is now known that this choice is not optimal in general. 
(see Henry and Robinson, 1996; Hurvich, Deo, and Brodsky, 1998; and Hurvich and Deo, 1999). Many 
researches attempted to find the optimal bandwidth rule such as Henry and Robinson (1996), Delgado and 
Robinson (1996) and Hurvich and Deo (1999). However, these works have limitations. The optimal m 
depends on d and their pl-ag-in procedure is iterative. Moreover, there is distributional restriction. So far, 
there is still no rigorous justification of the optimaIity of the choice of ordinates for the LP estimator. 
The main estimator for the fractional integration parameter in this chapter is the MLP estimator, where the 
results for LP estimator are for the robust check. Thus, the choice of harmonic ordinates for the LP estimator 
follows those of MLP estimator. 
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regression (MLP) is provided by Chang Sik Kim written in Gauss (see Kim and Phillips, 
1999,2006). Later on, Baum and Wiggins (2000) made the code of Kim and Phillips 
available in the environment of STATA. They also made an improvement on the original 
code by removing the deterministic trends from the series before application of the esti- 
mator'04 . The estimation results 
from the Gauss code of Chang Sik Kim and the STATA 
code of Baum and Wiggins (2000) yield very similar results. -However, this study reports 
estimation results from Baum and Wiggins (2000). 
The parametric ARFIMA estimates allows for autoregressive and moving average 
terms p and q. The parameters of the ARFIMA model are estimated by the exact maxi- 
mum likelihood estimators (ML) with the assumption of conditional normality in et. The 
criticism of the exact maximum likelihood estimation is that d can be severely biased in 
the presence of unknown nuisance parameters for regressor variables, even if there is only 
a constant to measure the unknown mean (see Doornik and Ooms, 2004). However, the 
presentation of the results from ML in this work is used as a robustness check. We utilise 
ARFIMA(l, d, 0) and (0, d? 1) models in estimating the value of d which is in line with 
Maynard and Phillips's (2001) work. 
The computation of the ARFIMA model using exact maximum likelihood is implc- 
mented using the AFRIMAI. 04 package of Doornik and Ooms (2006) within the program. 
ming environment of Ox (see Doomik, 2006).. For the purpose of illustration, we write the 
ARFIMA (1 7 d, 1) model as, 
io4 phillips (1999) suggested that deterministic trends should be removed from the series before application 
of the estimator, Using Baum and Wiggins (2000)'s program, the linear trend is extracted from the series by 
default. 
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(1 - 4)L)(1 - L)d(f t_ St _ 11) = (1 + OL)ct, 
where the orders of p and q can easily be derived. Here, the generic dependent variable yt 
is replaced by the forward premium, ft - st. 
In the previous literature, the choice of p, q varies case by case. The majority of pre- 
vious research considers a pure autoregressive process case where q=0 such as Hol and 
Koopman, 2002; Baillie and Bollerslev, 1994a; and Baillie, Han and Kwon, 2002. Hol 
and Koopman (2002) consider ARFIMA(1, d, 0) for the conditional second moment of the 
intra-day returns on the Standard and Poor 100 stock index. In their work, not all parame- 
ters of an ARFIMA(1, d, 1) can be identified from the data. The original test for long mem- 
ory of the forward premium by Baillie and Bollerslev (I 994a) applied an ARFIMA(2, d, 0) 
model on the I month forward premium in term of number of US dollars per unit of foreign 
currency. The fractional differencing parameters were estimated by approximate maximum 
likelihood. The resulting values of d were 0.445,0.767 and 0.551 in Canada, Germany and 
UK. Ba illie, Han and Kwon (2002) applied seasonal ARFIMý(1, d, 0) on the conditional 
rnean specification of the monthly 
CPI inflation series on eight developed countries, and 
found that the series follow stationary long memory process. They also found similar long 
mernorY properties in the second moment of 
inflation from applying ARFIMA-FIGARCH 
model. 
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Multiple mean break model 
Tle purpose of this subsection is to briefly review the methodology used by Bai 
and Perron (1998,2003a) to estimate the unknown StruCtural break dates. Their model 
considers a structural change in mean model that allows the errors to be serially correlated 
and heteroskedastic. 
Ilie structural change model we consider is defined by the multiple linear regressions 
vvith V breaks (V +1 regimes) as follows; 
I Yt : -- Zt Loj + Ut, (3.41) 
where t= Tj-, + Tj for j= t9 +1 and To =0 and T, 9+1 = T. In this model, 
yj is the observed dependent variable at time t, or the forward premium (ft, A; - St) in this 
case. zt(q X 1) is vector of covariates and pj 
Is the corresponding vectors of coefficients. 
11 z, oj is treated as the mean of the forward premium for each regime. ut is e th , disturbance 
at time t. The structural break points are represented by TI, ..., To and they are explicitly 
treated as unknown. 
The model in equation (3.41) is called a pure structural change model since all the 
coefficients are subject to change. The variance of ut need not be constant. Breaks in 
the variance are also permitted provided they occur at the same dates as the break in the 
parameters of the regression. 
For each V partition (TI, Tq), the method of estimation for oj is based on the 




ST (Ti i=l 't=Ti-l+l Yt t (3.42) 
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A 
Let g({Tj}) denotes the resulting estimates. Substituting them in the objective function, the 
estimated break points (TI, ..., Tv) are written as 
AA 
arg min ST(Tl,..., T, 9), (3.43) T, , ... ITIO 
where the minimization is taken over all partitions (T,,..., Tq) such that Tj - Ti-, ý: q. The 
regression parameter estimates are the associate least squares estimates at the estimated 
AA 
-partition f Tj }, i. e. g= off Tj 
I). Next, we consider the test statistics for multiple breaks 
as follows. 
The first test is a test of no break versus a fixed number of breaks, the sup FT(J) 
which is defined as the F statistic of no structural breaks (V = 0) versus a fixed number 
of breaks (V = k). The F statistic is obtained by maximizing the difference between the 
restricted (without zt) and unrestricted sums of squared residuals over all potential break 
dates. if a significant break is found, the full sample is divided into subsample at the break 
point, and the test is then performed on each of the subsample. 
The other two test statistics test the null hypothesis of no structural break against 
I an alternative of unknown number of 
breaks given Some upper bound L (the maximum 
number of breaks allowed). These two tests are the double maximum statistics (UD max) 
and the weighted double maximum statistics (WD max). They are dcfined as follow 
UD max = max sup FT 
(1), 
I<I<L 
WDmax = maxwl-supFT(l), 1<15L 
where w, are the weights to the 
individual sup FT(I) tests such that marginal P-values are 
equal across values of 
1. 
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The critical values of sup FT(I), UD max, and WD max tests statistics are presented 
in Bai and Perron (1998). 
The last test is a test of 1 versus I+1 breaks, denoted sup FT (1 + 111). This is a test 
of the null hypothesis of I breaks against the alternative that an additional break exists. The 
test is based on the difference between the sum of squared residuals obtained with I breaks 
and that obtained with 1+ 1 breaks. One reject the null in favour of a model with 1+1 breaks 
if the overall minimal value of the sum of squared residuals (over all segments where an 
additional breaks is included) is sufficiently smaller than the sum of squared residuals from 
the 1 breaks model. The critical values for this test can be found in Bai and Perron (1998, 
2003a, 2003b). 
There are two alternative ways in selecting the number of breaks, namely the "sc- 
quential procedures" and the information criterion. The "sequential procedure" is a criteria 
based on the sequential application of the sup FT(I+ 111) test usi ng the sequential estimates 
of the breaks. The other procedures to estimate the number of breaks are to minimize a 
Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC) suggested by Yao (1988) or a modified Schwarz's 
Criterion (LWZ) suggested by Liu, Wu and Zidec (1997). 
In the Monte Carlo experiments of Bai and Perron (2000), the "sequential procedure" 
is found to be more reliable than the model selection criteria. They suggested that the 
INC works well when breaks are present but less so under the null hypothesis of no break, 
especially if serial correlation is present. On the other hand, the LWZ criterion works 
better under the null hypothesis (even with serial correlation) by imposing a higher penalty. 
However, Bai and Perron (2000) suggested that this higher penalty translates into a very, 
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bad performance when breaks are present. A more detailed discussion can be found in 
Bai and Perron (1998,2003a). This chapter adopt the sequential procedure in estimating 
structural breaks. 
The practical recommendation by Bai and Perron (2003a) is to apply the sequential 
procedure in the presence of multiple breaks and check the UD max or WD max tests 
to see if at least one break is present. If the tests indicate the presence of at least one 
break (reject the null hypothesis of no structural breaks), then the number of breaks can 
be decided based on a sequential examination of the sup FT(I + 111) statistics constructed 
using global minimizers for the break dates. 
The computation of the multiple mean breaks model is implemented using the GAUSS 
code of Bai and Perron (1998,2003a). 
3.6.3 The empirical results 
This section presents the resulting estimates of the fractional differencing parameters in the 
forward premium series by using the daily data for ten mostly traded currencies during Jan. 
1994 - Jun. 2007. The approach 
is summarized into 3 steps as follows. First, the methods to 
estimate log memory parameter, d will be discussed. For our purpose, we have applied the 
modified log periodogram regression approach (MLP) of Kim and Phillips (1999,2006) as 
the main estimator which is widely used for the case of nonstationarY d. 
Second, we consider the argument of Choi and Zivot, 2005; Diebold and Inoue, 200 1; 
Grange 
I 
r, 1999; Granger and Hyung, 2004; and Lamourex and Lastrapes, 1990, that the 
presence of structural 
breaks may also artificially produce high persistence in volatility. 
3.6 Empirical evidence of the fractional integration in the forward premium 160 
We test for and estimate the multiple mean break model in the forward premium data using 
Bai and Perron's (1998,2003a) method. TIiird, we adjust for the structural breaks in the 
forward premium and reestimate, the long memory parameter using the MLP regression on 
the mean-break 'adjusted data. 
Step 1: Estimating d without allowing for structural breaks 
Estimates of the fractional differencing parameter (d) and its standard error are shown 
in Tables 3.3 and 3.4. Tables 3.3 presents the estimated parameters using the serniparamet- 
ric, estimation techniques whereas table 3.4 contains estimated parameters from the para- 
A. 
metric method by exact maximum likelihood"' (dML) of the ARFIMA(j, d, 0) and (0, d, 
models". 
Panel on the left hand side of table 3.3 contains the estimated long memory parame- 
A 
ters dMLPI. and its corresponding standard error and test statistics estimated by the modi. 
fied log periodograrn (MLP) method of Kim and Phillips (1999,2006). Panel of the right 
A 
hand side of table 3.3 contains estimated long memory parameters, dLp and its correspond- 
Ing test statistics estimated by the log periodogram method of Geweke and Potter-Hudak 
(1983). The first ýolurnn of table 3.3 presents the power or the alpha value in equation 
Jos Using the ARFIMA package on Ox (see Doornik and Oooms, 2006) the ML estimator was applied to the 
fIrst differenced series and the resulting estimate of d was then increased by one. 
106 There h'as been attempted in testing of higher order AR and MA PolYnornials in the ARFIMA esti. 
mation, i. e., ARFIMA(l, d, I) and 
ARFIMA(O, d, 2) models. However, the results are not reported in the 
thesis. There is problem of flat log-likelihood 
in some sample currencies using ARFIMA(l, d, l) model. 
in case of ARFIMA(Od, 2), some sample currencies show that 
MA(2) is not significant. Lastly, the re- 
sulting log-likelihood 
from the estimation show that ARFIMA(O, d, l) and ARFIMA(l, d, O) are superior to 
ARjFIMA(l, d, I) and ARFIMA(Od, 2) models. There is also a parsimony argument in favour of lower-ordcr 
processes. Using lower order 
is tested to be preferred. 
Lastly, these specifications correspond to Maynard and Phillips (2001) who selected the ARFIMA(l, dO) 
and ARFIMA(O, d, I) models 
in estimating the fimctional integration parameters of the forward Premium data. 
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(3.40), which determines the number of harmonic ordinates to be included in the spectral 
regression, m of the MLP and LP estimations. The results can be discussed as follows. 
The Modified Log Periodogram (NEP) estimation results in table 3.3 show that the 
estimated value for the fractional integration parameter, dMLp are positive in all cases. The 
estimated standard errors are found to be small for all currencies107. We reject the null of 
A 
dMLP =0 in all currencies and for all values of a. On the other band, the results show 
mixed evidence when testing for the null of dMLP 1. For example, one fails to reject the 
null of unit root process in the case of CAD, CHF, DKK, GBP and NOK for every value 
of a, while the forward premium series in AUD show no evidence of a unit root for every 
value of ordinates, m. The stationarity test for the rest of the sample currencies such as 
EUR, JPY, NZD and SEK show mixed evidence with respect to different values of a. The 
A 
resulting estimated values of 
dMLPcan be summarised as follows. 
In case of AUD, one can conclude that the forward premium series have mean re- 
verting properties with infinite variance, but finite cumulative impulse response weights. 
This is represented by the value of dMLp being statistically less than unity using 5 percent 
confidence interval and the 
forward premium series fall into the nonstationary range where 
A 
0.5 < dMLP < 1. In case of CAD, CHF, DKK, GBP and NOK, the forward premium sc- 
ries areý found to follow the unit root process where the estimated dMLp are statistically not 
different from unity. Using 5 percent confidence interval, the test statistics fail to reject the 
null of unit root in the forward premium series. 
107 Note that the standard errors generally increase when ct gets smaller. Moreover, the Point estimate falls 
as cr increases. 
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I 
Panel on the right hand side of table 3.3 presents the estimated dLP from LP estimator. 
.k All the dLp are positive and are highly significantly different from zero. This corresponds to 
the results from MLP estimator. The estimated values of d from LP estimator are very close 
to those from MLP estimator and all the series fall into nonstationary range of dk > 0.5. 
Table 3.4 presents the parametric estimation results using exact maximum likelihood 
estimation. All of the forward premium series are found to be nonstationary. Considering 
the mean reversion of the series, the ARFIMA(l, d, 0) and the ARFIMA(O, d, 1) give con- 
tradictory results. All estimated d are less than I when using the ARFIMA(l, d, 0) model 
(column I of table 3.4). In the ARFIMA(O, d, 1) model (column 2 of table 3.4), the impulse 
response weights of the forward premium for AUD, CAD, EUR, GBP, NOK and SEK are 
infinite (d > 1), which implies that shocks to level of the series are not mean reverting. 
However, the ARFIMA(1, d, 0) model is more preferred according to Akaike information 
criteria. Moreover, the estimated d from the ARFIMA(l, d, 0) model is more reliable since 
its estimated standard errors are lower than in the ARFIMA(O, d, 1) model. 
overall, the semiparametric and parametric estimators show mixed evidences of sta- 
tionarity and mean revertability. This i. s may be because of the structural changes in the 
forward premium series. In the next subsection, we identify and estimate for potential 
structural breaks. " Finally, we estimate the 
fractional differencing parameters using the 
mean break adjusted data. 
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Step 2: Estimating the mean break model 
Figures 3. IA-3. IJ Provide visual evidence of structural changes in the mean of the 
series. Following Bai and Perron (2003a) and Choi and Zivot (2005), we aPPly our proce- 
dure with only a constant as a regressor (i. e. zt =I 1}) and impose 15 percent trimming on 
each end of the sample and between the break dates and allow a maximum of 5 breaks"'. 
Table 3.5 reports the significant break dates (at 5 percent level) from the Bai and Per- 
ron's tests for multiple structural breaks. The mean forward premium before adjusting for 
the breaks is presented in the second column. The third column is TBi=,,..,. s the estimated 
11 mean after each subsequent breaks, which corresponds to ztj in equation (3.4 1), fo owed 0 11 
by asymptotic standard error. The last column is the estimated break dates with 95 percent 
confidence interval. 
Table 3.6 represents the multiple structural change tests results. Note that the final 
number of breaks is determined by the sequential procedure. As mentioned in the previ- 
ous subsection the information criteria are biased downward and the estimated number of 
breaks chosen by BIC and LWZ is only for illustration purpose. 
Figures 3.9A-3.9J plot the forward premium, along with their changing means, for 
all ten countries. 
107 Hience each segminent has at least. 510 days (15% of around 3,400 observations in our data). The choice 
of value of trimming 
W is specified by the program, it varies by the maximum number of break allows as 
follows. For each option, the maximal value of breaks is: 10 fore = 5%; 8 fore = 10%, 5 fore = 15%, 3 
for c= 20% and 2 for e= 25%. See 
details in Bai and Perron (2003). 
Considering the time span of our data (from Jan 1994 to Jun 2007), allowing 5 breaks is sufficient. Bai 
and Perron (2003a) also suggest that 
the maximum break of 5 is sufficient for most empirical applications 
and applied this to the study of 
the quarterly US real interest rates from 1961: 1 to 1986: 3. 
Anyway, this chapter found that the results are not sensitive to an altcmative trimming values of gr = 5% 
(when allowing for maximum of 
10 breaks). 
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In estimating the number of break points during 1994-2007 for 10 sample currencies, 
one can summarise the results from tables 3.5 and 3.6 as follows. 
First, the data suggest the presence of at least one structural change in all of the 
forward premium series. From table 3.6; the UD max, WD max and sup FT(J) through 
sup FT(5) tests of all series are significant at I percent level. 
Second, the lag orders (number of structural changes) selected by sequential pro- 
cedure and the sup FT(l + 111) statistics varies when using different series. The detailed 
description of the results is as follow. 
The forward premium series in NOK exhibit one structural break. The sequential 
sup FT(l + 111) test statistics (in table 3.6) suggest one break for NOK on 20 July 2004 pre. 
surriably due to the Norges bank stopped the loosening monetary policy'19. The results can 
be seen in table 3.5 and figure 3.9H. The break date has a rather small confidence interval 
(between 16 Jul. 2004 and 30 Aug. 2004). Before the break date the mean of the for. 
ward premium is estimated to be 0.206 percent while the estimated intercept aficr break is 
- 0.119 percent. 
Interestingly, the mean of the forward premium over the period of observa- 
tion before adjusting for the structural break is 0.093 percent. Thus, taking structural break 
into account, we drastically obtain more accuracy in explaining behaviour of the forward 
P- remiurn before and after the 
Norges bank's change in the monetary policy. We CXpect 
1? 9 on 22 January 2003, Norges Bank cut both overnight rate and the deposit rate by 50 basis points each, 
bringing rates down to 6% and 8% respectively. Ibis is to defend its currency against the strong Euro. The 
Norges bank cut interest rates 8 more times following the January rate cut, finally ending the loosening of its 
rnonetary Policy in March 
2004 with its key interest rate at 1.75%. 
rhe Norwegian rates stayed until around Mid-2005 when the oil price soared. Norway was the loth 
largest oil producing, and the third largest oil exporting country in the world in 2006.7bus, oil price soar 
made the Norwegian Krone grew even stronger. 
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that the value of the estimated long memory parameters should be reduced after taking into 
account the structural breaks as in Choi and Zivot (2005). 
Considering the tests results in table 3.6 for the case of NOK in details, sup FT(J) 
through sup FT(5) are all significant at I percent level. The UD max and WD max tests 
are also significant at I percent level which suggest the presence of structural change in 
these three countries, but the supFT(l + 111) statistics are not significant when 1>1 
which indicates only one break. This confirms the number of break dates selected by the 
sequential procedure. We therefore conclude that there is only one structural break in case 
of NOK. 
The forward premium series of CHF, EUR, and GBP are estimated to have 2 breaks. 
In the case of EUR at least one structural change occurred at around 4 Jan. 2001. We 
also find evidence of another structural break around 20 Jan. 2005. These two breaks 
significantly affect both the level and the slope coefficient of the forward premium"O. The 
two break dates are precisely estimated since the estimated 95 percent confidence intervals 
cover only a few days before and after. The differences in the estimated means over each 
segment are significant and point to a 
decrease of 0.274 percent in Jan. 2001 and an increase 
of 0'. 225 percent in Jan. 2005. In case of 
CHF, the first and second breaks Occurred on 8 
Jan. 2001 and 4 Apr. 2005, respectively. For GBP, the first and second breaks Occuffed on 
17 Sept. 2001 and 14 Jun. 2005, respectively. 
110 in case of EURO, the empirical evidence 
is that after the introduction of the Euro in 1999, its exchange 
rate against other currencies 
fell heavily, especially against the US. dollar. at Octobcr, 26,2000, it had fallen 
to an all-time low. Ilis results 
in the first break. 
After the first break, the Euro then began steadily appreciating, and reached parity with the U. S. dollar 
()n july 15,2002. The second 
break occur when the Euro, reached a peak at the end of 2004 since the U. S. 
dollar fell against all major currencies, fuelled by the double deficit in the US accounts. 7be dollar recovered 
in 2005 and was stable throughout the second 
half of 2005 and so on. 
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'Me forward premium series of AUD, DKK, JPY, and SEK are found to have more 
frequent structural changes as the sequential procedure estimates the number of break at 3. 
Lastly, 'the forward premium series of CAD and NZD are estimated to have 4 breaks. 
Step 3: Estimating d using the mean break adjusted data 
Tables 3.7 and 3.8 present the estimated long memory parameters for the break ad- 
justed forward premium data using both the semiparametric and parametric estimators. The 
break adjusted data is the residual series, ut = Yt - ztoj in equation (3.41). 
The panel on the left hand side of table 3.7 shows Kim and Phillips (1999,2006) 
Modified Log Periodograrn (MLP) regression estimate of the fractional integration para. 
A 
meter (dMLp) and its standard error, using the same range of bandwidth as in the first step. 
The panel on the right hand side of the same table presents the estimation results from the 
traditional Log Periodograrn (LP) regression estimate. Table 3.8 presents estimation re- 
suits from the parametric estimator of the 
ARFIMA(1, d, 0) and ARFIMA(O, d, 1) models, 
respectively. 
First and overall, the results show that allowing for structural breaks reduces the 
persistence of the daily forward premium 
data in ten mostly traded currencies. Tb' e results 
are robust across all currencies and model specifications. 
Considering the MLP estimator, 
A 
there is a meaningful reduction in the magnitude of 
dMLPin all currencies and the order of 
ordinates rn =-- TO. For example, the point estimate of 
the forward premium in AUD falls 
from dMLP 4ýý (0.811,0.897) to dMLp E (0-739,0.889). The point estimate for CAD also 
decreases from dMLp E (0.979,1.027) to dMLp 
E (0-889,0.924) and the point estimate 
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AI 
for SEK declines from dMLp E (0.851,0.976) to dMLPE (0.790,0.911). This shows that 
the estimation of the long memory parameter is sensitive to the multiple structural breaks. 
In addition, after removing the break, the previous failure to reject the unit root in 
the forward premium series no longer obtains in all currencies; using 5 percent confidence 
,k 
interval, the null of dMLP ý_- 1 is rejected in every value of a. Considering these two points, 
we thus support the argument of Choi and Zivot, 2005; Diebold and Inoue, 2001; Granger, 
-1999; Granger and Hyung, 
2004; and Lamourex and Lastrapes, 1990, that the presence 
of structural breaks can artificially produce high persistence -in volatility. This is called 
"Spurious long memory process". 
In comparison to Choi and Zivot (2005), the reduction in magnitude of d after al- 
]owing for structural breaks is less drastic in my work. In Choi and Zivot (2005), after the 
adjustment for multiple structural 
breaks, four out of five forward premium series appcar 
to change from nonstationary to stationary 
long memory process. However, after removing 
the breaks, the evidence of nonstationary long memory 
in the forward premium still per- 
sists in all cases in my work. 
The forward premium displays less persistence than a unit 
root process 
(d < 1), but still too much persistence to satisfy stationarity. Ibis is possibly 
due to different sample currencies and sample period used. They use monthly exchangc 
rate data in terms of 
US dollars for five G7 countries: Germany, France, Italy, Canada and 
UK over the period January 1976 to 
January 1999, whereas we employ the daily data of ten 
Inostly traded currencies"' 
from around Jan. 1994 - Jun. 2007.11us we can conclude the 
finding that the forward premium series of all sample countries 
is covariance nonstationary 
iii Me list of sample currencies can be found in table 3.1. 
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because its variance is not finite (Hosking, 198 1). However, the process is mean reverting, 
since an innovation has no permanent effect on the values of the forward premium series. 
Second, the other benefit of the structural break adjustment is that there is less in- 
consistency in the estimation results across different model specifications, i. e. MLP, LP, 
ARFIMA(O, d, 1) and ARFIMA(1, d, 0). The four sets of estimates match fairly closely. 
This is consistent with Maynard and Phillips (2001) who find that estimated values for d 
are robust to change in model specifications. I 
Lastly, it is useful to compare the estimation results to the previous literature. May- 
nard and Phillips (2001) applied a bandwidth of m= TO . 
75 in estimating the parameter d 
using the MLP estimator. They examined daily data from November 1986 to March 1988 
and the corresponding estimated d values 
in their work are 0.957,0.937,0.882 and 0.993 
for AUD, CAD, JPY and GBP, respectively. Considering the same bandwidth as Maynard 
and Phillips (2001), the estimated values of the 
long memory parameter are fairly close to 
their work. The corresponding values of dMLPusing the break adjusted data in this work 
are 0.845,0.914,0.882, and 0.906 
in AUD, CAD, JPY and GBP, respectively. However, it 
A 
is useful to note that the different value of dMLPis likely to be because of difference in pe- 
riods of observations and the time span of the 
data; this chapter employs a longer datascts 
than their work. 
ibe results ftom this chapter obtain somewhat larger eýtimatcs of d than those first 
reported by Baillie and Bollerslev 
(I 994a) and in the later work by Choi and Zivot (2005). 
Baillie and Bollerslev (1994a) used monthly data and found point estimates for the or. 
der of fractional integration using an 
ARFIMA(2, d, 0) model of 0.445 and 0.551 for 
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CAD and QBP, respectively. The corresponding values of d using the ARFIMA(1, d, 0) 
and the ARFIMA(O, d, 1) on the break adjusted data in this work are (0-935,0.954) and 
(0.849,0.968) for CAD and GBP, respectively. However, the reason that we obtain higher 
value of dMLP is clearly because of different model estimation method, period of esti- 
mations and frequency of the data. As mentioned earlier, this chapter employ the MLP 
estimator to study the daily forward rate data from Jan. 1994 to Jun. 2007. 
In comparison with the results from Choic and Zivot (2005), the resulting estimated 
long memory parameters in this chapter are more than in their work. They estimated the 
long memory parameter using the bandwidth of 7n = {TI . 70 , TO-75, TO-80} with the MLP 
estimator. Considering the break adjusted data, the estimated 
"* dMLP in their work are 
(0.450,0.517,0.582) in Canada and (0.303,0.369,0.455) in't. he UK, respectively. Using 
break adjusted data, the estimated parameter from MLP, dMLP using the same bandwidth 
as their work, are found to be 
(0.924,0.914,0.889) and (0-940,0.906,0.863), in Canada 
and UK, respectively. However, the 
different finding is due to the different time period of 
studies and frequency of the datasets since they used monthly data from Jan. 1976 to Jan. 
1999. 
Conclusion 
Using the daily data for ten mostly traded currencies during Jan. 1994 - Jun. 2007, 
this chapter confirms the finding of previous literatures that the forward premium data 
follow (nonstationary) fractionally integrated process, which attributes to the forward pre- 
rnium anomalies. The presence of structural 
breaks also Proves to play an important role in 
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explaining the long memory of the forward premium data. Allowing for structural breaks 
reduces the persistence of the forward premium across all currencies and model specifi- 
cations. Moreover, the criticism that the presence of the structural breaks tend to cause 
the spurious long memory process in the data as in Granger, 1999; Granger and Hyung, 
2004; Diebold and Inoue, 2001 is supported when applying the forward premium data in 
this study. 
This study also confin-ns the argument of Baillie and Bollerslev (2000) that the sta- 
tistical artifacts of the data are important. There is evidence of fractional integration in the 
forward premium series where the fractional differencing parameters of all currencies are 
significantly different from zero though on the whole 
less than unity. The very persistent 
autocorrelation in the 
forward premium contributes to the forward premium anomaly. The 
cstirnated values for d are quite similar to those obtained 
by Maynard and Phillips (2001). 
Considering the break adjusted data, the majority of the forward premium series are char. 
acteriscd by nonstationary 
long memory process although they are also mean reverting 
(o. 5 <d< 1). 
Lastly, upon finding evidence of fractional integration in this study, Maynard and 
Phillips (2001) suggested that traditional statistical theory may not be applicable to many 
of the regressions commonly used 
to test forward rate unbiasedness. Thus, it is necessary 
to develoP the new 
limit theories and new methods to test the unbiasedness hypothesis. 
The next section Rifther confirins the finding of an unbalanced order of integration in 
the unbiasedness regression 
by testing for stationarity of the return on the spot rate. 
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3.7 Evidence of stationarity in the spot return 
This subsection aims to study the time series properties of the return on the spot rates 
(Ast, t+k) series in equation (3.33). We first report the unit root tests of this series for each 
currency in tables 3.9A and 3.9B. 
We perform the Elliott-Rothenberg-Stock (ADF-GLS, 1996) cfficient test for an au- 
toregressive unit root. The results are presented in table 3.9A. The null hypothesis is that 
-the returns on the spot rate contain a unit root, and the alternative is that the series were 
generated by a stationary process. Table 3.9B presents Kwiatkowski, Phillips, Schmidt, 
Shin (KPSS, 1992) test statistics for the null of level stationary versus an alternative of a 
unit root of the spot return series at different values of truncation lag. I'lie maximum lag 
order for these two tests is by default calculated 
from the sample size using a rule pro- 
vidcd by Schwert (1989). For the ADF-GLS West, the optimal 
lag order is calculatcd by 
the Ng-Perron (1995) sequential t test on the highest order lag cocfficicnt, stopping when 
that coefficient's p-value is less than 0.10. 
The first column of table 3.9A presents the t-tcst statistics from the ADF-GLS tcst, 
followed by the optimal lag length. The ADF-GLS test results show that one can over. 
whclmingly reject the null hypothesis of a unit root at 
5 percent significance levels in all 
currencies. We next consider the KPSS test which can 
be uscd in conjunction with the 
ADF test to investigate the possibility that the returns on the spot rate series arc fractionally 
integrated. 
Further analysis using the KPSS test reveals that the spot returns of all the currcncics 
are indeed stationary. The KPSS test results 
in table 3.913 show that the spot returns in all 
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currencies are level stationary. Using a5 percent level otsignificance, one cannot reject the 
null hypothesis that the spot returns are level stationary in all countries for the truncation 
lags of up to their maximum. 
The finding that the spot returns are stationary in all currencies is not surprising. 
There is overwhelming evidence that the logarithm of the spot exchange rate is nonstation- 
ary andfqllows I(l) process, -while the return on the spot rate is stationary (Cornell, 1977; 
Meese and Singleton, 1982; Corbae and Ouliaris 1986; Baillie and Bollerslev, 1989; Baillie 
and Bollerslev, 1993; Baillie and Bollerslev, 1994a). 
These findings establish that there is unbalanced order of integration bctwecn the 
spot returns and the forward premium. Thus it is insufficient to test the hypothcsis of 
the forward rates being an unbiased predictor of the future spot rates by using traditional 
regression analysis. 
3.8 Estimating the exchange rate risk premia 
'Ibis section aims to estimate the foreign exchange risk prcmia, following Dornowitz and 
flakkio (1985) and Baillic and Bollerslev (1990). The risk*prcmium is proxicd by die 
conditional variance of the forward rate forecast error as rcprcscntcd by cquation (3.30), 
vart(ft, k - st+k), 
where (ft, k - St+k) is the forward rate forecast error, defined as die difference bctwcýn dic 
realiscd future spot rate and the current forward rate, st+k - fj, k. st+k is a natural log of the 
spot rate at time t+k and 
ft, k is the natural log forward rate at time t with maturity k. 
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In the previous section we found that the forward premium followed a fractionally 
integrated (ARFIMA) process, but its conditional variance was assumed to be constant 
over time. This section aims to model the long memory in the conditional variance for the 
forward rate forecast error series. The Fractionally Integrated Generalised Autoregressive 
Conditional Heteroskedasticity (FIGARCH) model explains the fractional integration (the 
long memory) behaviour in the conditional variance of the series. 
The analysis begins with a description of the conditional variance properties of the 
forward rate forecast error and the rationale for applying this model, followed by the thco- 
r- ctical modelling of the FIGARCH model. Lastly, it presents the cstimation results. 
3.8.1 Fractional Integration behaviour in the conditional variance of 
the forward rate forecast error 
Referring back section 3.4, this chapter apply the MA(20) process to filter out ale serial 
correlation from the I month forward rate forecast error series. We primarily observe the 
autocorrelation plots of the residuals from the MA(20) process (figures 3.7A-3.7J). Tbcse 
plots show that there are no significant autocorrelations 
in all lags, thus Cie filtcrcd forward 
rate forecast error series is the. short memory process 
in the level. 
We then plot the autocorrelation functions of the squared and the absolute value of 
thi residuals from the MA(20) process (figures 3.7A-3.711) and found that they display per. 
sistence pattern. This suggests long memory bchýviour 
in the second moment of tile scrics. 
Moreover, the autocorrelation coefficients display a slow hyperbolic rate of dccay. Tile 
autocorrclation, coefficients at various 
lags are very Ngh even up to a lag of 100 working 
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days. Thus, the fractional integration behaviour is likely to exist in the second moment of 
the filtered series. 
Lastly, we proxy the foreign exchange risk premium by applying the parametric 
model of long memory in the conditional variance of the filtered forward rate forecast 
error series. 
3.8.2 The Fractionally Integrated GARCH model 
This section aims to estimate the degree of persistence in the variation in the forward rate 
forecast error using the FIGARCH process. Originally, the Fractionally Integrated GARCH 
(FIGARCM model is introduced by Baillie, Bollerslev and Mikkelscn (1996), henceforth 
BBM- So far, none of the literature applies it to the foreign exchange risk premium contcxt. 










where k= 20. Equation (3.44) represents the conditional mean specifications of the model 
where (St+k - ft, k) is the forward rate forecast error series. We assume that el is an inno. 
vation in the forward rate forecast error series, that is, it has mean zcro conditional on time 
infonnation. 
The FIGARCH(P, J, Q) model of BBM is given by 
ci = vtht, (3.45) 
ao + L)JJC2 t1 (3.46) 
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where, B(L) = 61L +, 82L 2 +... +, 6pLP), O(L) = [1 - a(L) -, 6(L)](1 - L)-I and 
a(L) = (a, L + ... + aQLQ) and all 
have their roots outside the unit circle. (1 - L)8 
accounts for the long memory of the process and ao is a constant term. 
Equation (3.45) gives a decomposition of the innovations, Et. vt is an independently 
and identically distributed (i. i. d. ) random variable with Et-1 (vt) =0 and Vart-, (Vt) = 1. 
ht is a positive time varying and measurable function with respect to the information set 
available at time t-1. Et-, (. ) and VARt-, (. ) refer to the conditional expectation and 
variance with respect to this same information set. The {ct} process is serially uncorre- 
lated with mean zero, but the conditional variance of the process, h2 t is changing over time 
(Baillie, Bollerslev, Mikkelson (1996). 
To capture persistence in the series volatility, equation (3.46) is the conditional vari- 
ance specifi cation of the innovations. h2t is defined as the time t conditional variance"' 
of ct. We model the changing volatility of a time series ct by using the Fractionally In- 
tcgrated Generalised Autoregressive Conditional Heteroskadasticity (FIGARCII) method. 
ology. Conditional on time t-1 information, the innovation is assumed to be normally 
distributed: ct , N(O, h 2). In particular, the FIGARCH(P, J, Q) model implies a slow hy. t 
perbolic rate of decay for the lagged squared innovations in the conditional variance func- 
tion. The FIGARCH class of the process is covariance stationary for 0<6<1, shocks to 
conditional variance will ultimately 
die out. FIGARCH model implies a finite persistence 
112 W-Ith the time varying ht2 the unconditional distribution of et has fatter tails than a normal distribution 
[K(, ct) > 3]. This is because the variability of 
the conditional variance affects higher moments of the 
unconditional distribution Of ct- 
[see Campbell, Lo and MacKinlay (1997, page 480)] 
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of volatility shocks, i. e., there is a long memory behaviour and slow rate of decay after a 
volatility shock. 
If we introduce the conditional variance (or the conditional standard error) as an ex- 
planatory variables in equation (3.44), we get ARCH-in-Mean model (ARCH-M) of Engle, 
Lilien and Robins (1987), i. e. 
b 
pt =p+ vht (3.47) 
with b=1 to include the conditional standard deviation and b=2 for the conditional 
variance. The ARCH-M is usually applied to financial time series to represent the relation 
ship between the expected return of the series and its expected risk. Domowitz and Hakkio 
(1985) model the forward rate forecast error using the ARCH-in-mean relationship. The 
estimated coefficient of the expected risk v is interpreted as a measure of the risk-return 
trade-off. Integrating equation (3.47) to the FIGARCH framework yields the FIGARCII- 
in-mean model. In the estimation part, we examine the possibility of this specification. 
Chung (1999) introduced a slight modification in the conditional variance function 
of BBM. He argues that BBM's pararneterisation of the FIGARCH model may have a 
specification problem that causes difficulty 
in estimation and intexpretation of the resulting 
cstimates. Chung (1999) proposed a slightly 
different process in the conditional variance 
functiori of equation (3.46) as follows; 
2+h2 
t 
2 is the unconditional variance of et and vt 2h 2). where htt. 
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Tic computation. of the FIGARCH model is implemented using the G@RCH4.2 
package of Laurent and Peters (2004) within the programming environment of Ox. The 
estimation of the FIGARCH model assumes conditional normality of the process using the 
Maximum likelihood estimation for parameters of the process. The results are presented in 
the following subsection. 
3.8.3 The empirical results 
Tables 3.10 and 3.12 contain estimation results using the FIGARCH(1, J, 1) models for 
currencies' forward rate forecast error for both BBM's and Chung's specifications, respec. 
tively. We also found that there is no FIGARCH-in-mean relationship in the forward rate 
forecast error series. The estimated coefficient of the expected risk, v in equation (3.47) is 
found to be statistically insignificant for both b=1 and b=2 cases. . 
The estimated parameters from FIGARCH(1, J, 1) using BBM specification are prc- 
scntcd in table 3.10. There is strong evidence of long memory in the conditional variancc. 
Ile long memory parameter in the conditional variance spedification. (5) is significantly 
different from zero, and lies in the range between 0.279 and 0.528. Ilis means that the 
conditional variance matters in determining deviation of the forward rate from the expcctcd 
future spot rate. Since 0<ý<1, thus the propagation of shocks to the mean and variance 
of forward rate forecast error 
is proved to occur at a slow hyperbolic rate of dccay. The 
value of the skewness and the kurtosis of the standardised residuals of the estimatcd Fl. 
GARCH model and their p-values are reported. Moreover, the Jarque-Bera normality test 
(Jarque, and Bera, 1987) is also reported. 
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In modelling the foreign exchange risk premium, this paper proposed that the FI- 
GARCH model fits the data better than the multivariate GARCH model as used by Baillie 
and Bollerslev (1990) and the ARCH-in-mean model as used by Dornowitz and Hakkio 
(1985)). Reliable estimates and inference of the risk premium depend on well-specified 
conditional heteroscedasticity models. Thus, checking the adequacy of a fitted model be- 
comes an important issue for model selection. Tse (2002) argued that misspecification in 
the mean and variance results in inconsistency and loss of effiqiency in the estimated para- 
meters. it is useful to discuss the misspecification test results for the model in table 3.11 as 
follows. 
The misspecification tests of the FIGARCH model by BBM are presented in table 
3.11. The first panel reports the Box-Pierce statistics at lags 10,15 and 20 for the stan- 
dardised, residuals and the squared standardised residuals under the null hypothesis of no 
autocorrelations. The second panel 
is the residual based diagnostic (RBD) for conditional 
heteroskedasticity of Tse (2002). The residual-based diagnostics are constructed to test for 
certain residual patterns 
implied by the deviation of the fitted model from its underlying 
assurnPtiOns- This test 
diagnoses model misspecifications concerning on conditional het. 
eroscedasticity in time series models. 
This is the test of the null of model adequacy against 
alternatives of model misspecification. 
The third panel is the sign bias t test (SBI). This is 
a diagnostic test of 
Engle and Ng (1993) that investigates possible misspecification of the 
conditional variance equation and 
test for the presence of leverage cffect. This is the test 
of the null of no sign 
bias against the alternative of the presence of leverage effect. The 
next panel is the Adjusted 
Pearson Chi-square Goodness-of-fit test under the null ok a cor- 
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rect distribution of the innovations. Considering the test results in table 3.11, one can argue 
that the model captures the dynamic of the forward rate forecast error data in all curren- 
cies. The Q-statistics on standardised residuals and the squared standardised residuals, and 
RBD test with various lag values as well as the adjusted Pearson Chi-square goodness of 
fit test with different cells number accept the null hypothesis of correct specifications in all 
currencies. Additionally, there is no sign bias in the conditional variance function in all 
currencies. The last panel is Engle's LM ARCH test (Engle, 1982), it tests the presence 
of ARCH effects in a residuals. For each specified order, the squared series is regressed 
on p of its own lags. The test statistics is distributed X2 (p) under the null hypothesis of no 
ARCH effects. 
7be overall conclusion is that the FIGARCH model appears to be a good specification 
for the filtered forward rate forecast error series. The post estimation test results for the 
FIGARCH model using BBM's specification show that there is no misspecification. The 
model well captures the dynamic of the forward rate forecast error in all currencies. 
It is useful to examine the results from using an alternative specification of the Fl. 
GARCH model as suggested by Chung (1999). Table 3.12 contains the estimated Fl. 
GARCH models for currencies' forward rate forecast error using Chung's SPecification. 
. fbere is no 
FIGARCH-in-mean relationship. This is the samc-as the csfimation results us- 
ing I3BM's specification. This proves the robustness of the model. The estimated long 
memory parameter in the conditional variance specification 
(8) is significantly differcnt 
from zero, and lies in the range of 0.283 to 0.451. This confirm the evidence that the 
I 
volatility of the forward rate 
forecast error tends to change quite slowly over time, i. e. the 
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effect of shocks takes a considerable time to decay. The estimated parameter values from 
Chung's specification are quite close to those estimated by BBM's specification. The mis- 
specification test results are presented in table 3.13. Again, ýhung's specification appears 
to fit the data quite well. 
Lastly, Chung (1999) derived the sufficient condition for non-negative conditional 
variances for the case of FIGARCH(1,9,1) specification"' of BBM as 
2-5 ß' -5 <- '01 ý<, -3 
1-5 
andJ(01- 2)< (3.48) 
Tle estimation results show that the sufficient condition to ensure that the conditional vari. 
ance is positive almost surely for all t is fulfilled in all sample currencies using BBM 
specification. In contrast, the positivity constraint for the FIGARCH(1,5,1) is observed in 
I out of 10 currencies using Chung's specification (in case of CHF). Generally, the stan. 
dard errors of the estimated parameters in the conditional variance function from Chung's 
specification are relatively higher than in BBM specification. 
From the estimation results and misspecification test results, the BBM's specification 
proves to fit the data better. Hence, the exchange rate risk premium will be generated from 
the condi tional variance of the forward rate forecast error using BBM's specification. 
Additionally, this paper argue that the fractionally integrated GARCH model fits the 
forward rate forecast error data adequately. Comparing to Dornowitz and Hakkio (1985), 
we find that the estimated coefficient of 
the expected risk v in equation (3.47) is statistically 
insignificant, hence there is no ARCH (or FIGARCH)-in-Mean relationship in our data. 
113 see prove in appendix A of Chung, 1999. 
3.8 Estimating the exchange rate risk premia 181 
Comparing to Baillie and Bollerslev (1990) which applied the multivariate GARCH process 
to the forward rate forecast error series, the FIGARCH model in this work allows us to 
develop more flexible class of the process for conditional variance that are more capable 
of explaining and representing the observed temporal dependencies in the series volatility. 
The GARCH framework assumes no persistence in the volatility of shocks. However, the 
autocorrelation plots of the absolute and squared residuals (in figures 3.7A-3.7J) prove that 
there is persistence of shocks. Thus, the foreign exchange risk premium is proved have a 
long memory behaviour and slow rate of decay after a volatility shock. 
Dornowitz and Hakkio (1985) add the estimated risk premium in regression for the 
Uncovered Interest Parity as in equation (3.33)) and perform the OLS regression. How- 
ever, this chapter argues that it is inappropriate to use the OLS regression since one need to 
eliminate the nonstandard nature of the 
limit theory which attributes to the long memory of 
the forward premium and the foreign exchange risk premium. Additionally, Maynard and 
Phillips (200 1) suggest that the finding of short memo 
. 
ry in the spot return and a long mcm. 
ory in the forward premium already causes 
for rejection in the unbiasedness hypothesis. 
The contribution of this section 
is to propose a better estimator for the foreign exchange 
risk premia. Additionally, 
finding that the estimated value of the foreign exchange risk pre. 
m ia is non-trivial and -that the 
forward premium is nonstationary proves that the Uncovcrcd 




This work corroborates earlier findings that a principal reason for rejection of the forward 
rate unbiasedness hypothesis is differences in persistence between the forward premium 
series and the spot rate return and the existence of the time varying exchange rate risk 
premium. In the risk premia estimation part, this work suggests a new method in estimating 
the foreign exchange rate risk premium. 
This chapter extends the research of Baillie and Bollerslev (I 994a) by studying 10 
mostly traded currency using daily data. In accordance with their work, the forward pre- 
mium in the foreign exchange market, st - ft, k is best characterised by a (nonstationary) 
fractionally integrated process (1(d) where 0<d< 1), while the spot return series are 
found to be stationary which follow an 1(0) process in all sample currencies. This im. 
plies imbalance in the traditional regression of the return on the spot rate on the forward 
premium. 
The presence of structural breaks also proves to play an important role in cxplain- 
ing the long memory of the forward premium data. We correct for structural breaks in die 
forward premium data using Bai and Perron (1998,2003a). Allowing for structural brcaks 
reduces the persistence of the forward premium across all currencies and model specifl. 
cations. Nevertheless, the forward premium still 
follows the (nonstationary) fractionally 
integrated process after correcting for multiple structural breaks. 
In sum, the finding that there is an unbalance in the order of integrations prows that 
the statistical artefacts of the 
data contribute to the rejection of the hypothesis. Ms chapter 
thus argued that it is inappropriate to use 
OLS regression since one need to eliminate the 
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non-standard nature of the limit theory which attributes to the long memory of the forward 
premium already causes for rejection in the unbiasedness hypothesis. 
This chapter suggests a new methodology in estimating the exchange rate risk pre. 
mium by modelling the conditional variance of the forward rate forecast error (St+k - ft, A; ) 
using the fractionally integrated GARCH model. In estimating the foreign exchange risk 
premia, the FIGARCH model is found to be econometrically superior to regular stable 
GARCH model as in Baillie and Bollerslev (1990) and the ARCH-in-mean model as used 
by Dornowitz and Hakkio (1985). Finding that the risk premia exists can explain why the 
Uncovered Interest Parity does not hold. 
Lastly, to further study the high frequency dynamics of the forward premium and at- 
tempt to impose the balance in the UIP regression by adding the risk premia to the UIP 
regression is not plausible here. To find fractional cointegration between the risk premium 
and the forward premium which will lead to a reasonable estimate of beta coefficient rc. 
quires that these two variables have the same order of integration, and the results in the 
chapter find that they are not. 
Table 3.1: Summary statistics 
Panel 1: Daily one month return on spot exchange rates (with US doUars), (St+k -S, )*100 
Data Obs Mean Std. Dev. Skewness Kurtosis JB test 
Australian Dollar (AUD) 3390 0.104 2.716 -0.125 3.023 8.88 
British Pound (GBP) 3477 0.162 2.109 -0.040 3.188 237.00 
Canadian Dollar (CAD) 3468 -0.120 1.663 . -0.240 
3.296 45.86 
Danish Krone (DKK) 3430 -0.115 2.623 -0.176 2.959 17.88 
EURO(EUR) 2184 0.132 2.668 0.246 2.912 22.72 
Japanese Yen (JPY) 3475 0.051 3.126 -0.716 5.163 78.30 
New Zealand Dollar (NZD) 3280 0.164 2.972 -0.282 3.192 74.77 
Norwegian Krone (NOK) 2177 -0.194 2.812 -0.190 2.882 14.40 
Swedish Krone (SEK) 2181 -0.108 2.831 -0.160 2.740 15.42 
Swiss Franc (CHF) 3476 -0.103 2.839 -0.360 2.940 33.29 
Panel 2: Forward premium (%), 
(ft, 
k-st)*100 
Data Obs Mean Std. Dev. Skewness Xurtosis JB test 
Australian Dollar (AUD) 3410 -0-113 0.129 -0.357 2.058 198.70 
British Pound (GBP) 3497 -0-090 0.094 -0.199 1.977 186.40 
Canadian Dollar (CAD) 3488 -0.012 0.099 0.029 2.459 42.98 
Danish Krone (DXK) 3450 -0.042 0.129 0.413 1.835 293.10 
EURO(EUR) 2204 0.048 0.134 -0.091 1.375 245.40 
Japanese Yen PPY) 3495 -0.332 0.143 0.438 1.785 333.30 
New Zealand Dollar (NZD) 3300 -0.202 0.144 0.561 2.306 146.50 
Norwegian Krone (NOK) 2197 0.093 0.207 0.345 1.926 149.10 
Swedish Krone (SEK) 2201 -0.045 0.172 0.309 1.484 245.70 
Swiss Franc (CHF) 3496 -0.216 0.127 0.437 1.842 457.00 
Panel 3. Forward rate forecast error 
(70)9 (ft, 
k-St+0*100 
Data Obs Mean Std. Dev. Skewness Nurtosis JB test 
Austra. Fian Dollar (AUD) 3390 0.217 2.745 -0.128 2.931 9.28 
]3ritish pound (GBP) 3477 0.252 2.115 -0-030 3.189 - 123.01 
Canadian Dollar (CAD) 3468 -0-108 1.679 -0.280 3.265 55.46 
Danish Krone (DKK) 3430 -0.074 2.651 -0-173 2.928 17.9.1 
EURO(EUR) 2184 0.084 2.699 0.239 2.881 22.12 
Japanese Yen PPY) 3475 0.383 3.148 -0-678 4.997 184.20 
New Zealand Dollar (NZD) 3280 0.371 2.999 -0.289 3.139 73-19 
I; or. wegian Krone 
(NOK) 2177 -0.289 2.841 -0.199 2.846 16-50 
Swedish Krone (SEX) 2181 -0.064 2.870 -0.167 2.727 16-89 
Swiss Franc (CHF). 3476 0.113 2.867 -0.350 2.899 16-911 
Note: The exchange rate data are observed during 3rd January 1994 to 16th June 2007, 
except, EUR, NOX and SEX. 
The exchange rate data for these 3 countries are observed from 
4th JanuarY 1999 to 16 th June 2007. 
Table 3.2: The Unbiaseness Regression 
(Dependent variable: the spot return) 
beta cons F(Ho: beta=l) R^2 
CBP -1.129 0.001 
2.70 0.001 
(1.295) (0.002) [0.1001 
AUD -4.202 -0.004 16.31 0.040 
(1.288)*** (0.002)* [0-000] 
CAD -2.158 -0.002 11.05 0.016 
(0.950)** (0.001) [0.0011 
CHF -1.283 -0.003 8.38 0.008 
(0-789) (0.002) [0.0041 
DKK -3.967 -0.003 23.53 0.038 
(1.024)*** (0.002)* [0.000] 
EUR -4.111 0.003 15.22 0.043 
(1.310)*** (0.002)* [0-0001 
JPY -2.008 -0.006 18.25 0.017 
(0.704)*** (0.002)*** (0-0001 
NZD -2.373 -0.004 10.60 0.014 
(1.036)** (0.003) [0.001) 
NOX -1.353 -0.001 
6.34 0.010 
(0.935) (0.002) [0.012] 
SEK -3.229 -0.003 
15.36 0.039 
(1.079)*** (0.002) [0.000] 
Notes: 
'The first column represents the estimated beta coefficients of the UIP regression. The 
second column is the estimated constant. The numbers in parentheses are the Newey. 
West (1987) standard errors of the corresponding parameter estimates. 
*I **, *** indicate 10%, 5% and 1% significance respectively. 
2The third column represent the F-test statistics for the null of estimated beta equal to 
unity. The figures in the squared bracket are the corresponding p-values [Prob>Fj. 
Me last column represents the R-squared of the OLS regression. 
Table 3.3: Semi-parametric estimates Ior d before adjusting for structural breaks in the forward 
premium data 
MLP LP 
Cxmn" Power ordinates d týHuxl=v) r>f 
1. AUD 0.7 297 0.897 (0-038) 23.787 10.0001 -2.772 10.006) 0.892 (0.039) 22.606 10.000 1 
0.75 446 0.876 (0.032) 27.221 [0.000) 4.097 10.000] 0.848 (0.032) 26.299 [0.000 1 
0.8 670 0.811 (0.027) 30.470 [0.0001 . 7.641 10.0001 0.740 (0.026) 28.206 [0,000 1 
2. CAD 0.7 301 1.022 (0.035) 29.452 to. 0001 0.592 10.5541 1.032 (0.038) 27.135 [O. Ouo l 
0.75 453 1.027 (0.031) 33.407 [0.0001 0.894 10.3711 2.023 (0.030) 33.569 10.000 1 
0.8 682 0.979 (0.025) 39.214 10.0001 . 0.876 (0.3811 0.990 (0-025) 39.496 [0.000 1 
3. CHF 0.7 302 0.983 (0.032) 30.736 10.0001 -0.453 10.6511 0.986 (0.032) 30.931 10.000 1 
0.75 454 0.969 (0.037) 26.544 [0.0001 -0.832 [0.4051 0.936 (0.027) 35.245 10.000 1 
0.8 683 0.970 (0.033) 28.993 [0.0001 -0.821 10.4121 0.874 (0-023) 37.661 [0.000 1 
C DKK 07 299 1.018 (0.033) 31.126 10.000] 0.493 10.6221 1.016 (0.031) 33.320 10.000 1 
0.75 450 0.995 (0.027) 36.993 10.000] -0.181 10.8561 1.002 (0-026) 38.738 10.000 1 
0.8 676 0.963 (0.022) 42.815 (0.0001 -1.491 [0.1361 0.982 (0.022) 44-954 fo. ono l 
5. EUR 0.7 218 0.931 (0.046) 20.036 10.000] -1.580 
(0.114) 0.938 (0.050) 18.818 10.000 1 
0.75 321 0.913 (0.039) 23.720 [0.0001 -2.424 10.0151 O. W6 (0-042) 21.440 10.0001 
0.8 472 0.756 (0.034) 22.406 10.0001 -8.266 10.0001 0.736 (0.036) 20-458 1 0.0001 
6. GBP 0.7 302 1.005 (0.037) 27.325 10.0001 
0.148 JO. 883] 1.009 (0.038) 26.833 [ O. UUUI 
0.75 454 0.992 (0.031) 31.953 [0.0001 -0.279 [0.7811 1.000 (0.030) 33.433 1 0.0001 
0.8 6,83 0.978 (0.029) 33.516 10.0001 -0.747 10.4551 0.909 (0.025) 35.676 I n Owl 
JIPY 7 0.7 302 0.971 (0.037) 26.158 J0.000j -0,773 JO. 440J 0.984 (0.036) 25.693 1 0. OUUI . 0.75 454 0.953 (0.032) 29.882 10.000] -1.565 10.1181 0.899 (0-031) 29.009 1 0.0001 
08 683 0.813 (0.027) 30.640 10 0001 -7.632 10.0001 0.811 (0.026) 30.1)95 l o. of)nl 
NOX S 0.7 218 1.056 (0.040) 26.101 IO. OOOJ 
1.296 10.195) 1.051 (9.033) 31.423 1 0. OUUI 
. 0.75 320 1.003 (0.034) 29.666 [0.0001 0.079 10.937] 1.016 (0.029) 34,894 j O. ODOJ 
0.8 471 0.956 (0.043) 22.288 [0.0001 -1.214 10 2251 0.919 (0.027) 33.433 J OSM) 
NZD 9 0.7 290 0.946 
(0.037) 25.468 lu. 0001 -1.425 10.154) 0.937 (0.04o) 23.204 1 O. W)l 
. 0.75 435 0.893 (0.030) 29.585 10.0001 -3.495 10.0001 0.892 (0.034) 26.339 1 0.0001 
0.8 652 0.816 (0.026) 31.316 [0.0001 -7.337 [O. nOO) 0.824 (0.029) 28.625 J OAX)l 
10. SEK 0-7 218 0.976 
(0.043) 22.516 JU. OUOI -0.56110.575) 1.036 (0.043) 24.04U jo. (xx)J 
0.75 322 0.930 (0.042) 22.060 [0.0001 -1.614 [0.106) 0.926 (0.037) 25.322 10.0001 
0.8 472 0,851 (0.029) 29.752 10.0001 -5.059 
10.0001 0.780 (0.033) 23.706 10.0001 
Notes. 'Panel on the left hand side is estimated by the Modified Log Periodogram Regression estimator 
(MLP) by Kim and Phillips (1999,2006). Panel on the right hand side is estimated by tile Log 
Periodograrn Regression estimator (LP) by Geweke Porter-Hudak (1983). 
'Column 2 is the choice of the root (T) or the power value (alpha) in equation (3.40) In the main text. 
A range of power values (0.7,0.75 and 
0.8) is calculated. Column 3 is the number of harmonic ordinates 
to be included in the spectral regression. The term d represents the long memory 
(fractional Integration) 
parameter of the forward premium 
data, followed by conventional standard errors. Column 5 is the t. 
test statistics for the test of 
d=O and the corresponding p-values. Column 6 is the test statistics (zd) for 
the test of d=1 and its p-value. 
Table 3.4: Parametric estimates for d before adjusting for structural breaks 
in the forward premium data 
Estimated dmL 
Country ARFIMA(l, d, O) ARFIMA(O, d, l) 
1 AUD 0.714 (0.013) 1.150 (0-071) 
2 CAD 0.948 (0.017) 1.010 (0.028) 
3 CHF 0.787 (0.013) 0.812 (0.019) 
4 DKK 0.909 (0.016) 0.921 (0-020) 
5 EUR 0.857 (0.015) 1.332 (0-061) 
6 GBP 0.860 (0.014) 1.167 (0.063) 
7 JPY 0.767 (0.013) 0.774 (0.022) 
8 NOX 0.976 - (0.016) 1.048 (0.019) 
9 NZD 0.806 (0.015) 0.966 (0.044) 
10 SEK 0.831 (0.015) 1.026 (0.046) 
Notes: 
'All models were estimated by exact maximum likelihood (ML). 
Me numbers in parentheses are asymptotic standard errors of the corresponding parameter 
mtirnates. 
Table 3.5: Multiple Structural Change Model Estimates for forward 
premium with 1 month maturity (/US Dollar) 
_Country 
Mean Estimated intercept Estimated break date 
AUD -0.113 TB1 -0.127 (0.002) 10-Dec-96 05-Nov-96 01-Jan-97 
TB2 0.017 (0.001) 1&Sep-01 07-Sep-01 26-Sep-01 
TB3 -0.279 (0.002) 01-JUI-05 27-Jun-05 25-Jul-05 
TB4 -0.088 (0.002) 
CAD -0.012 TBI 0.063 (0.002) 21-Mar-96 01-Feb-96 21-Jan97 
TB2 -0.148 (0.002) 25-Mar-98 21-Jan-98 18-Feb99 
TB3 -0.049 (0.002) 24-Apr-01 22-Dec-99 10-Jun04 
TB4 0.111 (0.002) 19-Jan-05 11-Jan-05 18-Apr-05 
TB5 -0.076 (0.002) 
CHF -0.216 TB1 -0.277 (0.002) 08-Jan-01 04-Dec-00 17-Oct-01 
TB2 -0.079 (0.003) 04-Apr-0.5 29-Mar-05 26-May-05 
TB3 -0.283 (0.004) 
-0.042 TB1 0.065 (0.002) 26-Jan-96 23-Jan-96 14-Oct-96 
TB2 -0.140 (0.002) 22-Feb-01 19-Feb-01 13-Jul-01 
TB3 0.122 (0.002) 01-Dec-04 22-Jan-04 24-FebO5 
TB4 -0.142 (0.002) 
EUR 0.048 TBI 0.193 (0.007) 04-Jan-01 08-Dec-00 09-Jan-01 
TB2 -0-081 (0-010) 20-Jan-05 05-Jan-05 23-Feb-05 
TB3 0.144 (0.010) 
GBP -0.090 TBI -0.055 (0.002) 17-Sep-01 30-Aug-01 07-Nov-03 
TB2 -0.171 (0.002) 14-Jun-05 26-May-05 19-Jul-05 
TB3 -0.003 (0.002) 
JPY -0.332 TP1 -0.302 (0.003) 19-Jan-96 16-Jan-96 24-Feb-98 
TB2 -0.447 (0.002) 31-Jul-01 04-Jul-01 06-Aug-01 
TB3 -0.151 (0.002) 06-Jun-05 26-May-05 15-Jul-05 
TB4 -0.390 (0.003) 
NZD -0.202 TBI -0.215 (0.002) 03-A ug-98 16-Apr-98 15-Sep-98 
T132 . 0.000 (0.002) 14-Sep-01 12-Sep-01 02-Nov-01 
TB3 -0.324 (0.003) 22-A ugt- 03 27-Jun-03 28-Sep-04 
TB4 -0.361 (0.003) 25-Jul-05 07-Jul-05 29-JuIO5 
TB5 -0.222 (0.003) 
NON 0.093 TB1 0.206 (0.004) 20-Jul-04 I 16-Jul-04 MAug-04 I* 
TB2 -0-119 (0-005) 
SEX -0.045 TB1 -0.186 
(0.002) 20-Apr-01 02-Apr-01 27-Apr-01 
TB2 0.160 (0.002) 04-Ma4-04 06-Feb-04 16-Jun-04 
TB3 0.010 (0.002) 10-JU17-05 31-May-05 2T-Jun-05 
TB4 -0.209 (0.002) 
Notes: 
IThe estimated parameters are 
based on 95% confidence interval. Asymptotic. standard 
ors are reported 
in parentheses. err 
2 The second column represents the mean of 
forward premium data before adjusting for 
the structural breaks. 
31n the third column, TB1,.., TB5 are the estimated mean of the forward premium after 
adjusting for multiple structural 
breaks, with the break date report in italics. 
"The dates in the square bracket [. 
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Table 3.7: Semi parametric estimates for d after adjusting for structural breaks in 
the forwaxd premium data 
MLP LP 
Cmxntri Power Ordinates d t(HO: d=O) P>Itl z(HO: d=l) P>Izl d t( O: d=O) p7tT- 
L AUD 0.7 297 0.889 (O. U41) 21.913 [0.0001 -2.98T 10.0031 0.898 (0.038) 23.706 10.0001 
0.75 446 0.845 (0.033) 25.594 [0.0001 -5.100 [0.0001 0.876 (O. D32) 27.369 [0.0001 
0.8 670 0.739 (0.027) 27.577 [0.0001 -10.530 [0.0001 0.810 (0.026) 30.677 [0.0001 
2. CAD 0.7 301 0.924 (0.038) 24.256 10.0001 -2.053 10.0401 0.922 (0.038) 24.554 [O. OUO) 
0.75 453 0.914 (0.030) 30.850 [0.0001 -2.847 [0.0041 0.951 (0.031) 30.492 [0.0001 
0.8 682 0.889 (0.031) 28.573 10.0001 -3.677 10.0001 . 
0.938 (0.026) 36.653 [0.0001 
3. CUP 0.7 3U2 0.932 (0.027) 34.794 JUAXJOj -2.257 10.0241 0.970 (0.038) 25.7UU 10.000J 
0.75 454 0.877 (0.026) 34.111 [0.0001 -5.007 [0.0001 0.910 (0.030) 30.068 10.000] 
0.8 683 0.859 (0.025) 34.690 [0.0001 -5.766 [0.0001 0.852 (0.026) 33.206 10.0m ' 
,L DKX 0.7 299 0.915 (0.031) 29.343 10.0001 -2.815 
[0.005) 0.909 (0.040) 22.927 10.0001 
0.75 450 0.912 (0.038) 23.735 10.0001 -2.370 10.0181 0.906 (0.031) 28.917 10.0001 
0.8 676 0.902 (0.030) 30.446 [0.0001 -3.313 (0.0011 0.896 (0.025) 35.563 [0.0001 
S. LLM 0.7 218 0.930 (0.044) 21.194 10. UOOJ -1.6W 10.1091 0.918 (0.046) 19.917 10.0001 
0.75 321 0.925 (0.038) 24.447 [0.0001 -2.092 10.0361 0.899 (0.038) 23.869 10.0001 
0.8 472 0.855 (0-031) 27.512 [0.0001 -4.900 1010001 0.836 (0.031) 26.894 10.0001 
6. CDP 0.7 3U2 0.940 (0.026) 35.612 10.000J -2.428 10.0151 0.973 (U. 033) 29.532 [O. OUOI 
0.75 454 0.906 (0,025) 36.819 [0.0001 -3.837 [O. OW] 0.980 (0.029) 33.679 10.0001 
0.8 683 0.863 (0.023) 37.625 [0.0001 -5.565 [0.000) 0.906 (0.025) 36.853 10.0001 
7. JPY 0.7 302 0.913 (0.039) 23.358 10.000J -2.364 
10.018] . 0.9W %039) 23.191 [O. OUOI 
0.75 454 0.882 (0.032) 27.345 [0.0001 -3.913 [0.000) 0.878 (0.032) 27.253 10.0001 
0.8 683 0.788 (0.025) 31.095 (0-0001 -8.422 [0.000] 0.813 (0.027) _ _ 
30.652 10.0001 
NOX 0.7 218 gI 1.094 (0.050) 21.814 JU. 000] 2.155 
10.0311 1.038 (0.041) 25.055 10.0001 
. 0.75 320 0.911 (0.025) 36.194 10-0001 -3.611 10.0001 0.996 (0.036) 27.675 10.0001 
0.8 471 0.801 (0.026) 30.250 10-0001 -8.092 10.000) 0.891 (0.031) 29.150 [0.0001 
NZD 0.7 290 9 0.859 
(0.040) -3.736 10.0001 21.473 JO. UUOJ 0.867 (0.040) 21.849 10.0001 
. 0.75 435 0.840 (0.031) 26.820 10.0001 -5.204 (0.0001 0.846 (0.031) 27.228 10.0001 
20.339 [0.000] -7.916 [0.0001 0.795 (0.025) 31.390 10.0001 
SEX 11.7 218 10 0.911 ju. ui 1) 
24.929 10-0001 -2.495 P. 013] 0.927 (0.043) 21.420 10.0001 
, 0.75 321 0.909 (0.034) 27.094 [0.0001 . 2.549 
10.0111 0.904 (0.034) 26.394 10.0001 
0.8 472 0.790 (0.032) 24.548 [0.000) -7.117 10.000] 0.851 (0.030) 28.417 10.0001 
Notes: 'Panel on the left hand side is estimated by the Modified Log Periodogram Regression 
ator (MLP) ti by Kim and Phi llips 
(1999,2006). Panel on the right han d side is estimated by the es m 
L-og Periodograrn Regression estimator (LP) by Geweke Porter-Hudak (1983 ). 
2Colurnn 2 is the choice of the root (T) or the power value (alpha) in equation (3.40) in the main 
A range of power values (0. 7,0.75 and 0.8) is calculated. Column 3 is the number of harmonic text. 
s to be included in the spectral regression. The term d represents the long memory 
(fractional t e ordina 
integration) parameter of the forward premium data, followed by conventional standard errors. 
Column 5 is the t-test statistics for the test of d=O and the corresponding p-values. Column 6 is the 
test statistiFs (zd) for the test of d =1 and 
its p-value. 
190 
Table 3-8: Paxametric estimates for d after adjusting for 
structural breaks in the forward premium data 
Estimated dý, L 
Country ARFIMA(l, d, O)_ ARFIMA(O, d, l) 
1 AUD 0.739 (0.017) 0.855 (0-033) 
2 CAD 0.935 (0.020) 0.954 (0.025) 
3 CHF 0.764 (0.016) 0.767 (0-018) 
4 DKK 0.907 (0.021) 0.907 (0.021) 
5 EUR 0.855 (0.023) 0.893 (0.034) 
6 GBP 0.849 (0.016) 0.968 (0.038) 
7 MY 0.754 (0.017) 0.758 (0.020) 
8 NOK 0.899 (O. ON) 0.921 (0.027) 
9 NZD 0.799 (0.018) 0.863 (0.031) 
10 SEK 0.825 (0.025) 0.819 (0.027) 
Notes: 
'All models were estimated by exact maximum likelihood (ML). 
'The numbers in parentheses are asymptotic standard errors of the 
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Table 3.9B: The KPSS statistics for nuU of level stationary. ( The 1%, 5% and 10% critical values are 
0.739,0.463 and 0.347 respectively) 
Country 
Lag AUD CAD CHF DKK EUR GBP JPY NOK NZD SEK 
0 0.304 0.394 0.122 0.203 0.331 0.203 0.054 0.191 0.375 0.287 
1 0.304 0.395 0.122 0.218 0.344 0.203 0.054 0.191 0.375 0.290 
2 0.307 0.390 0.122 0.223 0.352 0.202 0.055 - 0.191 0.376 0.299 
3 0.313 0.384 0.122 0.224 0.360 0.203 0.055 0.192 0.377 0.306 
4 0.315 0.386 0.122 0.226 0.367 0.205 0.055 0.194 0.378 0.313 
5 0.315 0.392 0.122 0,225 0.370 0.207 0.055 0.194 0.375 0.316 
6 0.315 0.400 0.122 0.226 0.370 0.208 0.055 0.193 0.372 0,317 
7 0.315 0.406 0.121 0.225 0.370 0.207 0.055 0.193 0.369 0.318 
8 0.316 0.407 0.120 0.225 0.369 0.206 0.055 0.193 0.365 0.318 
9 0.316 0.409 0.121 0.225 0.372 0.206 0.055 0.192 0.362 0.316 
10 0.316 0.409 0.121 0.225 0.376 0.207 0.054 0.193 0.359 0.315 
11 0.318 0.409 0.121 0.226 0.885 0.209 0.054 0.194 0.358 0.317 
12 0.319 0.409 0.122 0.226 0.390 0.211 0.054 0.196 0.358 0.318 
13 0.320 0.407 0.122 0.226 0.392 0.212 0.054 0.198 0.358 0.317 
14 0.322 0.407 0.122 0.225 0.394 0.213 0.054 0.199 0.359 0.317 
15 0.323 0.408 0.122 0.225 0.395 0.215 0.054 0.199 0.360 0.317 
16 0.325 0.408 0.122 0.224 0.397 0.217 0.054 0.199 0.362 0.317 
17 0.325 0.408 0.122 0.224 0.399 0.219 0.054 0.198 0.362 0.316 
18' 0.326 0.407 0.122 0.223 0.399 0.221 0.054 0.198 0.363 0.315 
19 0.325 0.406 0.122 0.222 0.399 0.223 0.053 0.198 0.363 0.314 
20 0.324 0.403 0.122 0.221 0.395 0.224 0.053 0.198 0.361 0.313 
21 0.324 0.402 0.121 0.220 0.391 0.225 0.053 0.198 0.3GO 0.312 
22 0.323 0.400 0.121 0.218 0.387 0.226 0.053 0.198 0.358 0.310 
23 0.323 0.399 0.120 0.217 0.383 0.227 0.053 
0.198 0.356 0.309 
24 0.323 0.399 0.120 0.215 0.378 0.228 0.053 0.197 0.354 0.307 
25 0.323 0.398 0.119 0.214 0.375 0.228 
0.053 0.197 0.351 0.305 
26 0.322 0.397 0.118 0.212 - 
0.228 0.052 - 0.3,19 - 
27 0.322 0.395 0.118 0.211 - 
0.229 0.052 - 0.347 - 
28 0.322 0.393 0.118 0.210 - 0.230 
0.052 - OZIG - 
29 - 0.391 
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Table 3.11: test statistics (BBM's specifications) 
AUD CAD CHF DKK EUR GBP JPY NOK NZD SEX 
Box Pierce 
,Q 
statistics (the l ag order is in the parenthesis) 
Standardi sed residuals 
Q(10) 3.183 10.243 2.812 4.094 4.194 6.895 14.535 4.648 9.776 7.054 
[0.957] [0.419] [0.9861 [0.943] [0.938] [0.753] [0.150] [0.913) [0.460] [0.720] 
Q(15) 6.277 13.405 7.967 6.345 11-692 15.758 16.673 11.901 11-177 11.140 
[0.959] [0.571] [0.925] [0.973] [0.702] [0.3981 10.3391 [0.6871 [0.740] [0.743] 
Q(20) 13.997 17.141 9.51 12-606 13.244 18.823 22-777 13.638 17.226 13.772 
[0.784] [0.644] [0.976] [0.894] [0.867] [0.5331 [0.300] [0.8481 (0-638] [0.842] 
Squared standardised residuals 
(NO) 12.837 3.201 7.944 7.897 17.110 6.728 8.292 8.649 3.640 6.744 
[0.118] [0.921] [0.439] [0.4441 [0.029] [0.5661 [0.4051 [0.373] [0.888] [0.5641 
Q1,05) 15.085 4.843 9.358 12.159 19.062 15.798 11.376 8.917 7.677 12.371 
[0.302] [0.978] [0.745] [0.515] [0-1211 
. 
[0.2601 [0.579] [0.779] [0-8641 [0.4981 
Q'(20) 20-069 9.872 16.082 17.577 21.964 18.463 17.788 13.879. 11-062 16.136 
10.329] [0.936] [0.567) 
. 
[0.484] [0.2341 [0.4261 [0.470] [0.7371 [0-892] [0.5831 
Residuad-Based diagnostic for conditional heteroskedasticity of Tse (2001) 
R131)(10) 12,892 3.254 8.058 7.371 14.281 6.802 8.349 8.848 3.732 6.668 
10.230] [0.9751 [0.623] [0.690] [0.161] [0.744] [0-595] [0.647] [0-9591 [0.756] 
R13D(15) 15.047 5.115 9.388 10.856 17-491 15.724 11.305 9.076 7.841 11.804 
[0.4481 [0.9911 [0.8561 [0.763] [0.290] [0.401] [0.7311 [0.874] 19-930] [0.694] 
RBD(20) 19.986 9.253 15.879 15.525 20-923 18.181 17.539 14-034 10.866 16.274 
1 [0.459] [0.9801 [0.7241 [0.746] [0.402] [0.5761 [0.618) [0.829] [0-950] [0-7001 
Sign bias t test (Engle and Ng, 1993) 
t 1.417 0.510 0.448 . 
0.361 0.908 0.860 1.003 0.399 0.197 0.490 
[0.157] [0.610] [0.654] [0.7181 [0.364] [0.390] (0.316] [0.6901 [0.844) [0.624) 
Adjusted Pearson Chi-square Goodness-of-fit test 
X2,40 Cells 32.773 33.546 38.804 39.271 31-014 
[0.749] [0.7171 [0.4791 [0.458] [0.815] 
X2,50 cells 45.988 60.287 52.612 55.948 37.403 
[0.5961 [0.1291 [0.336] [0.2301 [0.8871 
X2,60 cells 62.142 62.865 . 
64.464 61.265 53.415 
10.3651 [0.341] [0.291] [0.3951 [0.681] 
42.988 39.265 51.186 34.925 34.112 
[0-3041 [0.4581 [0.092] [0.656] [0.692) 
52.596 54-350 63.282 46-876 41.673 
[0-337] [0.278] [0.083] [0-560) [0.762) 
59.898 53.211 58-875 42.870 51.545 
[0.4431 [0.688] [0.480] [0-9431 [0.744) 
ARCH-LM test (the lag order is in the parenthesis) of Engle (1982) 
ARCH(2) 1.287 0.512 0.706 0.452 1.458 1.765 0.483 1.238 0.008 0.153 
[0.231) [0.599] [0.494] [0.636] [0.2331 [0-1711 [0-6171 [0.290] [0-992] [0.858) 
ARaR(5) 0.997 0.442 0.477 1.053 1.651 0.738 1.079 0.554 0.285 0.794 
[0.4551 (0.820) [0.794] [0.3851 10.143] [0-5951 [0.3701 [0.7361 10.9221 [0-5541 
ARCH(10) 1.003 0.325 0.797 0.776 2.956 0.656 Q. 836 0.890 0.356 0.669 
[0.4551 [0-9751 [0,632] [0.653] [0.399] [0.7661 [0.5941 [0.5421 10.965] [0-754] 
Notes: 
'This table presents the misspecification test statistics of the estimates in table 3.10. 
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Table 3.13: test statistics (Chung's specification) 
AUD CAD CHF DKK EUR GBP JPY' NOK NZD SEK 
Box Pierce Q statistics (the lag order is in the parenthesis) 
Standardised residuals 
Q(10) 2.735 10.009 2.910 4.107 4.422 6.809 14.736 4.724 9.875 7.064 
[0.987] [0.4401 [0.9831 
Q(15) 5.823 13.181 8.060 
[0.9831 [0.5881 [0.921] 
Q(20) 13.436 16.927 9.562 
[0.858] [0.6581 [0.9751 
Squared standardised residuals 
QIVO) 12.806 3.108 8.328 
10.119] [0.927) [0.402] 
cr(15) 15.039 4.455 9.938 
[0.305] [0.9851 [0.699] 
Q'(20) 19.983 9.286 17.086 
[0.334] [0.953] [0.5171 
[0.942] [0.926 [0.7431 [0.142] [0-909] [0.452] [0.719] 
6.361 12.736 15.754 16.850 11.390 11.318 11.144 
[0.9731 10.6231 [0.3991 [0.3281 [0.725] [0.730] [0.742] 
12.629 14.612 18.791 23.059 13.201 17.416 13.783 
[0.8931 [0.798] [0.5351 [0.286] [0-8691 [0.626] [0.8411 
7.849 11.659 7.159 8.327 5.584 3.708 6.730 
[0.448] [0.1671 [0.5201 [0.402] [0.694] [0.882] [0.566] 
12.066 13,859 16.339 11.379 6.282 7.760 12.372 
[0.522] [0.3841 [0.231] [0.579] 10.9351 [8-860] 10.4971 
17.436 16.444 18.787 17.629 12.199 11.080 16.121 
[0.4931 [0.562] [0.405] [0.480] [0.8371 [0.8911 [0.584] 
Residual-Based diagnostic for conditional heteroskedasticity of Tse (2001) 
RBD(IO) 13-063 5.283 10.108 7.251 11.941 7.727 8.410 5.729 4.298 6.682 
10.220] [0.8711 [0.431] [0.7021 [0.2891 [0.6561 [0.5891 [0-838] [0-9331 [0.7551 
RBD(15) 15.126 ' 6.522 11.843 10.663 14-632 16.835 11-344 6.365 8.409 11.860 
[0.4421 [0.9701 [0.691] [0.7761 [0.478] [0.329] [0.728] [0-973] ' [0-9071 [0.690] 
RBD(20) 19.949 10.367 18.941 15.292 17.347 19.006 17.281 12.379 11.350 16.276 
[0.461) [0.961] [0.526] [0.7591 [0.630] [0.521] [0-635] [0-9021 [0.937) [0.699) 
Sign bias t test (Engle and Ng, 1993) 
t 1.359 0.560 0.507 0.365 1.144 0.869 1.030 0.485 0.563 OAS6 
[0.174] [0.575] [0.612 [0.715] [0.2531 [0.385) 10.303] [0.6281 [0.5741 10.6271 
Adjusted Pearson Chi-square Coodness-of-fit test 
X2,40 CeN , 40.655 36.821 44-554 41-114 34.797 43.328 45-507 49.054 26.947 34.846 
[0.3971 [0.5701 [0.250] [0.378] [0.6621 [0.2921 [0.219) 10.130] [0.928] (0.660] 
X2,50 cells 42.035 50-599 57.723 
58.192 38.267 49.51 54.193 62.619 41.669 44.332 
10.749] [0.4101 [0.184] [0.173] [0.8661 [0.453] [0.283] [0.0911 [0.7621 [0.663) 
X2,60 cells 69.292 48.471 70.277 
60-811 56-689 64.341 52.242 60.308 39.320 50.829 
[0.169] [0.8341 [0.1491 [0.410] [0.5611 (0.2951 [0.721) 10.428] (0.9771 [0.7671 
ARCIUM test (the lag order is in the parenthesis) of Engle (1982) 
ARCH (2) 1.288 0.473 0.709 0.454 0.598 1.875 0.448 0.112 0.009 0.154 
, 
[0.2311 [0.623] [0.4921 [0.6351 [0.550] [0.1541 [0.6391 [0.8941 10.9911 10-8571 
ARCHM 0.995 0.402 0.517 1.049 0.979 0.785 1.061 0.150 . 
0.288 0.796 
[0.4571 [0.8481 [0.7641 [0.3871 [0.4291 [0.560) [0.380] (0-9801 [0.9201 10-5531 
ARCH(10) 0.996 0.319 0.831 0.771 1.196 0.698 0.837 0.570 0.359 0.668 
[0.464J 10.9771 [0.599] [0.658] [0.288] [0.7271 [0-593] 10.840] [0-964] [0.755] 
Notes: 
'This table presents the misspecification test statistics of 
the estimates in table 3.12. 
2'rhe values in the square 
brackets are the p-values of the corresponding test statistics 
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Figure 3.2: Autocorrelations function for the forward premium 
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Figure 3.3: The return on the spot rate series filtered by the MA(20) 
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Eigure 3.4: ACF of 1 month return on the spot rates filtered by NIA(20) 
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Figure 3.5: The, forward rate forecast error filtered by MA(20) process. 
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Figures 3.7: The autocorrelation plots of the forward rate forecast error series Figures 3.7A: AUD1M 
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Figures 3.7C: CHF1M 
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Figures 3.7E: EUR1M 
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Figures 3.7G: JPYIM 
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Figure 3.8: The rolling regression 
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Figure 3.8G: JPYIM 
JPY/USD 




rl I I-- I C30Q W. J. 
Figure 3.8H: NOMM 
NOK/USD 






Ojjjýýý04 Oljarý2005 Oljulý005 Oljan2OO6 OljulkO6 01J&ý2007 0 
date 
beta of forward premILIM lower/upper 
The data Is on daily basis, using the rolling regression of 1,300 trading ClIkYss or 5 years 
Figure 3.81: NZDIM 
NZENUSD 








()ljLjll999 Oljarý2001 011Uý002 01jal42004 01JU'2005 01jan2007 
edate 
beta of forward premIurn 10wer/upper 
The data is on daily ba313, usina the rolling regre3slon of 1,300 trading days3 or 5 years 
227 
U Ijan4uUZ) Uljan20Q7 
edate 
beta of forward premiLir-n 10 
The data 19 on doily basis, using the rolling regression of 1,300 trading days* or 5 years 
Figure 3.8. J: SEKlM 
SEK/USD 




-n2004 01jui2004 Oijan2005 OIJU12005 OIjan2OOG OIjul2OOG OIjan2OO7 01 
date 
beta of forward premium lower/upper 
The dots to an daily basis. using the tolling regression of 1.300 trading days. or a yoon, 
228 
Figure 3.9: Forward premium series 
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Funded and PAYG Pensions when Annuities 
are backed by Bonds 114 
4.1 Introduction 
The ageing population in the UK and elsewhere has recently made pen sion finance an issue 
of great general interest There are 2 main types of pensions, classified by the way they are 
funded. 
_ 
The first type is the fully funded scheme which is based on the savings of members. 
-ne contributions are invested in financial assets. The second type is the Pay As You Go 
(pAyG) scheme which is usually funded by the state. The state can either tax or issue debt 
to the current working generation to pay the pensions of the currently retired. According 
to a two period overlapping generations (OLG) model, Diamond (1965) suggests that a 
fully funded system provides better incentives to save and results in higher capital and is 
therefore superior. On the other hand, the state pension reduces individual's utility in the 
, run since 
it creates additional reductions in the productive capital stock arising from long 
the substitution of government debt for physical capital in 
individual portfolios. 
Traditionally, the principal function of the pension system is as a means for con- 
sunIption smoothing 
(Samuelson, 1975 and Diamond, 1965). In this chapter, we argue that 
pensions take a role as a mechanism 
for both consumption smoothing and as a mcans of 
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being over time, thus people will transfer consumption from their productive middle age to 
their retirement. From the perspective of insurance aspect, in a world of uncertainty, agents 
need to insure against the risk of outliving their pension savings and the risk of assets de- 
faulting. 
The contribution of this chapter is motivated by the observation that government debt 
is both a complement and a substitute to physical capital. We observe that ownership of 
physical capital is mediated largely through equity, which represent high risk high return 
financial assets, whereas government debt is mediated through bonds, which can insure 
against long term risk. So although government debt and physical capital compete for 
funds (suggesting they are substitutes), the financial assets which results are quite different 
(suggesting complementarity). 
Empirically, the UK pension system can be approximately charactcriscd by tile two 
forms of assets being complements rather than substitutes. Agents choose to hold cquity, 
and hence phýsical capital, during the first phase of their life, while accumulating their 
pension fund. During their retirement, while decumulating their pension, they hold an 
annuity, backed by government debt, since this is virtually risk free over the period of 
retirement. The UK pension system will be discussed in the next section (section 4.2) 
followed by review of the related academic literature (section 4.3). 
. 
We then turn to a small general equilibrium model of an economy where agents be. 
have in this fashion and determine the optimal mixture of PAYG state pension and funded 
private pensions. Since funded pensions rely upon the Supply of government debt to facil- 
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itate a functioning annuity market"5, the goverment influences both the state and private 
pensions, and since returns on government debt must be financed from taxation, taxes Nvill 
also contribute to both sorts of pension. Section 4.4 explains the structure of the model and 
section 4.5 presents a simulation study. It generates 2 main analyses. First, it examines 
the optimal combinations of the state PAYG pension and the funded pension from the per- 
spective of the steady state. Second, it studies the effects of two policy shocks which are a 
sudden reduction in national debt and the baby boom. 
Lastly, we discuss two topical issues which face the UK at the moment: first, how to 
respond to the large bulge in the population as the baby-boom generation retires; sccond, 
the possible effects of cuts in govenýment debt 
4.2 The pension system in the UK 
Before describing the UK pension system, we start with the observation that private phys. 
ical capital is largely held through equity, while government debt is field in bonds. Equity 
and bonds are different sorts of financial instruments. We argue that a key reason for this 
difference is the time scales over which firms and nation states cxist, although othcr factors 
such as incomplete information and contracts also play a part. 
In gcncral, we observe that 
private firms are insufficiently long-lind to crcdibly providc long-datcd dcbt and fliat cor. 
115 in theory, pension liabilities are bond-likesopcnsion 
funds could match thcir liabilities by switching obt 
of shares and moving into bonds. Historically, 
British pcnsion funds were in favour of equity for dirce Main 
reasons. First, equities on average yield 
higher returns, firms that pay for pcnsion schemes can pay less Into 
the fund. Tle market will do part of the work 
for them. Sccondý it was assumcd that over the long run, profits, 
dividends and share prices would rise at least in line with inflation. 03 would wages (and thercrore pcnsion 
payments). 77hird, equities may 
be volatile but they have unusually rctumcd more than bonds over the long 
run. Pension funds could afford to 
be patient and collect this premium. ll()wcvcr, In the late 1990S, many 
researchers argue that if pension 
liabilities are bond-like, then buying equities Is a mismatch (Exlcy-Mctha. 
smith, 1997). 
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porate bonds rarely have terms to maturity much greater than five years, whereas the UK 
govemment provides bonds of 30 years maturity and in the past has sold debt with no date 
of redemption at all ("consols"), limited supplies of which still exist"'. If it is true that gov- 
ernment debt and private equity are not in direct competition, then we need to reconsider 
whether government debt will merely leads to crowding out. 
The discussion is within the context of the United Vingdom. The reason for this is 
that the UK pension system has functioned successfully for a long time, and consist of both 
a minimal state pension system as well as a system of voluntary private funded pensions. As 
a result, it has a large private pension sector and the largest annuity market in tile world. It is 
one of relatively few countries that can provide evidence for how a funded pension system 
operates in practice. It is also interesting to see how it will respond to the demographic 
challenges such as the retirement of the baby boom generation and the increased longevity. 
There are three tiers of pcnsion provision in operation in the UK. The first and sccond 
tiers are unfunded and compulsory wMle the third tier is provided by the private sector. 'nIC 
first two tiers represent the state pension, which is payable at 65 for men and 60 for women 
(UK pension commission, 2006). 
The first tier is the Basic State Pension (BSP) which is "unfunded" and pays a flat-rate 
pension. This scheme has no underlying fund of assets and in principle providcs a means of 
subsistence, arguably this is intended as a form of povcrty alleviation. I'llis Scheme is a pay. 
as-you-90 pension which represents intergcncrational transfer between dic working and the 
117 Tbe last issue was 3.5% war stock. Infinitely lived bonds such as this are a userul form Of asset to back 
a pension, since the flow of payments is constant, whereas a conventional finite term bond has too iar&c a 
payment at the longest maturity (when the probability of needing to make a pension Payment Is least). 
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retired population. The membership of this scheme is compulsory and the contributions are 
collected through the national insurance system. 
The second tier is the Additional State Pension, otherwise known as the State second 
pension (S2P)III. This scheme is also unfunded, but pays a defined benefit pension which 
is related to average earnings over the employee's life. Membership is compulsory for all 
employees (but not the self-employed) unless the employee has contracted out into a private 
pension scheme in which case they are exempt. 
The last tier is voluntary private pension provision, of which there are two types: 
occupational and personal pension schemes. Contributions into these schemes arc to an cx- 
tent subsidised by the government through tax-breaks. Occupational pension schemes arc 
usually "funded" and require contributions throughout the employee's working life. Tliese 
schemes are provided by employers and may pay on a "defined bcncfit" or a "dcfincd con. 
tribution" basis. The former usually are defined in terms of some proportion of final year 
earnings, and are related to the number of years of employment (Tonks, 1999). Dcfincd 
contribution (or money purchase) pensions are always fundcd and convcrt the value of the 
pension fimd at retirement into an annuity. On the other hand, all personal pcnsions arc dc. 
fined contribution, and often lack any contribution by the cmploycr. 11crc arc two distinct 
types, group schemes organised on a company basis, thus bencfiting from low commis. 
sions and some pooling of annuity risk, and individual affangcmcnts with life insurance 
companies. 
118 lie State Earning Related Pension Scheme (SERPS) was replaced In April 2002 with the 'State Second 
Pension' which is designed to give more to the lower paid and middle camcrs, carers and the long. tcrm 
disabled with broken work records. Whereas with SERPS, the more you cam, the higher your Pension, S211 
operate a flat rate which means that high earners will be better off opting ror private Pension schcmc3. 
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The UK pension system is traditionally seen as offering a good example to other 
countries, having features such as low social security pension expenditures as well as a high 
coverage of well-financed voluntary private schemes. But recently it has been suggested 
that the- UK pension system is less robust than previously believed. The state is currently 
planning to play a reduced role in pension provision because of demographic pressures. 
Policy has been based on the assumption that private provision will grow to offset this 
decline. Unfortunately, voluntary private pension provision has not grown as expected; 
instead, if anything, it has declined. Employers' willingness to voluntarily provide pensions 
is falling and initiatives to stimulate personal pension saving have not worked (UK pension 
conunission, 2006). 
In recent history, a pressing issue has been the under-funding of dcfined benefit oc- 
cupational pension schemes. But the sector has also faced problems bccausc of the bear 
market'19; and there are also ongoing crises of mis-selling of personal pensions - for exam- 
ple, the failure of Equitable Life insurance company' 20 
Annuity markets have attracted attention as part of a global debate on social security 
reform. There are proposals in many nations to replace or supplement dcfincd benefit social 
security programs with defined contribution systems in which individuals would accumu. 
late assets in individual accounts. In such systems, it is not clear how individuals Nvould 
119 Tbe key current issue in occupational defined bcncfit funds is undcr-funding. At end-2002, estimates 
suggested there were pension fund dcficits of 160-300 
billion pound (CI31,2003), relative to the accrued 
benefit obligation. 
There are a number of factors underlying the dcficits. Davis (2004) suggested that the most fundamental 
problem was the bcar market which hit pension funds in the UK, given their large holdings In equities. 
120 The near-collapse of Equitable Life in early 2000s, the world's oldest mutual Insurer, has been one of the 
biggest financial scandals in recent times. It shocked not just the firm's Policy holdcrs, but the whole lire 
insurance industry in the UK. 
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draw down their asset balances in retirement. Some proposals call for compulsory annuiti. 
sation at retirement, others would allow individuals to draw down their account balances in 
more flexible ways, either by choosing to purchase annuities from private insurance firms 
or by taking lump sum distributions. The relative attractiveness of these various options 
depends critically on whether reasonably priced individual annuities are actually available 
in the private annuity market. In case of the UK, the government requires that at least 75 
percent of an individual private pension fund be used for pension purposes through the 
purchase of an annuity and these are purchased in the "compulsory" annuity market allow. 
ing pensioners largely to avoid selection effects (Cannon and Tonks, 2004; Finkelstein and 
Poterba, 2002,2004). 
Tonks (1999) pointed out that under defined contribution schcmes, the pensioner 
bears the risk of fund underperformance, while the employer bears such risk under a dc. 
fined benefit schemes. It is useful to note that in case the of dcfincd benefit occupational 
pension schemes, the pension fund is overseen 
by trustees who arc required to meet ccr. 
tain funding requirements to ensure that the pension fund will be able to mcct its liabilities. 
Legislation to ensure that defined benefit pensions funds would be sufficient to rncct liabil. 
ities was strengthened considerably after the Maxwell scandal (when pension funds wcrc 
diverted to support Robert Maxwell's failing busine ss empire) by the 1995 Pensions Act, 
which came into force in 1997, and required 100 percent 
funding of liabilities. This means 
that funds whose assets fcll short of this requirement 
had to be made up within fivc years, 
with accelerated requirements 
if funding fell below 90 percent. In addition, pensions had 
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to be indexed to prices up to a limit of 5 percent, insuring pensioners against low inflation 
(through not insuring them against high inflation). 
These twin regulatory requirements of annuitisation for private pensions and min- 
imwn funding for occupational pensions has resulted in pensions providers having large 
near-certain liabilities which are most suitably backed by assets such as bonds, which are 
much less risky than equity. Since the UK govenunent issues long-dated bonds whose 
coupons and principal are fully indexed to prices, the requirement to index pensions can 
easily be met while still using bonds". 
For private pensions, it is clear that this requirement is only relevant in the "decu. 
mulation" phase, since workers could invest in any asset while accumulating their pension 
fund. Indeed a strategy of investing in equity during the accumulation phase, to obtain high 
rates of return, and in an annuity-backed bond during the decumulation phase could well 
be the utility maximising strategy: certainly this "life-cycle" type investment plan is rcc- 
ornmended by many financial advisors in the UK"'. For the defincd-bcncfit occupational 
121 UK inflation-indexed government bonds have been linked to an index of consumer prices (i. e. UK retail 
price index) since this is widely circulated and well understood and issued on a regular basis. Its first issue 
date was in 198 1. 
In order to construct precise protection against inflation, interest payments for a given period would need 
to be corrected for actual inflation over the same period. However, there is a possibility of lags between the 
Inovement in the price index and the adjustment to the bond cash flows that distort the inflation prooring prop. 
erties of indexed bonds. Generally, the lags arise in 2 ways. Firs4 inflation statistics can only be calculated 
and published with a delay. Secondly, in some markets, the size of the next coupon payment must be known 
before the start of the coupon piriod in order to calculate the accrued interest; this leads to a delay equal to 
the length of time between coupon payments. (see Choudhry 200 1, page 98-99) 
'ne point of view of this chapter is that ignoring a small measurement crror, the indcx-linked securities 
are approximately index-linked. 
122 ' One rationale for taking more risk during the accumulation phase is that one can offset poor investment 
performance if one still has labour income through increased saving: during rctircmcnt there no scope to 
hedge. Yaari (1965) shows that annuitising is optimal during retirement. Using die data set from ' Dunson, 
Marsh and Staunton (2002), the. correlation between bond and equity returns in the UK has been 0.55 over 
the 20th century and 0.50 since 1950, so there is limited scope to use the two sons of assets as hedges against 
each other. The correlation between the two asset returns is lower in most other countries in the data set, but 
still positive. 
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pension sector it is less clear whether pension funds hold government debt predominantly 
to back their liabilities for pensions currently being paid out or whether they also perceive 
them as being part of the assets to back liabilities of pensions still being accumulated. An 
extreme position is that occupational pension funds should hold bonds alone for both the 
accumulation and decumulation phases (Exley, Mehta and Smith, 1997) so that companies 
bear virtually no risk, through hardly any companies have acted on this advice in practice. 
Instead, occupational pensions have moved towards being defined contribution schemes, 
whereby the pension received by the employee is based upon an individual pension fund 
and where the rate-of-return risk is bome by the employee. Such occupational pensions 
then appear much closer to an individual private pension, with the only difference being 
that the employer is administering the fund. 
Our brief characterisation of the UK pension system thus provides two reasons to 
believe that government debt and physical capital might be used in different phases of a 
pension plan: equity in the earlier phase, to 
benefit from the higher rates of return and 
bonds in the later phase to minimise risk. 
The original contribution of this chapter is to ask what macroeconomic consequences 
would. follow from such economic behaviour, where the decision rule is to invcst in cquity 
while accumulating the pension and in bonds while decumulating is takcn as givcn. In 
particular we wish to know the optimal mixture of private and state pcnsion systcms, wilat 
effects would result from cuts in government debt and a baby-boom dcrnographic Shock. 
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4.3 Related Academic Literature: 
The first and foremost research on pensions in the economics literature is by Samuelson 
(1958) and Aaron (1966), who modelthe difference between funded and unfunded schemes 
in an overlapping generations framework. The research showed that with a PAYG scheme, 
it is possible in principle for every generation to receive more in pensions than it paid in 
contributions, provided that the rate of growth of total real earnings exceeds the interest rate 
indefinitely"'. This can happen when there is technological progress and/or steady popula- 
tion growth and capital accumulation. From this perspective, the introduction/expansion of 
unfunded public pension schemes in many industrial countries showed promising results in 
the post-war years. 
However, this argument does not appear to be currently relevant. The old age dcpcn. 
dency ratio in nearly all developed economies is substantially higher. In case die of the UK, 
life expectancy is increasing rapidly while low birth rates are predicted; this will produce a 
near doubling in the percentage of the population aged 65 years and over between now and 
2050 (UK Pension Commission, 2005). Ibis requires an adjustment to public policy and/or 
individual behaviour. The proposed opt. ions are either: 1. ) retirees become poorer relative 
to the rest of society; or 2) raising taxes/National Insurance contributions; or 3) Savings 
tnust rise; o r 4) average retirement ages must rise. 71is has generated a large literature on 
the reform of the pension systems (such as Feldstein, 1996; Feldstcin and Samwick, 1998; 
Mitchell -and Zeldes, 1996; Disney, 1996; Kotlikoff, 1996; 1 luang, Imrohoroglu and Sar. 
123 in unfunded pension systems, the contributions of the working general ion cam a return wh ich Is Composed 
of the rates of growth of population, or what we called "a biological rate of Interest" and of wages. For funded 
systerns, the market rate of interest (the marginal productivity of capital) Is rclcvanL It Is feasible that the 
fonner is higher than the latter. 
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gent, 1997; Miles and Timmerman, 1999; Sinn, 1999; and Campbell and Feldstein, 2001). 
These works mainly concentrate on the appropriate proportion of the unfunded state pen- 
sions and the private pension system. 
Among these, many researchers have expressed different opinions on the problem 
whether the* pay-as-you-go state pension system should be replaced with a funded sys- 
tem. The first group suggested efficiency gains from a transition to a funded system (Di- 
amond, 1965; Feldstein, 1977,1995; Kotlikoff, Smetters, and Walliscr, 1998; Feldstein 
and Samwickm 1998; Borsch-Supan, 1998; Homburg, 1990,1997; and Miles, 1999). The 
second group argued that a Pareto improving transition to a funded system is not possi. 
ble (Breyer, 1989, Fenge, 1995; Brunner, 1996; Sinn, 1997,1998; and Gcanakopolos, 
Mitchell, and Zeldes, 1998). 
The first group argue that the pay-as-you-go schemes induce important labour markct 
distortions due to the required income tax. Moreover, such schemes diminish flic capital 
stock because they are a special form of government debt (Feldstein, 1977). On the other 
hand, funded pensions are dynamically more cfficient, since theypncourage saving, which 
in turn raises the capital-labour ratio and income per head. As a result, phasing out un. 
funded state pensions completely generates higher saving, a higher capital stock and lowcr 
real rates of return. 
The second group argucd that this comparison of ratcs of rcturn docs not imply 
that the abolition of the state pay-as-you-go pension system would Icad to an intcrgcncra .- 
tional Pareto improvement since it is impossible to compensate the losers of the transition 
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(namely, the first generation which does not receive the state pension) without making at 
least one of the later generations strictly worse off"'. 
Among the work of Diamond, 1965; Feldstein, 1977; and others, the pay-as-you-go 
schemes diminish the capital stock because they are a special form of government debt. 
The logic of these models is that government debt will reduce welfare because it will divert 
savings away from productive capital, hence "crowding out" of private investment. 
The next section describes a three-period Diamond's (1965) overlapping generations 
model. 
4.4 The structure of the Model 
This section outlines a three-period overlapping generations model and studies optimal 
pension provision. The model is a simplification of the complex economic plicnomcna in 
the real world by assuming a closed economy. All equilibria in this study arc competitive. 
Additionally, the study deals with real economics, where there is no money involved and nil 
exchange are barter exchange. Thus, the question of 
inflation and die interaction bctwccli 
real and nominal variable will not be addressed 
here. Individuals are assumed neither to 
leave bequests nor to receive inheritance. Finally, there is only one type of gowmilicrit 
debt in this model which is the long term government bond. 
Our discussion begins by describing pattcms and the kcy ingrcdients of the njodel, 
In the first period of life, the young work and save by purchasing equity to obtain high rate 
124 In addition to this, there are important income redistribution consequences; as public pension systems 
often redistribute income 
from the rich to the poor (sce Barr and Diamond, 2006). 
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of returns on investment in the next period. This is the asset accumulation phase. In order 
to prepare for the (final period) retirement asset decumulation, agents continue to work in 
middle age (the second period) and purchase government bonds at the end of their working 
life. In fact they would do this indirectly by joining a funded pension scheme. The elderly 
live off the proceeds of the bonds as well as from a state pension. 
Agents contribute to both unfunded and funded systems. The first is through labour 
income tax. The latter is through contributing part of their carning to a private pension 
scheme when they are in their middle age. These private pension funds are then invcstcd in 
an annuity market, which is assumed to be bond backed. 
investment income is capitalized each period to produce a fund at rctircment. This 
SinipIc three period life-cycle model allows government to choose optimal combinations 
of the funded (private) and unfunded (public) pension over agents' lifetime. The resource 
transfer occurs both via the market for capital assets (by funded pension) and via the tax 
system (through an unfunded pay-as-you-go system). 
To characterise the model, we need to model the utility maximizing behaviour of 
agents and the productive sector of the economy. 
4.4.1 irms 
Production 
Consider a cohort of people who 'are young (age 1) at period t, middIc-agcd (age 
2) in period t+1, and old (age 3) in period t+2. There is no mortality whcn young or 
middle-aged. Nt is the number of agents in each cohoh, bom at time t. At cach pcriod 
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t 
ý>- 
15, Nt) Nt-1, Nt-2individuals are alive, including Nt young bom in t, Nt-1 middle age 
bom in t-1, and Nt-2 old bom in t-2. 
We shall normalise the amount of labour provided by each young person to be unity, 
(working full time). The simplest assumption to make would be that people are equally 
productive and have equal employment or participation rates when young and middle aged. 
However, we shall assume that the labour input of each middle-aged person is h times the 
labour input of the young. The parameter h can be interpreted as: first, how much more 
productive the middle-aged workers are compared to the young (productivity rising due 
to experience); and second, how much more labour (in terms of proportion of time) the 
middle-aged supply. Setting aside the issue of expericncc, high youth uncmploymcnt ratcs 
or long periods of university (such as is experienced in much of continental Europc) would 
suggest high values of h, while early retirement would suggest low valUCS12, of h. 
The individual lifetime labor supply profile is (1, h, 0). The young cxogcnously sup- 
ply Nt units of labour, the middle age supply 
hNt-I units. IIcnce at a given pcriod t, the 
total unit of labour supplied is Nt + hNt-i. 
The production sector is characterized by a representative firm that uscs capital, If, 
and labor, Lt. 'Tbe output is determined by a Cobb-Douglas aggregate production: 
Yt = QIft* [At (Nt + h]Vi-l)]'-', (4.49) 
125 To be specific, h<I can be interpreted as part time work or early rctircmcnt, while h>I implies 
learning by doing (as workers are more productive when he gets older) or workers are unemployed when 
young. 
De La Croix and Michel (2002), page 64, implies h>I as learning by doing alone. I lowcvcr, it is also 
plausible to interpret it as a case of youth unemployment. 
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where At is a "labor augmenting" or "Harrod neutral" technological progress 126 and Q is a 
constant. The technological progress (long run growth in output per worker) is assumed to 
be growing at a constant rate 
At = gAt-1, g>1. (4.50) 
The population growth rate is 
Nt 
Nt-, 
where nt varies from nt E [0, +ool - 
(4.51) 
The factor and output markets are assumed to be competitive. Factors are hired to 
the point where their marginal product equals factor payments and there is a one-pcriod 
time-to-build capital. 
Wages, Interest Rates and Pensions 
Each young person saves a total amount Sit, which is used to purchasc productivc 
capital, so 
Kt = Nt-ISt-,. (4.52) 
In other words, productive capital Kt at time t is built from the savings of tile last period's 
young generation, Nt-I Sit-,. We assume a 100 percent deprcciation rate. 
The middle-aged continue to work and save in addition to the savings brought for. 
ward while young. The additional saving is through a private pcnsion fund or s2i pcr 
person. The private pension fund is assumed to be invested in 
*govcnuncnt bonds. 
126 This is identical to the labouraýgmcntingtcchnological progress in Solow growth modcl. 7be tcchnolog. 
ical progress is exogcnous and it occurs when "At" increases over time, for example, a unit of labour is more 
productive when the level of technology is higher. 
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Since we are not interested in the effects of continuous population growth, we can 
use lower case characters to denote variables scaled by technology alone 127 so that 
yt = YtlAt, wt = WtlAt, kt = ICtlAt, Slt = SltlAtj S2t = S2tlAty (4.53) 
where Wt is the wage per unit of labour supplied. After rescaling, the production function 
in equation (4.49) can be rewritten as 
yt=QNt-, (h+nt)'-'(sit-llg) (4.54) 
Both capital and labour are paid their marginal products, so 




(Nt + hNt- 1) 
aQ 
sit-llgt 
1 (4.55) h+nt 
) 
wt (i - cy) Q 
(At 
(Nt + hNt 
At, 
sit-llgt 
wt - a) Q(h+ nt 
(4.56) 
where RM is the rate of return on capital investment. 
The old each receive a state pay-as-you-go pension, Pt, which the gownimcnt sets 
as a proportion of wages, so that 
Pt = ptvvt. (4.57) 
The government also issues bonds in each period t to be rcdccmcd in pcriod t+ 
with a total redemption value btIVA-2. These bonds are exclusively held by tile cldcrly 
using their private savings and thus the private pension per person is 
Bt = btlVt, (4.58) 
127 Note that it is not the same as the common definition dividing by effective labour units. 
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where bt can be interpreted as the government bonds (or funded pension) relative to the 
wage. 
Goverment set the rate of return on bonds as follows 
btWt gtbtwt I-a sit-1 
) C, 
's-l RB, t ý-== (1 - a) gt btQ 
(h+nt 
2t- (4.59) y2t-1 
S2t-1 
It is useful to continue the analysis by considering the government budgipt constraint. 
4.4.2 The Government-budget constraint 
Government receipts are based on taxation labour income and sales of bonds. Outlays -arc 
the state pension and the value of the bonds issued the previous period which must be 
redeemed. Assuming that the government levies the same income tax rate, rt on workcrs 
at different ages at time t, the interternporal, government budget constraint can be Nvrittcn 
as follows; 
Nt-IS2t+ (Nt + hNt-, ), rtlVt = (Bt + Pt) 
Nt-2y (4.60) 
where the government distributes a pay-as-you-go state pension of 
Pt pcr old individual. 
Since the government runs a balanced budget policy in every pcriod, the incomc tax is sct 
to compensate for the difference between government net worth 
Nt_jS2j and its liability 
M-2 (Bt + Pt). 
Using (4.51) and (4.53), equation (4.60) can be rescaled as 
S2t + (nt + h), rtwt = (bt + pt) wt/ni-1. 
In most of our analysis, we assume that the government aims at a particular lcvcl of 
pension and adjusts the tax rate accordingly, so the equation that 
dctcrmincs the tav. rate 
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is 
Irt =1 
(bt + pt) 
_ 





An individual's preferences can be represented by a lifetime utility function U= U(Cl, t, 
C2, t+15, 
C3, t+2). wherc Cl, t, C2, t+,, and 
C3, t+2 reprcscnt consumption of an individual in 
each period of life; -young, middle age and old, respectively. 
Assuming logarithmic utility function, the individual lifetimc optimization problcm 
is to maximize 
22 
EU(Ci+,, t+i) = E, 6'ln (Ci+,, t+i), 
i=O i=O 
where 6 is a geometric discounting parameter and 0<8< 
(4.63) 
2 
F, U(Ci+l, t+i) cxprcsses i=O 
the lifetime utility of individual in generation t, as a function of consumption over the 
three periods of life. With a log-linear utility function, the implied indiffcrcncc curves of 
individuals are convex. The utility function is twice continuously diffcrcntiab]C'21 oil the SCt 
of strictly positive real numbers R++. It is also strictly increasing (implying no satiation) 
and concave (decreasing marginal utility). 
The generation-specific budget constraints are , vrittcn as follows 
(1 - 7-t) Wt =. Pl, t Et, (4.64) 
(1 - 7-t+l) hWt+l + RE. t+ 
.I 
El = C2. i+l + Bj+ 1, (4.65) 
128 See De La Croix and Michel (2002), page 
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RB, t+2Bt+l + Pt+2 
C3, 
t+2) (4.66) 
where Wt is wage paid per unit of labour to the young and the middle aged at time t. 
Individuals receive total income Wt from inelastically supply I unit of labor when young, 
and will receive hlVt+l. when in middle age. In e ach period, the govenimcnt sets a single 
income tax rate for all workers regardless of their age. At time t the individual is subjected 
to an income tax rate of rt and of -rt+ I at time t+1. The other parameters and the savings 
portfolio are described as follows. 
The individual young works and saves at time t by purchasing equity Et, which gives 
him interest returns in the following period of Rr, t+l = (1 + rEt+, ) (this is presented in 
equation (4.64)). He continues to work 
in middle age and joins tile defined contribution (or 
money purchased) scheme at time t+1. 
The scheme is always funded and converts tile 
value of the pension fund at the retirement 
into an annuity which is bond-backcd. 17hus, 
the worker indirectly purchases government 
bonds of Dt+l and expect to receive rctums 
on bonds in the following period Of 
RB, t+2 =. (1 + rB, t+2). This is illustrated in equation 
(4.65). Generally, the rate of r eturn on bonds, rB, t+2 is lower than on equity, rrl+l since 
govemment bonds are relatively safer 
bets. Equity and government debt arc therefore not 
perfect substitutes in this framework. 
Apart from receiving the fully funded pension benefit at rctircnicnt, tile retiree also 
receives a pay-as-you-go state pension, 
Pt+2 at time t+2. ýnlis is be illustrated in cquation 
(4.66). Tbus, it is useful to note here that labor income is 'not tile SOIC dctcrrninant of life 
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cycle saving and consumption in the three periods model. This is because individuals also 
receive capital income and the state pension for their retirement consumption. 
A key aspect of the set-up is that there are inter-generational transfers between the 
working and the retired population since there is no underlying fund of assets for the flat 
rate pension Pt+2. Hence current workers partly pay the pensions of the retired through 
income tax. 
Combining equations (4.64) to (4.66), the lifetime budget constraint can be rewritten 
as 
, 
(1 - Tt+ ) hWt+l 
Pt+2 C2, t+l C34+2 




RE, t+, RB, RE, t+l RE, t+IRB, i+2 
where the left hand side of equation (4.67) repFesents the present value of lifetime income 
of an individual bom in period t. The right hand side of equation (4.67) is the present value 
of the lifetime consumption. 
It is useful to separately consider the utility maximisation of the young and the midd1c 
aged. The results are as follows. 
Utility maximization of the young 
The optimisation. Problem oýthc young is 
2 
max U 




Pt+21t + Ru, t+21t {(I - T-t+llt) 
hlVt+llt - C2.9+1+ Rv, jjjjj IV, 
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where Pt+21t is the expectation at time t of pension at time t+2 and similar notation is 
used for the bond rates, rates of return on equity and the wage rates. This chapter models 
expectations of future variables with static expectations": agents assume that trending 
variables will grow by their long-run trend and that non-trending variables will be constant 
so 
Pt+iit = Ypt, 
RB 
t+ilt = Ru, t, RE 
, t+ilt = 
RE, t- 
(4.69) 
An individual chooses an optimal lifetime consumption path, givcn his prcfcrcnccs 
and lifetime budget constraint. The optimal level of first period consumption is calculated 
by setting up Lagrangian, with the following result, 
Cit 
-rt) Wt + (i - Tt+llt) hWt+l 
(REt+llt) -I + Pt+21f (RE, t+llil? B. t+21t) 
[i +p+, all 
(4.70) 
From equation (4.70), consumption in the first period of life is a normal good since it riscs 
with the present discounted value of labor income after tax in both periods of %vorking life. 
There is also a positive relationship between the present value of die public pension and 
consumption in the first period. In contrast, an cxpcctcd rise in returns on cquity at time 
t+1 and on bond at time t+2 discourages consumption of 
the young at time t. This can 
be regarded as a substitution effect. When the 
future interest rates arc cxPcc(cd to rise, tile 
opportunity cost of current consumption i's 
higher. As a result, people tend to. savc more 
and shift parts of their current consumption to the 
futurc. 
129 The rationale for this assumption is that the time frame for each period of life is approximately 20-30 
years. Agents can hardly predict the amount of public social security bcncrit and the returns on assets they 
will receive. Thus agent's consumptions and savings 
decision arc based on current public Inrormation Instead 
of the expected real value in the 
future. 
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The optimal consumption in the second and third periods of life are C2, t+l = 
3RE, 
t+l C1, t 
and C3, t+2 = 
02 RE, t+, RB, t+2Cl, t- Moreover, at a consumer optimum, the gross interest 
rates (on bonds and equity) are proportional to consumption growth which can be expressed 
as: REt+l - -1 
( C21+1) and 
RBt+2 = -1 
(C"+2)- 
,8 
Cit 8 C2t+l 
Utility maximization of the Middle-aged 
Tbe middle aged individual's optimization problem is to maximize the rest of his 
life-time utility subject to his budget constraint. The budget constraint of the middle agcd 
becomes 
C3, t-ý., = pt4l + RB, t+l [(I - -rt) hlVt + RE, tEt-, - 
C2, 
tj - (4.71) 
To simplify the calculations for the dynamics of saving and to give a better cxplana- 
tion, for agent's behavior, it is useful to consider the optimization problcm of an individual 
in his second period of life as follows: 
1 
max U=1: 0'ln 
(Ci+2, t+i) (4.72) 
i=O 
S. t. 
C3, t-ý, <, Pt+llt + RB, t+llt [(l -, rt) hWt + RE, tSi, t-l - 
C2, t] i 
where Et-1 in equation (4.71) 
is replaced by Sl, t-,. The budget constraint of a middle 
aged individual is contingent on his current 
income, returns on saving when young (which 
determine the value of his private pension), and the public pay-as-you-go pension bcnefit. 
Again, with static expectations, the middle aged individuals makes his decision based on 
currently available information on public pension 
benefits and returns on bonds instead of 
the expected future value. The optimal level of second period consumption is dcrived to 
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be 
C2t 7-t) Wth + RE, tEt-, + 
(RB, 
t) t] - (4.73) -IP 
Agents' projection of future tax rates is detennined. by the govenunent budget con- 
straint. Since S2t is the total pension fund of each middle-aged person, we have 
S2, 
= (1 -, rt) hTVt + 
RE, tsl, t-1 - C2, t- (4.74) 
The next task is to derive the optimal level of savings for the young and the middle 
age generations. The results are presented in the following subsection. 
4.4.4 Savings 
Optimal level of saving for the middle age 
To derive the optimal solution to equation (4.72), we assume that the demand for 
government bonds comes purely from the 
funded pension sector. Combining cquations 
(4.53), (4.57), (4.69) and (4.74), the optimal saving function is 
S2t 
= 
(--L) [(l -, rt) hTVt + 
RE, tSl, t-21 - 
gpi 
1+, 8 + 
gpiwi 
S2, t -, rt) hwt + RE, t (1 +. 8) RB, t 
(4.75) 
91 
We then substitute for expressions for goverment budget constraint and factor mar. 
ket equilibrium such as wages (equafion (4.56)), interest rates (equations (4.55) and (4.59)) 




L2282, t-ly (4.76) 
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where 
L21 -- 
BQg-' (nt + h)1-a [(ant + h) - 
(1 - a) h (bt + pt) 0, (4.77) [(l + P) nt + h] nt-I (nt + h) 
and 
(nt + h) L22 
+ ß) nt +h 
Ebt- > 0. (4.78) 
Equation (4.76) shows that the savings of the previous middle aged generation, S2, t-I 
discourages saving of the current middle age generation, S2, t. The intuition is as follows. 
if there is higher demand for government bonds from the middle age generation at time 
t-1, the resulting return on bonds maturing at time t will be lower. The new middle age 
generation at time t observes that the return on bonds is not as high as before. Thus, the 
opportunity cost of current consumption 
declines. If substitution efrects outweigh income 
effects, then people will save less for retirement. 
Optimal saving in the first period of life 
To find an optimal solution for equation (4.68), we first substitute for optimal con- 
sumption (4.70) in the equation for budget constraint to get 





-I" - (i + ig +, 61) 
P 
REJ (1 +p+, 62) RB, tRn't 
The optimal level of saving for the young can be computed by substituting cquation 
(4.76) into equation (4.79), which is 
1-0 
si, t = Lils", t-l - 
L12SI, t-I - L13S2, t-I - 
L148i, 
t-182, t-11 (4.80) 
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where 
(ß + ß2) Qa+ ß) (nt + h) - 




_1>, 0, (1 +ß+ ß') ga (nt + h)' [(l + ß) nt + h] 
L12 -h 
[(l -a+, ß) (nt + h) - (1 - a) (1 + ß) (nt-1)-1 [bt + pt]] 
a (1 +ß+ ß2) (nt + h) [(l + ß) nt + h) 
(ß + ß2) 
> 0, L13 




(1 +ß+ ß2) 
(1 + ß) gcnt 
bt > 
0. 




Although we cannot show that all of the parameters Lji are positive universally, they 
are positive for all plausible parameter values and would only 
be negative if b+p was very 
high. 
The savings of the previous period's middle aged generation not only discourages . 
savings of the current middle age generation (as shown 
in equation (4.76)), but also the 
savings of the current young generation 
(as in cquation (4.80)).! 
Equilibrium: Steady state values of savings: 
To find steady state values of savings, we first perform flic first ordcr difrcrcnce of 
si, t andS2, t as follows; 
I-a Lils"'t-I - 
(1 + L12) Sl, t-l- L1352, t-I -- L145i, t-1-52, t-lo (4.81) 
AS2, t L21 sl", t- 1- 
(1 + L22) S2, t- I- (4.82) 
Let Asit =0 and AS2f =0 to establish an equilibrium system. The first is callcd the 
constant first period of life saving, while the latter is called the *constant sccond pcriod of 
life saving. 
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Setting AsIt = 0, the resulting equilibrium saving is 
1 I-cr S2 = L13 
[LIIS'I-(l+LI2)Sl-LI481 
S2]- (4.83) 
Similarly, setting As2t =0 yields 
S*j 
Lil (1 + L22) - L13L21 
(4.84) 
[(I 
+ L12) (1 + L22) + L14 L21 
L21_ 
(S* S2 (1 + L22) 
)a 
7 (4.85) 
where sl* and s2* are steady state values of savings. There is a unique interior solution as 
long as the term in the square brackets is positive. Considering the definitions of the Lij 
parameters, the steady state value of savings is determined by the independent variables 
(pension per GDP, p and bonds per GDP, b) and other parameters, namely, the gcomet. 
ric discounting factor in the utility function (fl), the relative productivity of the middle 
aged (h), the relative proportions of capital and labor in the production function (a), tile 
population growth rate (n), and total factor productivity (A). 
Stability of equilibria 
In a planar system, we can construct an autonomous first-order system of difference 
equations for (4-76) and (4.80) as follows; 
SIlt f (81, t-Is S2, t-2) 1 (4.86) 
S2, t 9(S1, t-lsS2, t-l)i (4.87) 
where both f and g are assumed to be continuously differentiable, f: RI --+ R and 
g: R 2--* R. The solutions to the system of equations in (4.86) and (4.87) (or in equations 
(4.80) and 4.76)) are steady states value of savings (S1 t -52) in the dynamic system. 
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Since equations for savings in both periods of life are non-linear, we need to approx- 
imate them in a neighbourhood of the steady state with a linear system. Thus all the partial 
derivatives are evaluated at the steady state. The system of equations above transforms into 
the linear system as follows; 
Of (8l, t-I i 82, t-1) 
Of (Sl, t-1) S2, t-1) 
si't - 
; 
I) + S2, t-1 - S2 Si + asi't-1 
(Si, 
t-1 - 81 
IOS2, t-1 
- 
09 (Slt-17 S2t-1) - 499 
(Sl, t-I p S2, t-1) S2, t ýý S2 +* 
19sit-I 
(Si, 
t-i - SI) + 19S2, t-1 
(S2, 
t-1 - 52 
Applying Taylor's formula"' to the system of equations above, we derive an approx- 
imation for a non-linear system near the steady state as 
xt+, =x+ Df 
(i) (X 
- x), (4.88) 
where Df 
H is an invertible Jacobian matrix"', and x- is a hyperbolic equilibrium of 
equations (4.86) and (4.87). Stability of the steady state 
(Sly S2) depends on the eigcnvalues 
of the Jacobian matrix of partial derivatives, namely, 
Of (Si, t-1,82, t- II Of (8l, t-1,82, t- I) 
which is simply the coefficient matrix of equation 
for Taylor approximation (4.88). From 
equations (4.8 1) and (4.82), this matrix can 
be rewritten as 
L12- (I - a) 






130 From Azariadis (1993, page59), Taylor's formula is 
f (x) =f 
(x) +Df (X) (X - X) +0 
(IIX 
- Xii) 
where the reminder term 
0 (-) is small in a well defined sense. We thus assume that this term is close to zero. 
131 From Azariadis (1993, p59), if the Jacobian matrix Df 
(i) is invertible, there is a neighbourhood of i 
in which a non linear system of equations 
(4.86) and 0.87) is topologically equivalent to the linear System 
(equation (4-88)). 
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The matrix in equation (4.89) can be rearranged by substituting for the steady state 
















The stability of equilibria can be determined by examining the eigenvalues of the 
Jacobian. The equilibrium will be stable (i. e. a sink) if both the eigenvalues are less than 
unity. Since the unstable equilibrium is viewed as uninteresting, the analysis below will be 
confined to the cases where this condition is met. 
The Jacobian matrix cannot be solved analytically; instead we will present numerical 
solutions to the model in the later sections. It is useful to first discuss the dynamics of 
savings and the comparative static analysis. Then, we will address the questions that we 
posted earlier, namely which sort of pension allocation is optimal and the effcct of shocks 
to the economy, in the following sections. 
The dynamics of savings 
To construct a phase diagram for the non-linear system in equations (4.86) and (4.87) 
(or equivalently equations (4.80) and (4.76)), it is useful to discuss the sign of ASI., and 
A52, t implied by equations (4.8 1) and (4,82). The results. are 
Asi't >0 
(1 + L12) 51, t-1 (4.90) Y- > 82. t-li L13 + L14SII, -t I 
L21 
C9 A-52, t >0 (1 + L22) 
Si, t-l > S2, t-l- (4.91) 
The next task is to discuss the effect of pension and govcmment bonds on savings by 
cornparative static analysis. 
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4.4.5 Comparative static analysis: 
This section presents a comparative static analysis for the unique interior solution of equa- 
tion (4.84)). To clarify the analysis, we concentrate on two measures, namely (p + b), 
which is a measure of total pension received by the elderly relative to the wage, and p1b as 
a measure of the composition of the public/private pensions. 
First, we study the impact of an increase in the private-public pension ratio on the 
equilibrium capital stock (i. e. the saving of the young). The results show that an equilib. 
rium capital stock positively relates to the ratio of private to public pension. 
ds, 
> 0. d (blp) (4.92) 
The pay-as-you-go state pension (p) negatively relates to capital accumulation. The role 
of the PAYG pension is to redistribute across generations. 
It is contractionary in nature 
since the state taxes the working population to pay the pensions of the retired generation. 
The income tax generally creates disincentive effects on labour supply. If the substitution 
effects outweighed the income effect, the working generation will work 
less. Aggregate 
output and savings will therefore 
decline. 
The fully funded pension (private pension, b) works in the opposite way. The fully 
funded scheme is based on savings and is a method 
ýf accumulating financial assets, Which 
are exchanged for goods at some later 
date. As a result the equilibrium capital stock riscs 
with privatepensions. 
The relationship between s, and the total pension (b + p) received by the cldcrly 
relative to the wage shows an ambiguous sign 
da in our study. 
(-d(RpI 
0) 
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N ds, (4.93) d (b1p) 51 d (b1p) 




>0 from equation (4.92). Thus, a higher level of output d(b1p) d(b1p) 
can be achieved by increasing the private to public pension ratio. This argument is an 
objection to the simple Diamond (1965) model, which argues that government borrowing 
crowds out investment and lowers output in the long run. In our three-period model, the 
funded pension (which is bond-backed) generates a positive impact on national savings and 
income. However, we should note that this conclusion obtains under an assumption of no 
severe shrink in population growth. If there is a persisting slump in the fertility rate (or 
population growth trend) (n < 0), the ratio of workers to pensioners will fall even though 
the life expectancy is unchanged. In that scenario, if the fertility rate falls until In] > h, 
there is a possibility that private pensions will crowd out saving and reduces output. 
The next question is the impact of alternative pension schemes on welfare. Equations 
(4.92) and (4.93) show that the private pension positively afficcts capital accumulation and 
output while the PAYG pension has a contractionary impact. However, it is not sufficient 
to automatically infer parallel responses of welfare since the latter cannot be gauged by 
output alone. There are some counterbalancing factors that need to be ncttcd out. In order 
to assess this fully, we first posit steady state welfare as 
u =Inc, +InC2 +In c3, (4.94) 
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where ci =- CiIA is consumption adjusted for technical progress. The impact of the pension 
ratio on consumer welfare can be investigated using the total derivative, 
de, - dc2 dc3 
d (blp) = uy ä -(blp) + UM d (blp) 
+ UO d (blp) 7 (4.95) 
where uy - 8Z ýM and 
-uO The first order conditions for each period OCI ) aC2 VC3 
consumption implies that 
ýy c2 ) and ým = 
(--C ? 
--) 




(02c, )d (REcj) 
+- 
(Lci )d (RBRE; cl) 
d (b1p) 
UY [d 
(b1p) C2 d (b1p) C3 d (b1p) 
(4.96) 
From the first-order conditions of the consumer's optimization problem, cl =Q= 'ORE 
_CI and uy can be substituted by -L. The impact of the pension ratio on welfare thus 
, 6rR, 
-RE C1 
depends on three factors; namely, the impact of pension on returns on both types of assets, 
and on first period consumption. The relationship can 
be written as follows, 




1 ß2 Rm 
01 = +-+ 







03 : -- 
ß4 
REC, > 0. 
C3 
Equation (4-97) implies that the ývelfare effects of the pension ratio (b1p) depend on the 
relationship between the pension ratio and the consumption of the young, and the returns 
on capital and on bonds. 
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We can explore this further by examining equations for the steady state of savings in 




e d (b1p) - -a 
(1 - a) Q [g (nt + h)]'-" 1d (b1p) 'o, (4.. 98) 
dRB 
- -a2Q 
(nt + h)-" (sllg) a-1 S2 lb 
dsi 
< 0) (4.99) d (b1p) d (b1p) 




d(b1p) [g (nt + h)]' nt- I (nt + hý] 11d (b1p) 
+a)() S-IS2 - 1] A 
ds, 
-a nt +hd (b1p) 
;ý0. (4.100) 
An explanation for -equation (4.98) is straight forward. Referring back to cquation (4.92), 
an increase in the private to public pension ratio raises the capital stock, which in turn will 
pressure down its retum. 
Equation (4.99) shows that when the debt stock increases, its returns dccline. Lastly, 
the relationship between consumption of the young and the pension ratio exhibits an am- 
biguous sign. Using equation (4.98) - (4.100) in equation ((4.97)) then 
A+I, 
) ds, 
d (b1p) d (b1p) 
(4.10 1) 
where 11 = c(1-c)Q S'-' 
101A 1- P(ý 
]-9 [( a) 02bsýl + (nt + h) ST103)] and lg(h+nt)]- II nt-l(nt+h) 1-a 2 
I-a nt+h I- 
1]. Howevcr, (f2 + 11) is ambiguous signcd, hcncc it is 01A 
[( )(1) S-lS2 
not possible to infer a clear welfare cffect of the privatc-to-public pcnsion ratio. I Iowcvcr, 
the size of pensions relative to wages (b + p) and savings (SI, SO play a major role in the 
welfare analysis. It is useful to illustrate the solutions numerically. 
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The next section presents the results of numerical simulaitons of the model. We 
address the question we posted earlier, namely which sort of pension is optimal and the 
effects of shocks to the economy. 
4.5 Simulation Results 
This section asks two sets of questions. First, we ask what is the optimal combination of 
the alternative pension schemes. Second, we study the effects of two different shocks to 
the economy and welfare: first, a reduction in the size of the national debt and sccond, the 
effect of a baby boom. 
in the simulations, we assume that each time period lasts 20 ycars, so that the young 
are aged between 21 and 40, the middle-aged between 41 and 60 and the elderly 61-80, 
These figures crudely correspond to labour market and mortality conditions in the UK. 
The discount factor in the utility function (0) is set equal to 0.6676 implying a discount 
rate of 2 percent per annum. On the production side, the parameter for middle aged labor 
productivitY (h) is set alternatively at 0.8,1, and 1.2. Exogenous technical growth is set 
alternatively at 0 and 2.5 percent per annum. (implying that g is set alternatively at I and 
1.638). Labour augmenting technological progress (A) equals 6, the capital share in the 
production function (a) is 0.3333 and the arbitrary constant Q is set equal to 3. 
4.5.1 Optimal Pensions in the Steady State 
The objective of this section is to describe the optimal combination of private (b) and 
public pensions (p) in the steady state by allowing variation in the population (nj) and 
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technological (g) growth rates, and the parameter of the middle age productivity (h). We 
first consider the optimal pensions in the case where the population growth rate (nt) is 
assumed to be in the range of -0.5 to 0.5 percent annually. We then consider the optimal 
pensions in the case of UK where the population grew by an annual rate of 0.3 percent. 
Ilie first part of this subsection describes the optimal combination of private (b) and 
public pensions (p) in the steady state where the population growth rate (nt) is assumed to 
be in the range of -0.5 to 0.5 percent annually]32 . This corresponds to values for n in the 
range of n =. (0.90461,1.10489). The solutions to the model are presented in table 4.1. 
Optimal combinations of (p*, b*) 
h=0.8 h=I h= 1.2 
n g=0% g=2.5% g=O% g=2.5% g= 0% g=2.5% - 
-0.5% 0,0.500 0,0.495 0,0.545 
0,0.545 0,0.595 0, T 590 
0% 0,0.580 0,0.580 0,0.635 0,0.630 0,0.685 0,0.685 
0.5% 0,0.680_ 
_- 
0,0.735 0,0.735 0,0.795 0,0.790 
Table 4.1. Optimality of different pension schemes 
From table 4.1, p* is the optimal public PAYG pension (expressed as percentage of 
the average wage), b* is the optimal private pension (again, exprcssed as a perccntage of 
wages), g is technological growth per annum, 
h is the labour productivity of the middlc 
aged, and n is population growth rate per annum. 
The simulation results in table 4.1 suggest that the optimal solution to the model is nl. 
ways to have no state PAYG pension at 
111133. 'Me results are robust across differmt valucs 
132 A scenario of negative population growth is plausible. From the projection of population growth dur. 
ing 2000-2030 by Population Reference Dureau, population growth rates are negative in many European 
countries, including Russia (-0.6%), Estonia 
(-0.5%), Hungary (-0.40/9), and Ukraine (-0.4%). For dcvcl. 
oped countries in Europe and North America, as well as Japan, Australia, and New Zcaland, populations are 
growing by less than I percent annually. 
233 Linear interpolation is adequate to calculate the optimal values of p and b for intcrmcdiatc values of the 
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of technological growth (g), population growth (n) and middle-aged productivity (h). The 
results imply that the representative agent provides for his pension through voluntary sav. 
ings to achieve his optimal time path of consumption and through an annuity to secure his 
retirement consumption with no need for government involvement. The simulation results 
are consistent with previous arguments that the transition to a funded system will generate 
efficiency gains, such as provided by Breyer and Straub, 1993; Brunner, 1996; Feldstein, 
1995; Fenge and Schwager, 1995, Kotlikoff, Smetters, and Walliser, 1998; Feldstein and 
Samwick, 1998; Borsch-Supan, 1998; and Homburg, 1990,1997. 
it is useful to further discuss the simulation results. The intuition for the optimality 
of the zero unfunded state pensions is as follows. 
We focus the explanation of the effects of social security on capital accumulation and 
welfare. Any social security program that affects the path of income received by individuals 
is likely to have an effect on savings and thus on capital accumulation. In a fully funded 
system, the rate of return on the social security contribution 
is the interest rates, while the 
rate of return on the contribution for the case of pay as you go system equals to population 
and economic growths. 
The fully funded social security has no effect on total savings and capital accumula- 
tion. Usually, an increase in social security savings (funded pension) is exactly offset by a 
decrease in private saving. In contrast, the social security in the pay-as-you-go system is 
a pure transfer scheme, which does not save at all, the only source of capital 
for the ccon- 
chosen parameters. In all cases, we retain the result that the optimal pensions policy 
is to have an entirely 
funded system. 
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omy in case of unfunded system is the private saving. Thus, social security contribution 
decreases private savings. 
In the comparative static analysis part (section 4.4), we found that the pay as you 
go pension negatively relates to the capital accumulation. The PAYG is contractionary 
in nature, since the state tax the working population to pay the pensions of the retired 
generation. The fully funded pension appears to work in opposite way. The fully funded 
schemes base on savings and it is a method of accumulating financial assets, which are 
exchanged for goods at some later date. As a result, an equilibrium capital stock rises with 
private pension. The model also shows that the funded pension generates positive impacts 
on national savings and income. With higher savings and income, the consumption is 
increasing so as the welfare. 
Lastly, in our model, pensions are allowed through the utility maximisation (through 
the optimal saving decision). We do not impose fixed pensions; instead representative 
agents are allowed to select the optimal proportions of alternative pension schemes. 
Thus, 
agents find that the pay-as-you-go pension 
is bad and choose not to hold it. 
There is no central government intervention in our model. Thus the rcdistributional 
purpose is omitted in this study. However, 
it is useful to discuss that in the real world, 
it may be potentially dangerous to totally phase out the public PAYG pension due to tile 
existence of imperfect information, missing markets, risk and uncertainty. Moreover, pub. 
lic policy generally has additional objectives to improving consumption smoodiing and 
insurance, namely, poverty relief and redistribution (Barr and Diamond, 2006). On the 
poverty relief grounds, the state pension can target the poor who may be unable to save 
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enough. On income redistribution grounds, the state pension can serve a role for both 
intra-generational and the inter-generational transfer. The latter is through subsidising the 
consumption smoothing of low eamers. 
The simulation results in table 4.1 also suggest that the optimal level of private pen- 
sion is positively related to the population growth rate and middle age productivity. From 
the table, greater population growth rates and middle age productivity leads to higher op- 
timal level of funded pension, while the change in technological progress has a very little 
impact on optimality. 
The second part of this subsection restricts the demographic growth rate to that found 
in the United Kingdom. The Office for National Statistics, reports that the UK still has a 
growing population"'. Between mid- 1991 and mid-2003 the population grew by an annual 
rate of 0.3 percent (corresponding to n=1.0617 in our model). Thus, we apply this 
population growth figure to the simulation study. Exogenous technological growth is again 
assumed to be 2.5 percent per annum 
(g = 1.638), while the middle age productivity (11) 
again varies from (0.8,1,1.2). Using this parameterisation we investigate the shape of 
social-welfare functions in figures 4.14.3 and the steady state values of other variables 
described in the model. 
Figures 4.1-4.3 illustrate the social welfare contours. Figure 4.1 illustrates die social 
welfare contour for h=0.8 perhaps suggestive oý a scenario of part time work in middle 
age or early retirement. Figure 4.2 corresponds to the case of h=1, or constant labor 
134 The UK population grew by 232,100 people in the year to mid-2003, and the growth was 0.4 percent in 
each of the years since mid-2001. T'he 
. UK population increased by 6.5 per cent in the last thirty years or so, 
from 55.9 million in mid- 197 1. Growth has been slightly faster in more rcccnt years. 
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productivity. Lastly, the case of h=1.2 in figure 4.3 perhaps captures learning by doing or 
youth unemployment. These 3 cases show similar results: welfare increases as one moves 
up to the north western direction. The optimal solution is to have private pensions equal 
to 63.5%, 69% and 74.5% of the wage for h=0.8,1 and 1.2, respectively and no state 
pension at all. The resulting economy cdn be expressed in the table 4.2 below, where rates 
of return are expressed at annual rates: 
Variables h=0.8 h=1 h=1.2 
(p*, b*) (0,0.635) (0,0.690) (0,0.745) 
Debt/GDP Y 
24.1431% 23.6894% 23.315% 
utility 0.0328 0.1371 0.2050 
RE (% annually) 9.0196% 9.6610% 10.2394% 
RB (% annually) 2.7085% 2.2795% 1.9333% 
Tax rate 3.1850% 3.1219% 3-OG99% 
Wage (W) 6.0070 5.7246 5.4312 
Output (Y) 15.9660 16.6739 17.3540 
S1 0.3947 0.3666 0.3435 
S2 0.6166 0.6870 0.7532 
Cl 0.6948 0.7096 0.7039 
C2 1.5916 1.6883 1.7788 
C3 0.9344 0.9574 0.980.1 
Table 4.2. Simulation results for the UK economy 
The results in table 4.2 show that as before it is optimal to have no state pension. The 
table also shows that the optimal level of debt is non-negligible in all cases. Increasing 
the productivity of the middle age raises social wclfarc and aggregate output as would be 
expected. 
Comparing the first two columns, the labour supply of die middle agcd dctcrmines ag. 
gregate output and capital accumulation; if the middle aged work full time until rctircmcnt 
(h = 1), it will generate a larger economy than in the case 
ýf early rctircmcnt (11 = 0.8). 
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Moreover, it also leads to a slightly better government fiscal stance, holding government 
expenditure constant. The productivity of the middle age (h) appears on the government 
revenue side of the government budget constraints equation (in equation (4.60)) because 
it contributes to government income tax revenues. Empirically, the fiscal burden increases 
with early retirement. This supports the current argument to increase the retirement age in 
order to relieve the fiscal deficit. From the pensions white paper 2006, the state pension 
age is going to rise to 66 years old in 2024, to 67 in 2034 and 68 in 2044. Lastly, the sce- 
nario that the worker develop leaming by doing 
(h = 1.2) leads to the best outcome to the 
economy and welfare. 
Middle age productivity also positively affects aggregate consumption and social 
welfare. As the workers become more productive, not only can they set aside more re- 
sources for their old age consumption and they also enjoy 
higher present consumption. 
From the simulation results, the lifetime consumption pattern is such that consurnp- 
tion during the middle age of life is highest, followed by retirement consumption and con- 
sumption when young. This corresponds to the rate of return arguments and 
flic life cycle 
theory of consumption (Modigliani, 1986): agents' consumption decisions do not depend 
solely on current income, but also on expected 
future income and financial wealth. From 
the simulation results, the rate of return on equity is high, so Young individuals consume 
less and accumulate more capital during the asset accumulation phase, Consumption is 
highest in the second period of life as individuals enjoy high returns on assets carried for. 
ward from the first period of life. Middle-aged individuals choose to invest in safe assets, 
which give lower returns than equity, for their retirement consumption. bld age consump. 
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tion is thus relatively lower than in the middle age, even though he receives the public 
pay-as-you-go pension too. 
4.5.2 The effects of shocks 
This section analyses the impact of two types of shock, namely: a reduction in the supply 
of bonds and the effects of the baby boom in 1941-1961. Throughout this section, middle 
aged productivity is assumed to be the same as that for the young (h = 1) . 
A reduction in National debt 
A reduction in national debt corresponds to a reduction in the supply of bonds, in our 
model the parameter b. In our simulation, we consider a scenario where the public pension 
relative to wage is nonzero and is constant across pcriods with the value of p=0.3. The 
private pension is initially set at b=0.4 and falls to b 0.3 at the beginning of year 
2001. Exogenous technical growth is again assumed to be 2.5 percent per annum, while 
the population is held constant. The effects of this policy change are presented in figures 
4.4-4.6. The results are described as follows. 
Figure 4.4 presents the rate of return on equity following 4 fall in the national debt 
in 2001. The results show that there is almost no effect on the rate of rcturn on equity; Ole 
nlaximurn change in the return is onlY from 9.08 pcrccnt in 2021-2040 to 8.83 pcrccnt in 
2041-2060. 
The path for the rate of return on bonds following a fall in the national dcbt in 2001 is 
presented in figure 4.5. The results show that such a shock gcncrates an cxccss demand for 
bonds, which in turn significantly depresses the return on bonds within the period that the 
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shock occurred and the following periods. The return on. bonds hits its minimum at the rate 
of -0.36 percent annually in 2001-2020, though there is a small rise in the return on bonds 
in the following periods. The steady state value for the return on bonds before the shock 
was initially 1.09 percent annually. The new steady state value becomes 0.06 percent per 
annum, thus the return on bonds becomes much lower in the long run after a sudden fall in 
the national debt. the tax rate is, initially at 9 percent, falls immediately to 7 percent and 5 
percent in the next period and reaches its stable value at 6 percent. 
The effect of a fall in national debt on utility is even more striking. Figure 4.6 illus- 
trates the welfare effects of the policy change following the transition. The utility of each 
generation can be derived from lifetime consumption, discounted by factor, 8 (at the rate 
of 2 percent annually) over each period. It reflects welfare of each cohort, for example, 
the utility figure during 1981-2000 implies the utility level of a generation born in 1981, 
which is -0.540. The steady state values of our social welfare metric are -0.453 and -0.5 10 
respectively, so this implies a small worsening 
in the long run. 
The first group that are affected by a reduction in national debt are the rctircd in 2001. 
2020 (i. e. the generation that entered economic life in 1961-1980). According to figure 4.5, 
the return on bonds hits its low in 2001-2020, when this generation receive returns . on their 
pension fund. However, they are unable io change their saving decisions and are faced 
with a much lower return on their pension fund. Hence their retirement consumption drops 
dramatically. 
As the supply for bonds declines (holding other thing constant), the bond price will 
rise with corresponding reduced returns. Tbe middle agcd in 2001-2020 (i. e. the gencra- 
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tion that entered economic life in 1981-2000) suffer most from the policy shock since this 
generation began to secure their old age consumption by investing in an annuity market, 
which is assumed to be invested in government bonds. This generation faces higher bond 
prices, and the return on bonds also hits its low this period. Additionally, this generation 
also get much lower returns on their saving when they get old, which in turn makes their 
old age consumption in the following period decline to even further than that of the retired 
in 2001-2020. 
Apart from people who are alive in 2001, the next 3 generations also suffer consid- 
erable declines in utility and the steady state is not reached until new generations enter 
economic life in 2081-2 100. The new steady state value for social welfare become '0.5 10, 
this means people are worse off in the long run after the reduction in national debt. 
We conclude that when agents are relying upon government debt to finance their 
pension, a sudden fall in national 
debt does not only affect current generation, but also 
hurts future generations. 
The effects of a baby boom 
This section investigates the impact of a demogr3phic shock on wclfarc. The pop- 
ulation size is assumed to be constant until a demographic shock occurring 
in the period 
1941-1960. We consider the effects of the generation cntcring economic life in 1941-1960 
being 10 perccnf larger than the generations before and after. To isolate tile demographic 
shock from all other effects, we assume a constant state pensions and bonds (proportional 
to wages) at the level of p=0.3 and b=0.4. 
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The effects are shown in Figures 4.7-4.9: The steady state values of our social wel- 
fare metric are -0.460 and -0.453 respectively, so the demographic shock implies a small 
improvement in the long run. From an initial level of 9 percent tax rates fall to 7 percent in 
1941-1960 but rise to 13 percent in 198 1, and thereafter remain between 8 and 9 percent. 
The baby boom affects the rates of return on both assets (figures 4.7 and 4.8), al- 
though the effects are not as remarkable as on the social welfare (figure 4.9), but nonethe. 
less are significant when compounded over long time periods. The group that initially 
suffers is the baby-boom generation itself The generation immediately preceding (which 
retires in 1961-80) benefits from additional labour 
in the baby-boom generation (which in- 
creases the return to private capital and boosts this generation's funded pension schcme), 
whereas the generation immediately following 
(which enters economic life in 1961-80) re- 
ceives the highest benefit from higher wages 
due to the large quantity of capital savcd by 
the baby-boom generation. 
However, although the baby-boom generation has relatively low utility, the two gcn- 
erations, which suffer the most, are the second and third generations 
later. TIIC Sccond 
generation (born in 1981-2000) suffer the most with the utility of -0.497.77his 
is bccause 
the baby boomers retire in this period. The dependency ratio reaches its pcak. This scc. 
ond generation pays the highest tax rate of 13 percent. This 
is partly to finance the pay 
as you go pension of the baby boom generation and also to 
finance the governmcnt deficit 
as the baby boomers start to redeem their return from holding bonds. I'his also rcsults in 
lower saving and capital accumulation, which not only adversely affccts the sccond gcn. 
eration directly but also the third generation (born in 2001-2020) who have to work Nvith 
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a lower capital stock. and thus have lower labour income. From figure 4.7, the rate of re- 
turn on equity reaches its peak in 2001-2020. This is because the second generation (born 
in 1981-2000) reduces savings and this results in a slump in an equity market. With an un- 
usually low demand for this type of asset, asset prices fall considerably, which results in a 
high rate of return on equity the following period. 
4.6 Conclusion 
It is an open question whether pension funds should be held in the form of public debt or 
private equity. Indeed recent crises have led to strong arguments solely in favour of the 
former: so does this chapter. 
It has been suggested that an optimal 'lifestyle investment plan' is to invest in equity 
during the asset accumulation phase (to obtain a high retum) and bonds in the decumula- 
tion phase (to reduce risk). In this chapter, we analyze the effects of that savings behaviour 
on the macro economy. To do this we apply a three-period Diamond's (1965) overlap- 
ping generations model to study the optimal pension provision, allowing 
for demographic 
change. 
in this chapter, we have taken the Diamond (1965) OLG model and extended it to 
model more explicitly the difference between the accumulation and decumulation phases 
of private pensions. We analyze a similar question to that of Diamond, namely the cffcct 
of government debt, but change the logic considerably by noting that government debt has 
different characteristics from private assets (i. e. equity) and that the two may be less close 
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substitutes than is usually assumed. Our analysis of UK institutions suggests that this is a 
reasonable characterization of the pensions system. 
Rather than crowding out private investment, government bonds provide an important 
part of the funded system. From this it follows almost automatically that it cannot be 
optimal to have no public debt. However, it is less clear what consequences this will have 
for the provision of pensions through a PAYG system: perhaps it could now be optimal to 
have positive state pensions. 
We conclude that it is still socially optimal to rely entirely upon a funded pension. 
This arises because the taxation needed to fund a PAYG pension might change labour mar- 
ket behavior since labour is supplied inelastically; furthermore the optimality of govcm- 
ment debt does not arise due to government using debt to provide public goods, since there 
are none in this model. Therefore the result here is a separate argument for preferring 
funded to PAYG pensions. 
Thus our main conclusion can be quite simply stated that the usual prefercnce for a 
funded to a PAYG pension holds even when the former is sustained through govcrrimcnt 
debt. 
Lastly, this chapter studies the effects of two alternative shocks to the economy and 
welfare: first a reduction in the size of the national debt and second, the effect of a baby 
boom. The results are as follows. When agents are relying upon government debt to finance 
their pensions, a sudden fall in national debt does not only affect the current generation, 
but also hurts future generations as well. The current middle, age and retired are directly 
affected by lower returns on savings (in the bonds market) which in turn leads to lower 
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levels of consumption and utility. Apart from people who are alive during the shock, the 
next three generations also suffer considerable declines in utility. After all, the new steady 
state value for social welfare declines too, hence people are worse off in the long run after 
the reduction in national debt. In contrast, a baby boom generates a small improvement 
to welfare in the long run. The generations immediately preceding and following the baby 
boomers obtain benefits from higher return to factors of production. On the other hand, the 
baby boom generation itself has relatively low utility. However, the two generations which 
suffer most are the second and third generations later. The second generation suffers the 
most since they need to pay the highest tax rates to support the retired baby boomers which 
results in lower saving and capital accumulation. This also affects the third generation since 
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Figure 4.4: Annual Rates of Return oil Equity with a fall in National Debt 
Annwal RateS Of Return on Equity with a Fall In National Debt In 2001 









Figure 4.5: Annual Rates of Return on Bonds with a fall in National Debt 
Annual Rates of Return on Bonds with a Fall in National Debt In 2001 

















Figure 4.6: Utility with a fall in National Debt 
Utility with a Fall In National Debt In 2001 












Figure 4.7: Annual Rates of Return on Equity with a Baby-Boom 
Annual Rates of Return on Equity with a Baby-Boom born In 1941-60 
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Figure 4.8: Annual Rates of Return on Bonds with a Baby-Boom 
Annual Rates of Return on Bonds with a Baby-Boom born In 1941-00 










Figure 4.9: Utility with a Baby-Boom 
Utility with a Baby-Boom Ooneration MOM In 1941-00 





The first main chapter of the thesis is called "Determinants of the time varying risk 
premia". This chapter gener ates monthly risk premia data using zero coupon government 
treasury bills for 43 countries over the period of 1994-2006. The measure of risk premia is 
based on the ARCH-in-Mean (ARCH-M) model introduced by Engle, Lilien and Robins 
0 987). We show that the risk premia are time varying and also vary considerably between 
countries. This study also examines the macroeconomic and political determinants of the 
risk premia by using cross section regressions and dynamic panel regression analysis. 
The cross section regression shows that on average through 1994-2006, the risk pre- 
mia for holding government assets required by risk averse investors is positively influenced 
by the level of inflation and the budget deficit as a percentage of GDP and is negatively 
determined by the country's economic growth. Additionally, lower income countries are 
estimated to have risk premia about 19 percent more than in the high income countries out- 
side the Eurozone, holding other variables constant. In the high income countries outside 
the Eurozone, the risk premia on holding government assets is predicted to be 10 percent 
more than those in Eurozone. 
Using panel regression analysis, we found that economic growth and the volatility 
of the real effective exchange rate are the main determinants of risk prcmia in the full 
sample regression. Risk averse investors require 
lower risk prcmia for holding government 
assets in countries with good economic performance e. g. high economic growth and a 
285 
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stable external price competitive position e. g. low volatility of real effective exchange 
rate. The institutional variables and the government fiscal conditions have limited power in 
explaining the risk premia in this study. 
Further analysis splits the sample by income group, namely, high income and low 
income groups. The results for the first group show that the main determinant of the risk 
premia is the real effective exchange rate; devaluation of the currency leads to better price 
competitiveness which in turn reduces the country risk premia. The opposite relationship 
is found in the regression of lower income countries. The possible explanation is that 
in financial vulnerable countries, weaker local currency can exacerbate the external debt 
service difficulties which result in economic contraction. This in turn raises the country 
risk premia. However, the impact of the level of real effective exchange rate is less strong 
in the low income group. For lower income countries, the volatility of the rcal effective 
exchange rate which reflects uncertainty in the exchange rate market plays an important 
role in determining the risk prcmia and there is a positive relationship bctwccn thcse two. 
The next chapter, entitled "Fractional integration and the forward premium puzzle", 
corroborates earlier findings that a principal reason for rejection of the forward rate unbi. 
asedness hypothesis is differences in persistence between the 
forward premium scries and 
the spot rate return and the existence of the time varying exchange rate risk premium. First, 
the results show that the forward premium is best characterized by a (nonstationary) frac- 
tionally integrated process while the spot return series are found to be. stationary, following 
an 1(0) process in all sample currencies. Ilis implies imbalance in Ole traditional rcgres- 
sion of the return on the spot rate on the forward premium. Additionally, correcting for 
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multiple structural breaks in the forward premium data (using Bai and Perron, 1998,2003a) 
shows that it reduces the persistence of the forward premium series, but the process is still 
found to be fractionally integrated. 
Second., the research associates the exchange rate risk premia to the forward rate un- 
biasedness hypothesis. The issues of persistency in the foreign exchange data are also care- 
fully dealt with. This chapter argued that the risk premia data should be proxied by the long 
memory in the conditional variance of the forward rate forecast error series. The exchange 
rate risk premium in this study is generated from the Fractionally integrated GARCH (171- 
GARCH) model of the forward rate forecast error series. We argue that this model fits the 
data better than the multivariate GARCH model as used by Baillie and Bollerslev (1990) 
and the ARCH-in-mean model as used by Domowitz and Hakkio (1985)). We find strong 
evidence of statistically significant long memory parameters 
in both the conditional mean 
and conditional variance of the forward rate 
forecast error series. The exchange rate risk 
premium is found to be nontrivial. 
The last main chapter of this thesis is entitled "Funded and PAYG Pensions when An- 
nuities are backed by Bonds". In this chapter, we have taken the Diamond (1965) Overlap- 
ping Generation Model (01, G) model and extended 
it to model more explicitly the differ- 
ence between the accumulation and decumulation phases of private pensions. We analyze a 
similar question to that of Diamond, namely the effect of government debt, but change the 
logic considerably by noting that government debt has different characteristics fr9m. private 
debt (i. e. equity) and that the two may be less close substitutes than is usually assumed. 
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Our analysis of the UK institutions suggests that this is a reasonable characterization of the 
pensions system. 
Rather than crowding out private investment, government bonds provide an important 
part of the funded system. From this it follows almost automatically that it cannot be 
optimal to have no public debt. However, it is less clear what consequences this will have 
for the provision of pensions through a PAYG system: perhaps it could now be optimal to 
have positive state pensions. We conclude that it is still socially optimal to rely entirely 
upon a funded pension. 
Lastly, this chapter studies the effects of two alternative shocks to the economy and 
welfare: first a reduction in the size of the national debt and second, the effect of a baby 
boom. The results show that when agents arc relying upon government debt to finance their 
pensions, a sudden fall in national debt 
does not only affect the current generation, but also 
hurts future generations as well and people are worse off in the long run. The baby-boom 
also affects different generations and it generates a small 
improvement to the welfare in the 
long run. 
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Appendix A 
Appendix to Thesis 
A. 1 Regression results from LSDVC for whole sample; 
A. 1.1 Coefficients of the volatility of real effective exchange rate, 
VREER 
Model 1 results: "as ln(VREER) increase by I unit, the In(l + R-P-) increase by 0.01 10 
unit" 
Antilog: as VREER increase by 2.7183 unit, the RP increase by 0.1005 unit 
thus as VREER increase by I unit, the RP increase by 11-10-05 =0.037 unit 2.7183 
(If ln(l + T'O) = 0.01, then a=0.1005) 10 
A-1.2 Coefficients of economic growth, GGDP 
Model 1 results: "as GGDP increase by 1 percent quarterly, the In(l + ") decline 
by 0.461 unit" 
10 
Antilog: as GGDP increase by 1 percent quarterly, the RP increase by 5.8566 unit 
(if In(i + -2-) = 0.461, then a=5.856 6) 10 
Note: Annual growth rate is GGDPt = log GDPt - log GDPt-4, but GDP growth 
percent quarterly is approximately (log GDPt - log GDPt-4month)/4. 
310 
A. 2 Regression results from LSDVC for rich country; 311 
By approximation, GGDP increase by I percent yearly, the RP increase by 1.4642 
unit 
Model 2 results: "as GGDP increase by 1 percent quarterly, the In(l + aP--) decline 10 by 0.481 unit" 
Antilog: as GGDP increase by I percent quarterly, the RP increase by 6.1769 unit 
If ln(1 + -ý-) = 0.481, Solution is: 6.1769) 10 
Note: By approximation, GGDP increase by 1 percent yearly, the RP increase by 
1.5442 unit 
A. 2 Regression results from LSDVC for rich country; 
A. 2.1 Coefficients of real effective exchange rate, REER 
Model 1 results: "as In(REER) increase by 1 unit, the ln(l + R10E) increase by 0.059 
unit" 
Antilog: as REER increase by 2.7183 unit, the RP increase by 0.60775 unit 
thus as REER increase by I unit, the RP increase by 
0.60775 
= 0.22358 unit 2-7183 
Model 2 results: "as In(REER) increase by I unit, the In(l + ýM) increase by 0.053 10 
unit" 
Antilog: as REER increase by 2.7183 unit, the RP increase by 0.59715 unit 
thus as REER increase by I unit, the RP increase by 
0,59715 
= 0.21968 unit 2.7183 
A. 2 Regression results from LSDVC for rich country; 312 
A. 2.2 Coefficients of the volatility of real effective exchange rate, 
VREER 
Models 1 and 2 results: "as In(VREER) increase by I unit, the In(l + A-P-) increase 
by 0.005 unit" 
10 
Antilog: as VREER increase by ý. 7183 unit, the RP increase by 0.050125 unit 
Thus as VREER increase by I unit, the RP increase by 0.0 1844 unit 
A. 23- Coefficients of economic growth, GGDP 
Model 1 results: "as GGDP increase by 1 percent quarterly, the In(l + 915P) increase 
by 0.337 unit" 
0 
Antilog: as GGDP increase by I percent quarterly, the RP increase by 4.0074 unit 
By approximation: as GGDP increase by. I percent yearly, the RP increase by 
1.0019 unit 
Model 2 results: "as GGDP increase by 1 percent quarterly, the In(i + &P-) increase 
by 0.319 unit" 
10 
Antilog: as GGDP increase by I percent quarterly, the RP increase by 3.7575 unit 
By approximation: as GGDP increase by I percent yearly, the RP increase by 
0.93938 unit 
A. 2.4 Coefficients of Inflation, llVFL 
Model 1 results: "as In(l + "vFL) increase by 1 unit, the In(l. + RE) increase by 0.029 10 10 
A. 2 Regression results from LSDVC for rich country; 313 
unit" 
Antilog: as INFL increase by 17.183 unit, the RP increase by 0.29425 unit 
Thus, as INFL increase by I unit, the RP increase by 0.0 17124 unit 
Model 2 results: "as In(l + INFL) increase by 1 unit, the In(l + R-P) increase by 0.027 10 10 
unit" 
Antilog: as INFL increase by 17.183 unit, the RP increase by 0.27368 unit 
Thus, as INFL increase by I unit, the Rp increase by 0.0 15 927 unit 
A. 2.5 Coefficients of Government Budget Deficit (%GDP), DEFGDP 
Models 1 and 2 results: "as In(I + D-"'F) increase by 1 unit, the In(l + R-P) increase 30 10 
by 0.021 unit" 
Antilog: as DEP increase by 51.548 unit, the RP increase by 0.212 22 unit 
Thus, as DEF increase by 1 unit, the RP increase by 0.004117 unit 
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